CVE-2024-28613

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-28613 is a critical SQL Injection vulnerability discovered in PHP Task Management System v.1.0. The flaw resides in the task_id parameter of the task-details.php and edit-task.php components. An unauthenticated remote attacker can inject arbitrary SQL commands, leading to privilege escalation and unauthorized access to sensitive information. The vulnerability has a CVSS base score of 9.8 (Critical) due to network exploitability, low attack complexity, and high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or patch is currently available, making this a high-priority unpatched risk.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This is a standalone PHP application, not an NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby package. No supply chain implications are present.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
• Base Score: 9.8 (Critical)
• Attack Vector: Network (AV:N)
• Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L)
• Privileges Required: None (PR:N)
• User Interaction: None (UI:N)
• Scope: Unchanged (S:U)
• Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H)
• Integrity Impact: High (I:H)
• Availability Impact: High (A:H)
• EPSS Score: 0.0% (low exploitation probability currently, but expected to rise)

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is a classic SQL injection in the task_id GET parameter. The application fails to sanitize or parameterize user input before constructing SQL queries. An attacker can inject SQL commands to bypass authentication, extract database contents, or modify data.

Vulnerable Code Path:

• task-details.php and edit-task.php directly concatenate $_GET['task_id'] into SQL queries without prepared statements or input validation.

Example vulnerable query:

$sql = "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id = " . $_GET['task_id'];

Attack Vector:

• Unauthenticated HTTP GET request to task-details.php?task_id=1 UNION SELECT ...
• The injected SQL can be used to enumerate tables, extract user credentials, or escalate privileges.

Impact:

• Full database compromise (user credentials, task data, application configuration).
• Potential for remote code execution if the database user has file write privileges (e.g., INTO OUTFILE).

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (PHP Task Management System v.1.0):

// task-details.php
$task_id = $_GET['task_id'];
$query = "SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id = $task_id";
$result = mysqli_query($conn, $query);

Patched Code (Recommended):

// task-details.php
$task_id = intval($_GET['task_id']); // or use prepared statement
$stmt = $conn->prepare("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE task_id = ?");
$stmt->bind_param("i", $task_id);
$stmt->execute();
$result = $stmt->get_result();

Key Differences:

• Use of intval() or prepared statements eliminates SQL injection.
• Input is treated as data, not executable code.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Lab Environment:

• Install PHP Task Management System v.1.0 on a local LAMP stack.
• Ensure task-details.php and edit-task.php are accessible.

Exploitation Steps:

1. Identify the vulnerable parameter: task_id.
2. Test for SQL injection with a simple payload:

   http://target/task-details.php?task_id=1'
   

   If an error is returned, the parameter is injectable.
3. Use UNION-based injection to extract data:

   http://target/task-details.php?task_id=1 UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,98,99,100--
   

4. Enumerate database tables:

   http://target/task-details.php?task_id=1 UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,98,99,100,group_concat(table_name) FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema=database()--
   

5. Extract user credentials from users table.

No public exploit code is available; the above is a generic SQLi methodology.

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection:

• Monitor HTTP GET requests to task-details.php and edit-task.php for abnormal task_id values (e.g., containing SQL keywords like UNION, SELECT, ', --).
• Deploy a Web Application Firewall (WAF) with SQL injection signatures.
• Enable database query logging to detect anomalous queries.

Mitigation:

• Immediately apply input validation and parameterized queries (see patched code).
• Restrict database user privileges (e.g., no FILE privilege).
• Use a WAF to block malicious payloads until a patch is applied.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network IOCs:
  • HTTP requests to /task-details.php or /edit-task.php with task_id containing SQL metacharacters (', ", --, #, UNION, SELECT, 1=1).
  • Unusual database error messages in HTTP responses (e.g., You have an error in your SQL syntax).
• File IOCs:
  • Unexpected files in the web root (e.g., shell.php, cmd.php) if the attacker achieved file write.
• Log IOCs:
  • Database logs showing queries with UNION, INTO OUTFILE, or LOAD_FILE.
  • Web server logs with repeated requests to vulnerable endpoints with varying task_id values.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

Sigma Rule

Suricata Rule

Remediation & Mitigation

1. Immediate Actions:

   • Apply input validation: Use intval() or prepared statements for all database queries.
   • Restrict database user privileges to least privilege (e.g., no FILE, CREATE, DROP).
   • Deploy a WAF with SQL injection rules (e.g., ModSecurity with OWASP CRS).

2. Long-term Fix:

   • Rewrite all database interactions using parameterized queries (PDO or MySQLi prepared statements).
   • Conduct a full code audit for similar injection flaws.
   • Implement a Content Security Policy (CSP) and input sanitization library.

3. Monitoring:

   • Enable detailed logging for web and database servers.
   • Set up alerts for SQL injection patterns in logs.

4. Vendor Communication:

   • Since the vendor is unresponsive, consider forking the project and applying patches internally.

Valters IT
DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Division