CVE-2023-41919

Executive Summary

CVE-2023-41919 describes a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.8) in Kiloview P1/P2 network video encoder/decoder devices arising from hard-coded credentials embedded within the application source code. This flaw permits unauthenticated remote actors to obtain valid access credentials, thereby enabling full administrative control over affected devices without any prior knowledge of the system. Affected organizations are those deploying Kiloview P1 or P2 hardware in production broadcast, surveillance, or teleconferencing environments. As of the latest analysis, no patch is available, and the vulnerability remains exploitable on any exposed device, posing a high risk of total device compromise, network pivoting, and potential disruption of video infrastructure.

Technical Analysis

The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) description for CVE-2023-41919 is minimal: "Hardcoded credentials are discovered within the application's source code, creating a potential security risk for unauthorized access." The CNA title identifies the affected products as Kiloview P1/P2 devices. This places the vulnerability squarely in CWE-798 (Use of Hard-coded Credentials).

Because the description does not disclose the exact credentials, the embedding location (e.g., compiled binary, firmware, JavaScript bundle, or configuration file), or the specific authentication mechanism used by the devices, a precise code-level analysis is not possible from the provided data. However, the vulnerability class is well understood and poses a severe risk for the following reasons:

1. Mechanism: Hard-coded credentials are credentials (usernames/passwords, secret keys, or API tokens) that are compiled, written, or otherwise embedded directly into the codebase of an application or device firmware. In the context of embedded network hardware like the Kiloview P1/P2, these credentials are typically used for default administrative access (e.g., a default "admin/admin" login) or for backend services like SSH, SNMP, or an HTTP management console.

2. Attack Surface: Kiloview P1/P2 devices are network-attached encoders/decoders commonly used in professional video production, IP-based video surveillance, and broadcast environments. These devices expose several network services to facilitate management and streaming (e.g., an HTTP/HTTPS web server for configuration, potentially RTSP/RTMP for video streaming, and possibly SSH/Telnet for system administration). All of these services are potential targets for credential abuse. If the devices are exposed to the internet (e.g., via port forwarding or an insecure network segment), the attack surface is global.

3. Complexity of Exploitation: The exploitation complexity is low. Because the credentials are hard-coded and identical across all devices of the same model/firmware version, an attacker does not need to brute-force or guess. The attacker only needs to obtain a copy of the firmware to extract the credentials, or find them publicly documented online (if leaked). The presence of these credentials negates the security of any other authentication layers, as the attacker effectively has a pre-shared, valid administrative key.

4. Lack of Patch: The data provided indicates a patch confidence score of 0/4, with no vendor fix or workaround listed. This means Kiloview has not officially released a remediation, leaving all P1/P2 devices vulnerable indefinitely.

Insufficient technical detail is available from the NVD description to provide function names, specific URL endpoints, or the exact credential strings; therefore, the analysis remains at the vulnerability-class level.

Exploitation Scenarios

The following attack chain is inferred from the vulnerability class (hard-coded credentials) and the device's network context. No public PoC is available, and specific implementation details are not disclosed in the NVD description.

1. Reconnaissance/Target Identification: An attacker first identifies exposed Kiloview P1/P2 devices. This can be achieved via internet-wide scanning tools like Shodan or Censys using queries such as title:"Kiloview" or product:"Kiloview", which index the device's web interface banner. Alternatively, the attacker can use mass port scanning of target IP ranges to find devices hosting the typical management web server or streaming ports. Once a candidate device is found, the attacker confirms it is a Kiloview P1/P2 by examining the HTTP response headers, login page title, or favicon hash.

2. Triggering the Flaw: The attacker attempts to authenticate to the device's management interface (e.g., the web login portal) using the known hard-coded credentials. Because the credentials are embedded in the source code and are identical across all P1/P2 devices, the attacker can guess or directly input the "factory default" credentials without needing to interact with any encryption or bypass mechanism—there is no need to bypass authentication because the attacker has valid authentication.

3. Payload/Execution Method (Vulnerability-class level): At the vulnerability-class level, the "payload" is the credential pair itself. The attacker submits these credentials to the authentication endpoint, typically via a standard HTTP POST login request. If the device's web application validates the credentials correctly and accepts the hard-coded pair as valid, the attacker is granted a session with administrative privileges. This is distinct from a privilege escalation; it is a direct authentication bypass via credential abuse (T1078 — Valid Accounts).

4. Post-Exploitation Impact: Successful login grants the attacker full administrative control. Impact includes:

   • Full Configuration Compromise: Changing video encoding, network, and routing settings.
   • Data Exfiltration: Access to video streams or stored footage. If the device has an SD card or NFS storage, the attacker can retrieve sensitive visual data.
   • Device Hijacking: Repurposing the device for malicious use (e.g., as a point in a botnet, or a proxy for internal network scans).
   • Network Pivoting: If the device resides on an internal network, the attacker can use it as a launchpad to compromise other, more critical internal systems, circumventing perimeter defenses.

Confidence Note: "No public PoC available; attack chain is inferred from vulnerability class." The specific steps (e.g., the exact port or the login interface) are not detailed in the CVE data and are typical of embedded network devices.

Impact Assessment

The CVSS base score is 9.8, which is classified as Critical. The CVSS vector string (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) indicates:

• Attack Vector (AV:N): The vulnerability is exploitable remotely over the network.
• Attack Complexity (AC:L): No special conditions or race conditions must be overcome.
• Privileges Required (PR:N): No privileges are required to exploit the vulnerability.
• User Interaction (UI:N): No user interaction is required.
• Confidentiality (C:H): The hard-coded credential allows full read access to device configuration and potentially video data.
• Integrity (I:H): The attacker can modify device settings, firmware, or system files.
• Availability (A:H): The attacker could disable the device, cause shutdown, or degrade performance, resulting in full service loss.

Business Impact: For organizations relying on Kiloview P1/P2 in broadcast or surveillance roles, this vulnerability directly threatens operational integrity. A compromise could lead to industrial espionage (theft of proprietary video content), reputational damage, and financial losses from operational downtime. The lack of a patch means the window of exposure is indefinite.

Systemic Risk: The affected devices are embedded appliances; the supply chain risk is high because they are distributed as hardware. There is no simple way to remove the credentials without vendor intervention, and the risk extends to any device left on the public internet. The blast radius includes all network segments the device can access.

Detection Guidance

Detection of this vulnerability is challenging because exploitation involves valid credential usage. It does not typically trigger traditional "attack" signatures. Detection must rely on anomalous behavior, authentication event logs, and known credential usage.

Sigma Rule

Sigma rule to detect a successful login to the Kiloview device using the hard-coded credential name (this rule assumes the device logs failed followed by successful logins, or a generic credential alert).

title: Kiloview P1/P2 Hardcoded Credential Usage Attempt
id: 3f8a1c7e-2b9d-4f6a-9b3e-7a1d5c6f8e0a
status: experimental
description: Detects authentication events against Kiloview devices that may indicate usage of built-in default credentials.
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41919
author: ValtersIT Cyber Threat Intelligence
date: 2024/03/15
logsource:
    product: kiloview
    category: authentication
detection:
    selection:
        EVENT_TYPE: "login"
        USERNAME:
            - "admin"
            - "root"
            - "default"
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of factory default credentials if administrators have not changed them.
level: high

YARA Rule

A YARA rule designed to identify the presence of hard-coded credential strings within Kiloview firmware or configuration files. This rule looks for specific, commonly used default credential patterns.

rule Kiloview_Hardcoded_Credentials_CVE_2023_41919
{
    meta:
        author = "ValtersIT Cyber Threat Intelligence"
        date = "2024-03-15"
        description = "Identify firmware files containing hardcoded credential strings associated with CVE-2023-41919."
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41919"
    
    strings:
        $a = { 61646D696E } // "admin" in hex
        $b = "kiloview" ascii wide
        $c = "p1p2" ascii wide
        $d = "root" ascii wide

    condition:
        (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint32(0) == 0x464c457f) and // PE or ELF binary
        2 of them
}

Suricata IDS Rule

Suricata rule to detect HTTP POST requests to the Kiloview login endpoint with common hard-coded credentials.

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"ET WEB_SPECIFIC_APPS Kiloview P1/P2 Hardcoded Credential Brute Force Attempt";
flow:to_server,established;
http.method; content:"POST";
http.uri; content:"login";
http.request_body; content:"admin"; within:1; 
http.request_body; content:"password"; distance:21;
classtype:attempted-admin;
sid:2024031501; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

EQL query to detect a spike in successful authentication from a single external IP to multiple network assets, which could indicate credential spraying with default credentials.

authentication where
  event.category == "authentication" and
  event.outcome == "success" and
  process.name == "svc" and
  system.message == "default_credential"

Note: Since the actual authentication process for Kiloview devices is unknown, a more generic EQL rule can be used:

any where
  event.category == "authentication" and
  event.outcome == "failure" and
  user.name in ("admin", "root") and
  source.ip == "1.2.3.4"

Splunk SPL Query

Splunk search to identify hosts communicating with exposed Kiloview ports and subsequently a failed login followed by a success.

index=main source="web_access.log"
| rex field=uri "/(?<endpoint>[^/]+)$"
| search endpoint=login
| regex dest_port="(80|443|22)"
| stats count as attempts, dc(src_ip) as source_ips by dest_ip
| where attempts > 100

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

Wazuh rule to alert on access to the Kiloview administrative interface returning a 200 OK with a suspicious header.

<rule id="100200" level="12">
  <decoded>
    <program_name>apache|nginx</program_name>
  </decoded>
  <field name="url">^/login</field>
  <field name="srcip">!^127\.0\.0\.1</field>
  <description>Kiloview P1/P2 login attempt from remote IP</description>
  <group>authentication, kiloview, cve_2023_41919,</group>
</rule>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch confidence: 0/4 (UNPATCHED — no patch evidence from any tracked source). The following steps are critical to protect systems until Kiloview releases an official fix.

1. Immediate Mitigations:

   • Air-Gap/Isolate the Device: If the Kiloview P1/P2 is not absolutely required on the internet, immediately disconnect it from the public internet. If remote access is necessary, place it behind a firewall or VPN and restrict remote access to known IPs only.
   • Change All Credentials: Access the device via a trusted local network and change the password immediately. Note: This does not fully remediate the vulnerability if the hard-coded credential is a permanent "backdoor" account, but it will prevent easy exploitation if the device only has a single set of default credentials that can be changed.
   • Block Access: Implement firewall rules at the network perimeter to block access to the admin interface from untrusted sources.

2. Patch/Upgrade Steps:

   • As of this report, there is no official patch available from Kiloview.
   • Regularly monitor the Kiloview vendor advisory page and the NVD entry for updates. As of the analysis date, no fix has been published.
   • If a firmware update becomes available, apply it immediately, but verify its integrity before installation.

3. Long-Term Hardening:

   • Network Segmentation: Place these devices in a dedicated VLAN and restrict network traffic to/from them. Only necessary services should be exposed (e.g., video streaming), and the management interface should be isolated.
   • Monitor for Anomalies: Deploy the detection rules suggested above to flag new administrative sessions, especially from unusual source IPs.
   • Inventory Management: Maintain an accurate inventory of all Kiloview devices and their firmware versions. Flag any device that is internet-facing for immediate remediation.
   • Consult the Vendor: Contact Kiloview support (if reachable) to demand a security bulletin and a patch timeline. Also inquire about a mechanism to disable or over-ride the embedded backdoor credential if one exists.

References

The following references provide authoritative information on CVE-2023-41919. As of the analysis date, there are no known public threat actor campaigns exploiting this vulnerability, and it is not listed on the CISA KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities) catalog.

1. NVD Entry: NIST National Vulnerability Database (Primary Reference)

   • URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41919
   • Description: The primary vulnerability record.

2. CVE.org Record: CVE-2023-41919

   • URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-41919
   • CNA Title: Use of Hard-coded Credentials in Kiloview P1/P2 devices.

3. CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (Does NOT contain CVE-2023-41919)

   • URL: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
   • Status: Not listed. The vulnerability has not been exploited in the wild per current reporting.

4. Mitre CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials (Class Definition)

   • URL: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/798.html
   • Context: Provides the general weakness class and common remediation guidance.

5. Vendor Contact: Kiloview (Official Website)

   • URL: https://www.kiloview.com
   • Status: No public security advisory has been published by the vendor at this time; however, this URL is the authoritative source for future vendor communication.

Note on Exploit-in-the-Wild Evidence: There is currently no public evidence of mass exploitation or specific threat actor campaigns targeting CVE-2023-41919. The EPSS score (0.00421) indicates a low probability of exploitation in the wild within the next 30 days, but the high CVSS base score and the lack of a patch make it a priority for defensive measures.