CVE-2022-25787

Executive Summary

CVE-2022-25787 is an information disclosure vulnerability in the LMM (Lifecycle Management Module) WEB API of Secomea GateManager, a remote access gateway product used for managing industrial and OT (operational technology) infrastructure. The flaw stems from sensitive information being exposed through query strings in GET requests — a class of vulnerability that allows a system administrator-level user to view or intercept data that could enable connection hijacking. All versions of GateManager prior to 9.7 are affected. The vulnerability carries a CVSS score of 7.5 (High severity) and, while no public exploit or PoC has been identified, the attack surface is significant given GateManager's role as a central access point for industrial networks.

Technical Analysis

The vulnerability is classified as "Information Exposure Through Query Strings in GET Request," which corresponds to CWE-598 (Information Exposure Through Query Strings) — the most likely CWE mapping given the description, though the provided data lists CWE as N/A. This is a design-level flaw rather than a memory-corruption or injection bug.

Vulnerability Mechanism: The LMM (Lifecycle Management Module) WEB API of Secomea GateManager constructs GET requests that place sensitive data — potentially including session tokens, authentication material, or connection parameters — directly in the URL query string. Query strings are logged by numerous intermediary systems (proxies, web server access logs, SIEM solutions, browser history). This means any component that observes or records HTTP traffic between the administrator's browser and the LMM API can capture these secrets. The exposed data could allow a system administrator — who already possesses elevated privileges — to hijack an active connection or session.

Attack Surface: The LMM WEB API is part of the management plane of GateManager. The attack surface includes:

• Web Management Interface — accessible over HTTP/HTTPS to administrators
• API Endpoints — the LMM API specifically, which handles lifecycle management operations (device provisioning, configuration, firmware management)
• Network Infrastructure — any intermediary logging or monitoring traffic between the admin client and the server
• Log Aggregation Systems — Splunk, Elastic, syslog servers that ingest web server access logs

Why This Matters in an OT Context: GateManager is deployed as a central remote-access hub for industrial sites. Administrators manage connections to PLCs, HMIs, RTUs, and other OT devices through this platform. A hijacked administrative session grants access not just to the management plane, but potentially to the operational network behind the gateway — a scenario with severe safety and availability implications beyond typical IT data breaches.

The NVD description explicitly states the vulnerability "allows system administrator to hijack connection," indicating that the information exposure enables an attacker who reaches the log/observer position to take over an administrative session. No specific function names, URL paths, or parameter names are provided in the available data, and we do not invent any.

Exploitation Scenarios

The NVD description provides minimal technical detail. The attack chain below is inferred from the vulnerability class (CWE-598) and the explicit claim of "connection hijacking" capability. No public PoC is available; this scenario is a reconstruction based on the vulnerability class.

Step 1 — Reconnaissance / Target Identification: The attacker first identifies a target running Secomea GateManager. This can be done via Shodan or Censys searches for devices exposing the GateManager web interface (HTTP/HTTPS on standard management ports), or organizationally, by identifying which facilities deploy GateManager for remote OT access.

Step 2 — Gaining Observation Position: The core prerequisite. The attacker must gain access to a log stream or network position where the LMM API GET request URLs are visible. Possible vectors:

• Compromising a web server, reverse proxy, or load balancer that fronts GateManager and retains access logs
• Accessing a centralized SIEM or syslog repository that ingests GateManager access logs
• MITM (man-in-the-middle) positioning on an unencrypted segment of traffic between admin and server (if HTTPS is not enforced)
• Compromising a system administrator's browser or client, where URL history is stored

Step 3 — Capturing Query String Data: Once in an observation position, the attacker waits for or triggers a system administrator to perform any LMM API operation (device enrollment, firmware update, configuration change). The GET request to the LMM API contains sensitive data in the URL query string, which is recorded in access logs.

Step 4 — Connection Hijacking: The attacker extracts the sensitive parameter (session identifier, authentication token, or connection parameters) from the log entry. Using this data, the attacker replays or modifies the captured request to impersonate the system administrator. The NVD description states the attacker can "hijack connection," meaning they can take over the active session or establish a new session with the stolen credentials.

Post-Exploitation Impact: With a hijacked system-administrator session, the attacker gains full control of the GateManager platform, including the ability to:

• Modify or disable remote access policies
• Reconfigure gateway connections to OT devices
• Exfiltrate configuration data revealing OT network topology
• Potentially pivot into connected industrial networks

Impact Assessment

Business Impact: Secomea GateManager is a centralized remote access solution for industrial environments. A security breach here is not a typical data-loss event — it represents a pathway into operational technology. Depending on the industry, the consequences could include production downtime, physical safety risks, regulatory non-compliance (e.g., NERC CIP, IEC 62443), and reputational damage.

Affected Systems: All versions of Secomea GateManager prior to 9.7. Given the versatility of GateManager as a remote access hub, affected deployments include manufacturing plants, critical infrastructure facilities, and distributed industrial operations.

Blast Radius: The vulnerability requires the attacker to first achieve an observation position (compromised log system, MITM position, or client compromise). The CVSS score of 7.5 (High severity) reflects that — while exploitation is not trivial — the impact is severe: the confidentiality of sensitive data is compromised, and the integrity of administrative sessions can be violated. The EPSS score of 0.00232 (14.2nd percentile) indicates low current exploitation probability, but this is a high-value target class for advanced persistent threats (APTs) targeting industrial sectors.

Data Sensitivity: Query string data in administrative APIs often includes session tokens, authentication codes, and unique identifiers. Exposure of these facilitates account/session hijacking, which is the stated impact of this CVE.

Detection Guidance

The following detection rules target the observation of anomalous GateManager LMM API GET requests, unusual access to log systems, or session anomalies indicative of hijacking. Since the exact API path is unknown, rules focus on HTTP GET requests to the GateManager management interface and on session anomaly patterns.

Sigma Rule

title: Secomea GateManager LMM API Sensitive Data in GET Request
id: 7f4a9d2c-5b8e-4f1a-9c3d-2e8b7a1f6d4c
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP GET requests to GateManager LMM API that may expose sensitive data in query strings, indicating CVE-2022-25787 exploitation.
author: Valtersit Threat Intelligence
date: 2024/11/28
logsource:
  category: webserver
  product: apache
  service: access_log
detection:
  selection:
    cs-method: GET
    cs-uri-query|contains:
      - 'token='
      - 'session='
      - 'auth='
      - 'key='
      - 'password='
      - 'credential='
      - 'api_key='
  filter_known_good:
    cs-uri-offset|startswith:
      - '/static/'
      - '/assets/'
      - '/favicon.ico'
      - '/robots.txt'
  condition: selection and not filter_known_good
falsepositives:
  - Legacy applications that legitimately pass tokens via query strings
  - Administrative tools that have not yet migrated to POST-based authentication
level: medium

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2022_25787_GateManager_InfoExposure
{
    meta:
        author = "Valtersit Threat Intelligence"
        description = "Detects log files or traffic captures containing sensitive data in GateManager LMM API GET request URLs"
        reference = "CVE-2022-25787"
        severity = "high"
        date = "2024-11-28"
    strings:
        $s1 = "GET /" ascii
        $s2 = "?token=" ascii nocase
        $s3 = "?session=" ascii nocase
        $s4 = "?auth=" ascii nocase
        $s5 = "?apikey=" ascii nocase
        $s6 = "&token=" ascii nocase
        $s7 = "&session=" ascii nocase
        $s8 = "LMM" ascii nocase
        $s9 = "GateManager" ascii nocase
        $s10 = "HTTP/1." ascii
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x0A0D or  // log file with CRLF
        uint32(0) == 0x0A0D0A0D or  // network capture
        (
            $s9 and
            $s10 and
            any of ($s2, $s3, $s4, $s5, $s6, $s7)
        )
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2022-25787 - Secomea GateManager LMM API Sensitive Data in GET Query String"; flow:to_server,established; http.method; content:"GET"; http.uri; content:"/"; http.uri; pcre:"/\?(token|session|auth|apikey|key|password|credential)=/i"; http.uri; content:"LMM"; nocase; classtype:attempted-admin; reference:cve,2022-25787; priority:2; sid:1000025787; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

// EQL query for Elastic Security
// Detects HTTP GET requests with sensitive data in query strings to GateManager LMM API
sequence by source.ip, destination.ip
  [network where network.protocol == "http" and http.request.method == "GET"
   and url.query contains "token=" or url.query contains "session=" or url.query contains "auth="
   or url.query contains "password=" or url.query contains "apikey="]
  [authentication where event.outcome == "success" and user.name != null
   and process.name == null] // correlates with subsequent successful auth

Splunk SPL Query

index=web sourcetype=access_combined
  | where method="GET"
  | search uri_query="*token=*" OR uri_query="*session=*" OR uri_query="*auth=*" OR uri_query="*password=*" OR uri_query="*apikey=*"
  | rename src_ip as source_ip, uri_path as uri_path
  | eval is_high_risk=if(uri_path LIKE "%LMM%" OR uri_path LIKE "%lmm%" OR host LIKE "%gatem%" OR host LIKE "%secomea%", "HIGH", "LOW")
  | where is_high_risk="HIGH"
  | stats count by source_ip, dest_host, uri_path, is_high_risk, _time
  | sort - count
  | table _time, source_ip, dest_host, uri_path, uri_query, is_high_risk

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="web,secomea,gatemanager,">
  <rule id="100287" level="10" frequency="3" timeout="60">
    <if_sid>31100</if_sid>
    <match>GET /</match>
    <regex>(?i)\?(token|session|auth|apikey|password|credential)=</regex>
    <description>Potential CVE-2022-25787 exploitation: Sensitive data exposed in GET query string to Secomea GateManager LMM API</description>
    <group>attack_in_progress,</group>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1552</id>
      <ref>T1552.001</ref>
    </mitre>
  </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch Confidence: 2/4 — CLAIMED — The CNA (Secomea) claims a patch exists in version 9.7, but this has not been independently confirmed by a third-party security researcher or public advisory. Proceed with caution and verify the patch integrity.

Immediate Mitigations (while patching or verifying):

1. Upgrade to Secomea GateManager version 9.7 or later — this is the claimed patched version that addresses the information exposure in the LMM API.
2. Restrict access to the GateManager management interface — implement IP allowlists to ensure only known administrator workstations can reach the LMM API and web interface.
3. Enforce HTTPS everywhere — ensure all administrative access to GateManager is over TLS and disable any HTTP-only or legacy protocol support to prevent MITM observation of query strings.
4. Harden log management — ensure any intermediary systems that log HTTP traffic (proxies, WAFs, load balancers, SIEM) do not capture or long-term store full URLs; strip query strings where possible or restrict access to these logs.
5. Monitor access to log systems — treat log repositories containing GateManager traffic data as high-value assets; audit access and alert on anomalous reads of these logs.
6. Review administrator sessions — look for unexpected session reuse patterns or logins to the LMM API from unfamiliar source IPs.

Patch Verification Steps:

• Confirm the installed version of GateManager; if < 9.7, schedule the upgrade immediately.
• Download version 9.7 only from Secomea's official distribution channels or through the vendor's update mechanism.
• After upgrade, verify the LMM API no longer places sensitive parameters in the query string (test with a controlled admin session).

Long-Term Hardening:

• Architectural: Migrate all LMM API interactions to POST-based requests, which place sensitive data in the request body rather than the URL — this is the standard fix for CWE-598.
• Operational: Implement Network Detection and Response (NDR) at network chokepoints to flag GET requests with sensitive tokens in the query string.
• Continuous Monitoring: Maintain version awareness for all industrial remote-access platforms; treat them as crown-jewel assets with stricter change control and monitoring.
• Access Control: Implement Privileged Access Management (PAM) for all administrative access to GateManager; add MFA even for system administrators.
• Log Hygiene: Implement URL-query-scrubbing in all web server and proxy logging configurations.

References

1. NVD Entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25787 — Official NVD record with the searchable description and CVSS data.
2. Secomea Vendor Advisory: Refer to Secomea's official security advisories page (https://www.secomea.com/support/security-advisories/) for the vendor's own disclosure and patch notes for version 9.7. Note: not independently confirmed as of this report.
3. CWE-598 Reference: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/598.html — Official MITRE CWE entry for "Use of GET Request Method With Sensitive Query Strings," the underlying weakness class exploited by this CVE.
4. EPSS Data: https://www.first.org/epss/ — For contextualizing the exploit probability score (EPSS 0.00232, 14.2nd percentile).
5. CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV): https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog — CVE-2022-25787 is NOT listed in the KEV catalog, indicating no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation as of this writing.

Threat Actor Campaigns: No known threat-actor campaigns have been publicly attributed to exploitation of CVE-2022-25787. The low EPSS percentile (14.2%) and absence from CISA KEV suggest limited active exploitation. However, the OT-focused nature of the affected product makes it an attractive target for industrial-sector-focused APT groups (e.g., those targeting manufacturers, energy, and critical infrastructure), so organizations in these sectors should treat this with elevated urgency.