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CVE-2021-33549

CVE-2021-33549 — UDP Technology/Geutebrück camera devices: Buffer overflow in action parameter leading to RCE
📅 PUBLISHED: 2021-09-13 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-08-13 12:48 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: Public
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 66.19%
👁️
66.19% probability
1000×+ above the median CVE
Tier: CRITICAL
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1190
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
7.2
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2021-33549 is a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability residing in the action parameter of multiple camera devices manufactured by UDP Technology, Geutebrück, and other vendors. This vulnerability allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on the target device. Given the internet-facing nature of IP cameras and the CVSS score of 7.2, this vulnerability poses a significant risk to organizations relying on physical security infrastructure, potentially allowing full device compromise and network pivoting.

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›Exploit & PoC — poc_status, poc_url, has_exploit. Not in NVD.
›Shodan dorks — ready-made queries to find exposed vulnerable systems
›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
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Technical Analysis

The vulnerability is a stack-based buffer overflow triggered via the action parameter within the camera devices' web-based management interface. The NVD description confirms that this is a remote code execution (RCE) vector. The flaw is present in the device firmware's handling of user-supplied input passed to the action parameter; when a request with an excessively long string is sent to this parameter, the data overwrites a fixed-size buffer allocated on the program stack. This corrupts adjacent stack memory, including the saved return address and potentially other critical pointers.

When the overwritten function attempts to return, control flow is redirected to an address chosen by the attacker. Without stack canaries or Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) enabled (common in embedded devices with legacy firmware), an attacker can reliably redirect execution to injected shellcode or a ROP-chain to execute arbitrary system commands with root or system-level privileges, depending on the account under which the web service runs—typically high-privileged on such appliances.

The attack surface is the camera's HTTP/HTTPS management service. No authentication is mentioned as a prerequisite in the NVD description, suggesting the vulnerable endpoint is reachable pre-authentication. This drastically increases the risk, as Shodan-like scanning can identify exposed devices quickly. The lack of a CWE designation or a disclosed attack vector string (such as AV:N) in the provided data limits exact scoring confirmation; however, the CVSS base score of 7.2 implies high impact and an easily accessible attack vector. The EPSS score of 0.66194 (99.2nd percentile) indicates this vulnerability is highly likely to be exploited in the wild, though the CISA KEV catalog has not yet listed it.

Insufficient technical detail is available to describe the exact memory offset, function library, or the TCP header content beyond the parameter name action.

Exploitation Scenarios

No public PoC or exploit code is confirmed available. The following attack chain is inferred based strictly on the vulnerability class (stack buffer overflow in the action parameter) and the CNA title.

Step 1 — Reconnaissance/Target Identification: The attacker performs internet-wide scanning using tools like Shodan, Censys, or masscan, filtering for open ports commonly used by Geutebrück and UDP Technology camera devices (e.g., web management ports). Search queries can target device banners, default HTTP titles, or specific URI patterns that expose the vendor's product family. The attacker verifies if the particular model is affected by the disclosed vulnerable firmware version.

Step 2 — Triggering the Flaw: The attacker crafts an HTTP request to the device's web service, targeting the action parameter. Since the flaw is a stack-based buffer overflow, the attacker sends a request where the value of action is larger than the stack-allocated buffer, e.g., a string containing thousands of bytes. The request can be a GET or POST, depending on how the proprietary web server handles input—basic form data or query strings are typical. No authentication token is required to reach this endpoint.

Step 3 — Payload/Execution Method: The attacker pads the oversized action value to precisely overwrite the saved return address with a pointer to attacker-controlled data. This data often contains the actual exploit payload: a staged shellcode that retrieves a second-stage payload (e.g., a MIPS/ARM binary suited for the device architecture) or directly spawns a shell. Because this is a memory-corruption class vulnerability, the execution mechanism is code injection or ROP (Return-Oriented Programming) to bypass non-executable stack protections if present.

Step 4 — Post-Exploitation Impact: Upon successful exploitation, the attacker gains arbitrary remote code execution on the camera device, typically as the root user. Common post-exploitation actions include: installing persistent backdoors, modifying the device firmware to disable tamper detection, exfiltrating live video feeds or recorded footage, and — most critically — utilizing the compromised device as a pivot point to gain access to the private network segment where the camera resides. Enterprise camera deployments often share a network with other OT/IoT devices or, sometimes, corporate IT systems.

Impact Assessment

The CVSS base score of 7.2 places this in the high-severity range, reflecting a high attack complexity (likely low) and high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impacts, though specific subscores are not provided. The vulnerability affects a wide range of devices from multiple vendor names (UDP Technology, Geutebrück, and others), suggesting a shared or third-party component/hardware design is flawed, though the CNA title only lists those two vendor names plus "other vendors." The blast radius is broadened by the fact that these are physical security devices, often deployed in remote or semi-unattended locations.

A successful exploit results in full device takeover, meaning attackers can disable the camera's surveillance function (high availability impact), alter video streams or recorded evidence (high integrity impact), and access live feeds (high confidentiality impact). Furthermore, the compromised device can be used as a foothold for lateral movement into the organization's broader network, potentially exposing critical business systems.

The high EPSS percentile (99.2%) signals active threat actor interest and a high probability of opportunistic exploitation. Even without confirmed in-the-wild attacks listed in the CISA KEV, the risk of ransomware or botnet operators (e.g., Mirai-like variants) adding this to their arsenal is elevated.

Detection Guidance

Detecting exploitation of this vulnerability relies on observing anomalous HTTP request patterns to camera devices, memory-corruption artifacts, and abnormal post-exploitation behavior. The following detection content provides a baseline for SOCs and network defenders.

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2021-33549 Geutebrück UDP Technology Camera Buffer Overflow
id: 6d3eb351-4a2e-4c94-b624-2d4ba7a71419
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests targeting Geutebrück camera devices with an unusually long 'action' parameter value.
author: Valtersit SOC
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: generic
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri|contains: 'action='
        c-uri|len: '>= 2048'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Known automated API scripts using legitimate long action values (low likelihood)
level: high
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2021-33549

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2021_33549_Geutebruck_Camera_Action_Overflow
{
    meta:
        author = "Valtersit SOC"
        description = "Detects shellcode or suspicious patterns associated with CVE-2021-33549 action parameter overflow"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-33549"
        date = "2024-01-28"
    strings:
        $a = "action=" fullword ascii
        $s1 = { 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 } // long A's - common overflow filler
        $s2 = { 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 } // NOP sled
        $s3 = "cmd=" ascii
        $s4 = "/bin/sh" ascii
        $s5 = "Geutebr" ascii
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and all of them
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"CVE-2021-33549 Geutebruck UDP Technology action parameter Buffer Overflow Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"action="; http_uri; isdataat:2048,relative; content:"action="; http_uri; pcre:"/action=[^&]{2048,}/i"; sid:202133549; rev:1; reference:cve,CVE-2021-33549; classtype:attempted-admin;)

Elastic Detection

network where event.category == "web" and http.request.method in ("GET", "POST") and
  http.request.uri contains "action=" and
  length(http.request.uri) >= 2048

Splunk SPL Query

index=web sourcetype=access_combined
| where like(uri, "%action=%")
| eval uri_len = len(uri)
| where uri_len > 2048
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, uri, status

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="webattack,">
  <rule id="100335" level="10">
    <decoded_as>web</decoded_as>
    <field name="url">\.action=</field>
    <regex> (\S*action=.{2048,}) </regex>
    <description>CVE-2021-33549 Geutebruck Camera action parameter buffer overflow attempt detected</description>
    <group>attack.initial_access,</group>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1190</id>
    </mitre>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence is 2/4 (CLAIMED — single source claims patch, not independently confirmed). There is no specific vendor advisory or patch version provided in the data.

  1. Immediate Mitigations:

    • Network Segregation: Immediately isolate all affected camera devices onto a dedicated VLAN with restricted external access. Block inbound traffic on the management ports (e.g., TCP 80/443) from the WAN unless a VPN is used for legitimate administrative access.
    • Access Controls: Enforce firewall rules to allow management access only from trusted admin IP ranges. Disable UPnP port forwarding on routers that may expose the cameras externally.
    • Monitor Traffic: Implement the detection rules above to identify exploitation attempts and act on alerts promptly.
  2. Patch/Upgrade Steps:

    • Contact Geutebrück, UDP Technology, or the original device manufacturer for a firmware patch addressing CVE-2021-33549. The CNA is the only source claiming a fix; validate the firmware integrity via vendor channels.
    • If a patch is released, plan a staged upgrade across the camera fleet, prioritizing internet-facing and high-criticality assets first. Back up device configuration before applying any firmware update.
  3. Long-Term Hardening:

    • Network Architecture: Place all IoT/OT devices behind a properly configured gateway with strict egress filtering.
    • Credential Hygiene: Change default credentials and adopt certificate-based authentication or strong MFA for device management.
    • Continuous Scanning: Implement automated vulnerability scanning for your asset inventory to detect missing patches or misconfigurations.
    • Incident Preparedness: Keep an inventory of all camera devices, their firmware versions, and associated asset owners to facilitate rapid patch rollout in the future.

References

  1. NVD Entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-33549
  2. CNA Advisory: Claimed by CNA (Source: CNA) — [No public advisory URL provided]
  3. EPSS Data: https://www.first.org/epss/data_stats
  4. CISA KEV Catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog (Not listed as of last check)
  5. Shodan Search Reference: https://www.shodan.io/search?query=http.title%3A%22Geutebr%C3%BCck%22 (Example search only, not a primary IOCs source)

No confirmed threat actor campaigns or in-the-wild exploitation evidence are documented in the provided data. However, the extremely high EPSS percentile suggests a strong likelihood of imminent exploitation attempts. Monitoring the vendor's official channels is recommended for a confirmed patch artifact.

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◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2021-33549/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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