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CVSS: 7.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 🐛 CWE-822
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2023-34333

CVE-2023-34333 Supply Chain Attack in Ami
📅 PUBLISHED: 2024-01-09 22:17 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-08-12 14:53 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: Public
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.03%
👁️
0.03% probability
<1× above the median CVE
Tier: LOW
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1190
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 7.8
AV: L Attack Vector Local
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: N Privileges Required None
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: H Confidentiality High
I: H Integrity High
A: H Availability High
7.8
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2023-34333 is a critical vulnerability in AMI’s SPx (Server Platform) firmware, specifically within the Baseboard Management Controller (BMC). The flaw allows an attacker on the local network to trigger an untrusted pointer dereference, potentially leading to full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. With a CVSS score of 7.8, this vulnerability poses a significant risk to enterprise servers and data centers relying on AMI BMC firmware. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or patch is currently available, making proactive detection and mitigation essential.

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Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby packages. It is a firmware-level issue in AMI’s SPx BMC, affecting hardware supply chain security. Organizations should verify the integrity of their BMC firmware and monitor for vendor updates.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • CVSS Score: 7.8 (High)
  • Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
  • Attack Vector: Local Network (AV:L) – The attacker must have network access to the BMC management interface.
  • Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – No special conditions required.
  • Privileges Required: None (PR:N) – No authentication needed.
  • User Interaction: None (UI:N) – No user action required.
  • Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – The vulnerability affects only the BMC.
  • Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H) – Full data exposure possible.
  • Integrity Impact: High (I:H) – Full system control possible.
  • Availability Impact: High (A:H) – Denial of service possible.

Threat Level: Critical for unpatched systems. The lack of a patch and public exploit increases risk, but the local network requirement limits exposure.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the BMC firmware of AMI’s SPx platform. The BMC is a dedicated microcontroller that manages system monitoring, remote control, and IPMI functions. The flaw involves an untrusted pointer dereference, meaning the BMC processes a pointer value supplied by an attacker without proper validation. This can lead to arbitrary memory access, code execution, or system crash.

Root Cause: The BMC fails to sanitize pointer values received over the network, allowing an attacker to craft a malicious packet that causes the firmware to dereference a controlled memory address. This is a classic CWE-822 (Untrusted Pointer Dereference) issue.

Attack Vector: The attacker must be on the same local network as the BMC (typically on a dedicated management VLAN). By sending specially crafted IPMI or other management protocol packets, the attacker can trigger the vulnerability.

Impact: Successful exploitation can lead to:

  • Confidentiality Loss: Reading sensitive data from BMC memory (e.g., credentials, system logs).
  • Integrity Loss: Modifying BMC firmware or configuration.
  • Availability Loss: Crashing the BMC, causing loss of remote management.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, a direct code comparison is not possible. However, the vulnerable code likely resembles:

// Vulnerable: No validation of pointer
void process_packet(uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
    uint32_t *ptr = (uint32_t *)(data + offset);
    uint32_t value = *ptr; // Untrusted pointer dereference
    // ... use value
}

A patched version would include bounds checking and pointer validation:

// Patched: Validate pointer before dereference
void process_packet(uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
    if (offset + sizeof(uint32_t) > len) {
        return; // Reject invalid packet
    }
    uint32_t *ptr = (uint32_t *)(data + offset);
    uint32_t value = *ptr;
    // ... use value
}

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Exploitation)

Lab Environment:

  • Target: Server with AMI SPx BMC (e.g., Supermicro, ASRock Rack)
  • Attacker: Kali Linux on same management network
  • Tools: ipmitool, custom Python script

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Reconnaissance: Scan for BMCs using nmap -p 623,664 <subnet>.
  2. Craft Payload: Create a malicious IPMI packet with an invalid pointer.
  3. Send Payload: Use ipmitool raw or a custom script to send the packet.
  4. Trigger: The BMC dereferences the pointer, causing a crash or code execution.

Example Python Script (Conceptual):

import socket

def exploit(target_ip):
    # Craft a malicious IPMI packet (simplified)
    packet = b'\x06\x00\xff\x07\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
    # Replace with actual payload
    sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
    sock.sendto(packet, (target_ip, 623))
    sock.close()

exploit("192.168.1.100")

Note: No public exploit exists; this is a conceptual example.

Blue Team (Defense)

Detection & Prevention:

  1. Network Segmentation: Isolate BMCs on a dedicated management VLAN with strict ACLs.
  2. Monitor IPMI Traffic: Use Suricata rules to detect anomalous IPMI packets.
  3. Firmware Integrity: Regularly verify BMC firmware checksums.
  4. Log Analysis: Monitor BMC logs for crashes or unexpected reboots.

Honeypot Setup: Deploy a fake BMC service to capture attacker activity.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network IOCs:
    • Unusual IPMI packets with malformed headers or pointers.
    • Traffic to/from BMC on port 623 (IPMI) or 664 (RMCP+).
    • Repeated BMC crashes or resets.
  • Host IOCs:
    • BMC firmware version mismatch or unexpected changes.
    • System logs showing BMC watchdog timeouts.
  • File IOCs:
    • Modified BMC firmware files (e.g., *.rom).
    • Presence of unknown scripts in BMC filesystem.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2023_34333_BMC_Exploit {
    meta:
        description = "Detects malicious IPMI packets targeting CVE-2023-34333"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2023-34333"
    strings:
        $ipmi_header = { 06 00 ff 07 }  // IPMI RMCP+ header
        $malformed_ptr = { 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 }  // Null pointer
    condition:
        $ipmi_header at 0 and $malformed_ptr
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2023-34333 BMC Untrusted Pointer Dereference
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2023-34333 via IPMI traffic
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: network
    product: suricata
detection:
    selection:
        dest_port: 623
        payload|contains: '0600ff07'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate IPMI management traffic
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert udp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 623 (msg:"CVE-2023-34333 BMC Untrusted Pointer Dereference"; content:"|06 00 ff 07|"; depth:4; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Isolate BMCs: Place all BMCs on a separate management VLAN with strict firewall rules.
  2. Disable Unused Services: Turn off IPMI over LAN if not required.
  3. Monitor Logs: Enable BMC logging and monitor for crashes.
  4. Apply Workarounds: If available, use vendor-provided mitigations (e.g., disabling certain IPMI commands).

Long-Term Fix:

  • Await an official patch from AMI. Contact AMI support for updates.
  • Consider replacing affected hardware with patched versions.

Compensating Controls:

  • Use network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) to detect exploitation attempts.
  • Implement host-based intrusion detection (HIDS) on BMC-adjacent systems.

Valters IT

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AMI SPx

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◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2023-34333/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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