CVE-2023-41926
Executive Summary
CVE-2023-41926 is an insufficiently protected credentials vulnerability affecting Kiloview P1/P2 devices, specifically in the web-based configuration interface. The webserver relies on basic authentication over port 80 without encryption, allowing network-based attackers to eavesdrop on user traffic and intercept credentials in transit. The vulnerability carries a CVSS score of 8.8 (High severity), yet has a low EPSS score of 0.00261 and is not listed on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. As of this report, no patch has been identified, leaving affected devices exposed to credential interception attacks.
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Technical Analysis
The vulnerability stems from the webserver configuration of Kiloview P1/P2 devices, which implements HTTP Basic Authentication for user login to the configuration interface. Three factors combine to create the vulnerability:
Basic Authentication Over Cleartext HTTP: Basic authentication transmits credentials (username and password) encoded in Base64 rather than encrypted. Base64 is trivially reversible and offers no cryptographic protection.
Unencrypted Transport on Port 80: With encryption disabled on port 80, all traffic between the client browser and the device configuration interface traverses the network in plaintext. This includes NOT only the authentication exchange but also any session credentials or tokens passed thereafter.
Eavesdropping Feasibility: Any attacker with the ability to observe network traffic — via ARP spoofing, passive sniffing on a shared segment, malicious Wi-Fi access point, or compromised network infrastructure — can capture the Base64-encoded credentials and decode them within seconds using standard tools.
From a vulnerability class perspective, this maps to CWE-522 (Insufficiently Protected Credentials) and aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1040 (Network Sniffing) for the exploitation phase. The attack surface is the device's management interface network exposure. If the configuration interface is exposed to the internet or accessible from untrusted network segments, the risk increases dramatically.
The technical description does not specify affected firmware versions, authentication endpoint paths, or specific HTTP request formats. Insufficient technical detail is available regarding the exact login mechanism beyond the Basic Authentication framework. What is clear is that the credential transmission path lacks the confidentiality protections expected of network management interfaces. This is a well-understood vulnerability class with decades of known exploitation history, making the risk profile predictable even without device-specific exploit code.
Exploitation Scenarios
No public PoC is available; the attack chain is inferred from the vulnerability class and NVD description.
Step 1 — Reconnaissance/Target Identification: An attacker identifies Kiloview P1/P2 devices by scanning for open port 80 across target IP ranges. Device identification can be performed via HTTP banner grabbing, or by inspecting response headers and default web content served by the configuration interface. Attackers may also use Shodan or Censys to locate internet-exposed devices. The attacker also identifies a position on the network path between the legitimate operator and the device — this could be a compromised host on the same LAN segment, a rogue Wi-Fi access point, or a malicious network appliance.
Step 2 — Triggering the Flaw: The attacker does not need to actively trigger anything. The flaw is passive in nature — it exists in the normal, legitimate operation of the device. When an authorized operator opens a web browser, navigates to the device's configuration interface on port 80, and submits the login form, the browser constructs an HTTP request with an Authorization: Basic header containing Base64-encoded credentials. This request traverses the network in cleartext.
Step 3 — Payload/Execution Method: The attacker captures the HTTP request using a packet capture tool (e.g., Wireshark, tcpdump) or a network interception proxy. The credentials are extracted from the Authorization header, Base64-decoded, and recovered in plaintext. No injection, code execution, or memory corruption is required — this is purely a passive network-level attack. Alternatively, an active man-in-the-middle attack (e.g., ARP spoofing) can be used to redirect traffic through the attacker's system to ensure capture even on switched networks.
Step 4 — Post-Exploitation Impact: With valid credentials, the attacker gains full administrative access to the Kiloview P1/P2 device's configuration interface. Depending on device capabilities, this may allow the attacker to:
- Modify video encoding/streaming settings
- Extract RTSP/RTMP stream URLs and credentials
- Reconfigure network settings to establish persistent backdoor access
- Pivot to other devices on the same network segment
- Disrupt video streaming operations (availability impact)
The captured credentials may also be reused against other systems if the operator reuses passwords (a common practice), broadening the blast radius beyond the Kiloview device itself.
Impact Assessment
The CVSS score of 8.8 reflects high severity across confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact. The attack requires no authentication (the attacker is pre-authentication, capturing the credentials of a legitimate user), low attack complexity (standard network sniffing), and no user interaction beyond the legitimate operator logging in normally.
Business Impact:
- Confidentiality: Administrative credentials are exposed, providing a foothold into the device. Streaming credentials, network configuration details, and potentially connected systems become accessible.
- Integrity: An attacker with admin access can modify device configuration, potentially redirecting video feeds to attacker-controlled destinations or altering stream content.
- Availability: An attacker can disable the device, reconfigure network paths, or lock out legitimate operators by changing credentials.
- Compliance: For organizations operating under regulatory frameworks requiring encryption of management traffic (e.g., PCI DSS, HIPAA, NIST 800-53), this vulnerability represents a compliance failure.
Blast Radius: Limited to Kiloview P1/P2 device families. However, these devices are often deployed in security-sensitive environments (surveillance systems, broadcast operations, industrial monitoring), where compromise of video infrastructure carries significant operational and safety implications. The lack of a patch compounds the risk — affected organizations have no vendor-provided remediation path.
Detection Guidance
Sigma Rule
title: Kiloview P1/P2 HTTP Basic Auth Over Cleartext Port 80
id: 3f2a8c1e-5b7d-4e9a-8c2f-1d4b6e8a0f3c
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP Basic Authentication requests to Kiloview P1/P2 devices over unencrypted port 80, indicating potential credential exposure
references:
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41926
author: Valtersit Threat Intelligence
date: 2024/01/15
logsource:
category: webserver
product: apache
definition: 'Web server access logs from Kiloview device management interfaces or network appliances that log HTTP traffic'
detection:
selection:
cs-method: 'GET|POST'
sc-status: '401'
cs-uri-extension:
- 'login'
- 'auth'
cs-user-agent|contains: 'Mozilla'
filter_known_clean:
cs-port: '443'
condition: selection and not filter_known_clean
falsepositives:
- Legitimate access to the configuration interface by authorized operators
- HTTP access from internal trusted network segments
level: medium
tags:
- attack.t1040
- attack.t1078
- cve.2023.41926
YARA Rule
rule CVE_2023_41926_Kiloview_Basic_Auth_Sniffing
{
meta:
author = "Valtersit Threat Intelligence"
description = "Detects HTTP Basic Authentication headers targeting Kiloview P1/P2 devices in captured network traffic or pcap files"
cve = "CVE-2023-41926"
date = "2024/01/15"
reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41926"
severity = "high"
strings:
$auth_header = "Authorization: Basic " ascii wide nocase
$http_get = "GET /" ascii wide nocase
$http_post = "POST /" ascii wide nocase
$login_path = "login" ascii wide nocase
$auth_path = "auth" ascii wide nocase
$cfg_path = "config" ascii wide nocase
$kiloview_marker = "Kiloview" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x4d3c or filesize > 0 and
any of ($http_get, $http_post) and
$auth_header and
(any of ($login_path, $auth_path, $cfg_path) or $kiloview_marker)
}
Suricata IDS Rule
alert http any any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"CVE-2023-41926 Kiloview P1/P2 Basic Auth Cleartext Credential Exposure"; flow:to_server,established; content:"Authorization: Basic"; http_header; http.method; content:"Basic"; http_auth; http.uri; content:"login"; http.uri; content:"login|config|auth"; http.uri; classtype:attempted-recon; reference:cve,2023-41926; sid:202341926; rev:1;)
Elastic Detection
// EQL query for Elastic Security — detect HTTP requests to port 80 with Basic Authentication headers
sequence by source.ip
[ network where network.protocol == "http" and destination.port == 80 and
http.request.method == "GET" or http.request.method == "POST" ]
[ network where network.protocol == "http" and destination.port == 80 and
http.request.headers contains "Authorization: Basic" ]
Splunk SPL Query
index=proxy OR index=web sourcetype="access_combined"
| where dest_port=80
| search "Authorization" OR "auth"
| rex field=_raw "Authorization:\s*Basic\s+(?<encoded_creds>[^\s]+)"
| eval decoded_creds=frombase64(encoded_creds)
| table _time, src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, uri, encoded_creds, decoded_creds
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, uri
Wazuh OSSEC Rule
<group name="kiloview,">
<rule id="100215" level="10">
<decoded>HTTP authorization header with Basic credentials over port 80</decoded>
<match>Authorization: Basic</match>
<regex>port 80|:80</regex>
<description>CVE-2023-41926: Kiloview P1/P2 device — cleartext Basic Authentication credentials detected on port 80</description>
<mitre>
<id>T1040</id>
</mitre>
<group>authentication_attempt,</group>
</rule>
</group>
Mitigation & Patch Guidance
Patch Confidence: 0/4 — UNPATCHED. No vendor patch, security advisory, or firmware update has been identified from any tracked source. Affected devices remain in an unpatched state as of this report.
Immediate Mitigations:
- Network Segmentation: Isolate Kiloview P1/P2 devices on a dedicated management VLAN with strict access control lists. Do not expose the configuration interface (port 80) to the internet or to untrusted network segments.
- VPN/Tunnel Requirement: Mandate that all administrative access to device configuration interfaces occur through an encrypted tunnel (VPN, SSH tunneling, or HTTPS reverse proxy). This neutralizes the eavesdropping risk by adding a protection layer above the cleartext HTTP channel.
- Network Monitoring: Deploy the detection rules above on network tap points and log aggregation systems. Alert on any Basic Authentication traffic transiting port 80.
- Credential Hygiene: Require strong, unique passwords for device accounts. Disable default credentials. Rotate credentials if any suspicion of network compromise exists.
- Access Restriction: Restrict source IPs allowed to reach the device management interface to only known administrative workstations.
Patch/Upgrade Steps:
- Monitor the Kiloview vendor website and security advisory feeds for firmware updates addressing this vulnerability.
- Contact Kiloview support to inquire about planned patch timelines and interim guidance.
- Upon release of a patched firmware, validate the update against a test device before wide deployment. Check whether the firmware enforces HTTPS on the management interface.
Long-Term Hardening:
- Replace or re-architect legacy devices that cannot be patched — consider hardware refresh for devices that remain unpatched past a defined risk tolerance window.
- Implement a formal vulnerability management policy that requires encrypted management planes (HTTPS, SSH) for all network devices.
- Deploy TLS inspection at network egress points to detect cleartext admin traffic transiting the network.
- Establish that all new device procurement requires HTTPS-only management interfaces and automatic firmware update capabilities.
References
- NVD Entry — CVE-2023-41926: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41926
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1040 Network Sniffing: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040/
- CWE-522 Insufficiently Protected Credentials: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/522.html
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (confirms CVE not listed): https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
- FIRST EPSS — CVE-2023-41926 Scoring: https://www.first.org/epss/
Threat Actor Activity: No known threat actor campaigns or exploit-in-the-wild evidence have been publicly reported for CVE-2023-41926 at the time of writing.