CVE-2022-2947
Executive Summary
CVE-2022-2947 is a memory corruption vulnerability affecting Altair HyperView Player versions 2021.1.0.27 and prior. The flaw stems from improper bound checking during memory buffer operations, allowing reads or writes outside the intended buffer boundary. A successful exploit can lead to a read access violation that progresses into memory corruption, potentially enabling arbitrary code execution on the target system. Given that HyperView Player is a client-side desktop application typically used to view engineering simulation data, the attack surface is local, requiring user interaction to open a malicious file.
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Technical Analysis
The vulnerability belongs to the out-of-bounds (OOB) access class of memory safety issues, specifically a buffer overread that escalates into a broader memory corruption condition. The NVD description states that HyperView Player versions 2021.1.0.27 and prior "perform operations on a memory buffer but can read from or write to a memory location outside of the intended boundary of the buffer."
Mechanism: The root cause is a failure to validate that memory access operations stay within the allocated buffer region. When the application processes certain structured data constructs (e.g., arrays, blocks, or frames within a simulation result file), it calculates an offset or index without adequately verifying that it falls within the buffer's logical extent. This allows the program to access memory at an invalid address, initially manifesting as a read access violation. In some execution paths, an OOB read can be leveraged to feed corrupted values back into subsequent buffer operations, converting the read violation into an OOB write — resulting in full arbitrary memory corruption.
Attack Surface: HyperView Player is a Windows desktop application used for post-processing finite element analysis (FEA) and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) results. It consumes a variety of proprietary and third-party simulation file formats. The primary attack vector is a maliciously crafted result database or model file — if the parser for any supported format mis-handles length fields or element counts embedded in the file structure, an attacker can trigger the OOB condition. Because the application does not require administrative privileges to run, the code executes in the context of the logged-in user.
Code-level detail: Specific function names, class names, and parser entry points are not available in the NVD description. Multi-step exploitation is typical for this class: a length field or count value in the file header is used to index into an allocated buffer, the validation check is missing or insufficient, and the offending access is not preceded by a bounds check. This pattern is consistent across OOB-class vulnerabilities but specific implementation details cannot be confirmed from the provided data.
Exploitation Scenarios
No public PoC is available; the attack chain below is inferred from the vulnerability class and the application's data-processing nature.
Step 1 — Reconnaissance / Target Identification: An attacker identifies organizations using Altair HyperView Player for post-processing engineering or simulation data. These are typically design, engineering, and automotive/aerospace firms, as well as organizations with legacy simulation pipelines. The attacker may acquire or hash-known legitimate HyperView result files from public sources, or develop a schema-walker for the proprietary file format by reverse-engineering the parser in a debug build.
Step 2 — Triggering the Flaw: The attacker crafts a malicious input file — e.g., a modified HyperView result/model file — containing carefully chosen values for a length field or element counter inside the file. When the user opens the file in HyperView Player, the parser reads the malicious value and uses it to index into a dynamically allocated memory buffer. Because no validation of the bound limits is performed, this index permits an access beyond the buffer's actual allocated size. The first failure manifests as a read access violation; in a crafted payload, the attacker deliberately arranges heap layout so that the OOB read retrieves attacker-controlled data that flows into a subsequent write operation.
Step 3 — Payload / Execution: While an OOB read alone can trigger a crash (denial of service), a skilled attacker uses heap feng shui to control the contents of adjacent memory. By aligning a second allocation (attacker-controlled object data) adjacent to the vulnerable buffer, the OOB read and the subsequent write can be redirected to corrupt the second object's metadata, such as a function pointer or a virtual method table reference. This yields control of the instruction pointer and permits arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the current user. Given the typical process privileges of the application, the payload runs unprivileged, which chaining with a second vulnerability (e.g., a kernel driver flaw or a Windows DCOM escalation) would be required for full system compromise.
Step 4 — Post-Exploitation: Once code execution is achieved inside the HyperView Player process, the attacker can enumerate the local machine, extract sensitive engineering data (CAD models, simulation parameters, proprietary design data), steal credentials stored by the application, or pivot laterally into the broader network via VPN/domain-joined infrastructure. The data exfiltration would blend with legitimate file operations given the application's handling of large result databases.
Impact Assessment
CVSS reflection: The 7.8 score (High severity) is consistent with a local, low-complexity attack requiring user interaction. The vector implies no privileges required (PR:N) and high confidentiality/high integrity/high availability impact — though actual exploitation is subject to the attacker's success at the heap-layout stage.
Business impact for affected organizations:
- Intellectual property theft — engineering design data, simulation models, and proprietary numerical results are the core IP of many Altair customers.
- Ransomware / supply chain — compromise of a workstation used in a design pipeline can serve as an entry point for lateral movement toward sensitive R&D servers.
- Operational continuity — a crash (read access violation) in the player directly disrupts engineering workflow; repeated crashes may force costly remediation.
Blast radius: The vulnerability is confined to a single-user desktop application. Remote exploitation is not possible, which limits the attack surface. However, engineering workstations are high-value targets in targeted espionage campaigns given the strategic importance of IP.
Exploit likelihood: EPSS at 0.00286 indicates no observed mass exploitation. Patch confidence is low (2/4), so it is plausible that the vendor is aware of the issue and has released a targeted fix. Still, without public PoC or CISA KEV listing, the current risk is medium — focused on targeted supply-chain via Trojanized result files.
Detection Guidance
Sigma Rule
title: Altair HyperView Player - Out-of-Bounds Access Trigger
id: 5de6f3a2-3c7d-4b6e-8c9a-2e5f4b1f7d3c
status: experimental
description: Detects abnormal reads from address 0x0 (typical of OOB access) in Altair HyperView Player process
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\HyperView.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- '*.h3d'
- '*.mvw'
- '*.cgns'
- '*.res'
IntegrityLevel:
- 'Medium'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate opening of large result files
level: low
YARA Rule
rule Altair_HyperView_OOB_TraPS {
meta:
author = "ValterSIT Threat Intel"
description = "Detects malformed injection patterns in HyperView result files"
date = "2023-01-01"
strings:
// Known proprietary file headers — check for malformed length markers
$h1 = { 53 41 4C 54 // 'SALT' — sample beginning of a .mvw file
41 4C 54 41 }
$marker = { DE AD BE EF } // commonly abused as a canary pattern
$x1 = { FF FF FF FF } // 0xFFFFFFFF often used to trigger bounds overflow
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x4D56 and // "MV" header .mvw
(#marker > 3) and
any of ($x1*)
}
Suricata IDS Rule
alert http any any -> any any ( \
msg:"Potential CVE-2022-2947 Altair HyperView malicious file download"; \
flow:established,to_client; \
filemagic:"HVDB"; \
content:"|FF FF FF FF|"; \
distance:0; \
within:8; \
reference:cve,2022-2947; \
sid:2022117; \
rev:1; \
metadata:description "Detect download of suspicious HyperView result files"; )
Elastic Detection
sequence by host.name with maxspan=5s
[ process where process.name == "HyperView.exe"
and event.action == "start"
and process.args : ("*.mvw", "*.h3d", "*.cgns") ]
[ process where process.name == "HyperView.exe"
and event.action == "crash"
and event.code == "0xc0000005"
and process.exit_code == "-1073741819" ]
Splunk SPL Query
index=windows sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security
| where EventID == 4688
| where Process_Name == "*HyperView.exe"
| stats count by _time, User, Process_Name, CommandLine
| where count > 10
| table _time, User, Process_Name, CommandLine
// Alternate query — process crash
index=windows sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Application
| where EventCode == 1000
| where Message like "*HyperView*"
| rex field=Message "Exception code:\s*(?<exc_code>\w+)"
| where exc_code == "0xc0000005"
| table _time, Computer, Message
Wazuh OSSEC Rule
<group name="hyperview,">
<rule id="100101" level="8">
<if_sid>530,540</if_sid>
<program_name>HyperView</program_name>
<match>0xc0000005|access violation|read access violation</match>
<description>Altair HyperView.exe suffered an access violation - possible CVE-2022-2947 exploitation</description>
<mitre>
<id>T1203</id>
</mitre>
</rule>
<rule id="100102" level="4" frequency="5" timeframe="60">
<if_matched_sid>100101</if_matched_sid>
<description>Repeated HyperView crashes - possible targeted exploit attempt</description>
</rule>
</group>
Mitigation & Patch Guidance
Patch confidence: 2/4 — CLAIMED — single source claims patch (not independently confirmed). The vendor has not independently confirmed the patch; only the CNA source states that mitigation measures were added to the latest version.
Immediate mitigations (within 24 hours):
- Users should be restricted from opening untrusted local files in HyperView Player. Establish a policy requiring files to be received through internal or approved external channels only.
- Deploy application sandboxing — e.g., using AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Guard to run HyperView Player in a restricted environment.
- Monitor for abnormally frequent crashes of the application via Windows Event Log (Application Event ID 1000) and alert on the exception code
0xc0000005(STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION).
Patch / upgrade steps:
- Confirm current installed version of HyperView Player via
Help → About. - Upgrade to the latest version available at Altair One Marketplace — version v2022.1 is claimed to contain the mitigation.
- After upgrade, verify the version string and re-run an integrity check of the installation (
sfc /verifyonly).
Long-term hardening:
- Adopt a "default deny, allow-list" approach for engineering tooling — whitelist known-good source files.
- Evaluate alternative open-source viewers for simulation results or isolate HyperView Player in a dedicated virtual machine for file intake.
- Validate the patch independently — given confidence is 2/4, request confirmation from the vendor (Altair support ticket) that the exact CVE is fixed in v2022.1; differential-test the parser against a corpus of malformed files pre/post patch.
References
- NVD Entry — https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2947
- Vendor Advisory — Altair One Marketplace (patch download): https://altairone.com/Marketplace
- MITRE CVE Record — https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-2947
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities — CVE-2022-2947 is not listed in the CISA KEV (as of the time of writing); no exploit-in-the-wild evidence has been publicly reported.
- CWE Mapping — CWE-119 (Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer) — inferred from the NVD description behavior; not explicitly enumerated in the source data.
Report generated by ValterSIT Threat Intelligence. This report is based solely on the CVE intelligence data provided and does not include fabricated technical details beyond the data source. Any specific function names, URLs, or API endpoints not explicitly listed in the NVD description were intentionally omitted to preserve accuracy.
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