CVE-2024-10544

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-10544 exposes a critical information disclosure vulnerability in the Woo Manage Fraud Orders WordPress plugin, affecting all versions up to and including 2.6.1. The flaw arises from publicly accessible log files that contain sensitive user information. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this by simply requesting the log file path, leading to the exposure of personally identifiable information (PII) and potentially other operational data. This vulnerability is classified as a WordPress ecosystem issue, not related to the underlying web server (Apache/Nginx). The CVSS score of 5.3 (Medium) reflects the low complexity and network-based attack vector, though the impact is limited to confidentiality.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is specific to the WordPress plugin ecosystem. The plugin is distributed via the official WordPress plugin repository. Users are advised to monitor for updates from the vendor (Woo) and apply patches immediately when available. No known supply chain compromise has been reported.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Score: 5.3 (Medium)
• Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
• Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) – The vulnerability can be exploited remotely.
• Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – No special conditions are required.
• Privileges Required: None (PR:N) – No authentication needed.
• User Interaction: None (UI:N) – No user action required.
• Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – The vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.
• Confidentiality Impact: Low (C:L) – Limited information disclosure.
• Integrity Impact: None (I:N) – No data modification possible.
• Availability Impact: None (A:N) – No denial of service.

Threat Level: Medium. While the EPSS score is 0.0%, indicating low exploitation likelihood currently, the ease of exploitation (unauthenticated, network-based) makes it a viable target for automated scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the Woo Manage Fraud Orders plugin’s logging mechanism. The plugin writes debug or operational logs to a file stored within the WordPress installation’s web-accessible directory (e.g., wp-content/uploads/ or a plugin-specific folder). These log files are not protected by any access control, allowing any unauthenticated visitor to read them by navigating to the file’s URL.

The exposed log files may contain:

• User email addresses
• IP addresses
• Order details (e.g., product names, quantities)
• Payment transaction IDs (partial or full)
• Session tokens or cookies (if logged verbosely)

The root cause is a failure to restrict access to log files via .htaccess or server configuration, combined with the plugin’s default behavior of logging sensitive data.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (<= 2.6.1): The plugin likely writes logs using a function like file_put_contents() or fwrite() to a path such as:

$log_file = WP_CONTENT_DIR . '/uploads/woo-manage-fraud-orders.log';
file_put_contents($log_file, $log_entry, FILE_APPEND);

No access control is applied to the log file.

Patched Code (Hypothetical): A patch would either:

1. Move log files outside the web root (e.g., WP_CONTENT_DIR . '/logs/woo-manage-fraud-orders.log' with a .htaccess deny rule).
2. Disable logging by default or implement a non-web-accessible logging mechanism.
3. Sanitize log data to exclude sensitive information.

Example patch:

$log_file = WP_CONTENT_DIR . '/logs/woo-manage-fraud-orders.log';
// Ensure directory is not web-accessible
if (!file_exists(dirname($log_file))) {
    mkdir(dirname($log_file), 0755, true);
    // Add .htaccess to deny all
    file_put_contents(dirname($log_file) . '/.htaccess', 'Deny from all');
}
file_put_contents($log_file, $log_entry, FILE_APPEND);

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Exploitation)

1. Identify Target: Scan for WordPress sites using the plugin (e.g., via Shodan dorks or WPScan).
2. Locate Log File: Common paths include:
   • /wp-content/uploads/woo-manage-fraud-orders.log
   • /wp-content/plugins/woo-manage-fraud-orders/logs/debug.log
   • /wp-content/debug.log
3. Extract Data: Use curl or a browser to fetch the log file:

   curl -O http://target.com/wp-content/uploads/woo-manage-fraud-orders.log
   

4. Parse Logs: Extract sensitive fields (e.g., email, IP) using grep:

   grep -E '\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\.[A-Z|a-z]{2,}\b' logfile.log
   

Blue Team (Defense & Detection)

1. Check for Exposure: Manually verify if log files are accessible:

   curl -I http://your-site.com/wp-content/uploads/woo-manage-fraud-orders.log
   

2. Harden Logging: Move log files outside web root or add .htaccess:

   <FilesMatch "\.log$">
       Require all denied
   </FilesMatch>
   

3. Monitor Access Logs: Look for requests to .log files in web server logs.
4. Disable Logging: If not needed, disable the plugin’s logging feature via settings or code.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• File Paths:
  • /wp-content/uploads/woo-manage-fraud-orders.log
  • /wp-content/plugins/woo-manage-fraud-orders/logs/debug.log
  • /wp-content/debug.log
• Network Patterns:
  • HTTP GET requests to paths ending in .log within wp-content/
  • User-Agent strings typical of automated scanners (e.g., curl, python-requests)
• Log Entries: Presence of sensitive data (emails, IPs) in publicly accessible log files.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule Woo_Manage_Fraud_Orders_Log_Exposure {
    meta:
        description = "Detects exposed log files from Woo Manage Fraud Orders plugin"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2024-01-01"
        reference = "CVE-2024-10544"
    strings:
        $log_header = "Woo Manage Fraud Orders Log" nocase
        $email = /[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\.[A-Za-z]{2,}/
        $ip = /\b\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\b/
    condition:
        $log_header or (any of ($email, $ip) and filesize < 10MB)
}

Sigma Rule

title: Woo Manage Fraud Orders Log File Access
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests to Woo Manage Fraud Orders log files
author: Valters IT
date: 2024-01-01
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10544
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
    service: access
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-extension: ".log"
        cs-uri-path|contains: "wp-content"
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin access to debug logs
level: medium

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2024-10544 Woo Manage Fraud Orders Log Exposure"; flow:to_server; content:"GET"; http_method; content:"wp-content"; http_uri; content:".log"; http_uri; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

1. Immediate Action: Remove or restrict access to existing log files:

   find /var/www/html/wp-content -name "*.log" -type f -exec chmod 600 {} \;
   

2. Plugin Update: Check for a patched version (> 2.6.1) from the vendor. If unavailable, consider disabling the plugin.
3. Web Server Configuration: Add rules to deny access to .log files:
   • Apache: Add to .htaccess:

     <FilesMatch "\.log$">
         Require all denied
     </FilesMatch>
     

   • Nginx: Add to server block:

     location ~* \.log$ {
         deny all;
     }
     

4. Log Rotation & Cleanup: Implement automated log rotation and deletion of old logs.
5. Monitor: Continuously monitor for unauthorized access attempts to log files.

Valters IT