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CVE-2024-3777

CVE-2024-3777 Supply Chain Attack in Ai3
📅 PUBLISHED: 2024-04-15 03:26 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-09 05:41 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.71%
👁️
0.71% probability
17.7× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
9.8
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-3777 is a critical vulnerability in the Ai3 QbiBot platform, specifically within its password reset feature. The flaw allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to reset any user's password due to a lack of proper access control (CWE-306). With a CVSS score of 9.8, this vulnerability poses a severe risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected system. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or patch details are currently available, but the potential for account takeover and lateral movement is high.

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Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to an NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby package. It is a proprietary web application vulnerability in the Ai3 QbiBot product.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical)
  • Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
  • Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) - The vulnerability can be exploited remotely over the network.
  • Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) - No special conditions or complex attack sequences are required.
  • Privileges Required: None (PR:N) - The attacker does not need any authentication.
  • User Interaction: None (UI:N) - No user action is required for exploitation.
  • Scope: Unchanged (S:U) - The impact is confined to the vulnerable component.
  • Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H) - An attacker can gain full access to user accounts and sensitive data.
  • Integrity Impact: High (I:H) - An attacker can modify user data and system settings.
  • Availability Impact: High (A:H) - An attacker could potentially lock out legitimate users or disrupt service.

Threat Level: Critical. Immediate action is required to mitigate the risk of account takeover and data breach.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the password reset functionality of the Ai3 QbiBot. Typically, a secure password reset process requires authentication (e.g., a token sent to the user's email) or at least a verification step. In this case, the endpoint responsible for resetting passwords does not enforce any access control checks. This means an unauthenticated attacker can directly call the password reset API or function without providing a valid token or session.

The likely attack flow is:

  1. Reconnaissance: The attacker identifies the password reset endpoint (e.g., /api/reset-password, /forgot-password, or similar).
  2. Crafting the Request: The attacker sends a POST request to the endpoint with a target username or user ID and a new password of their choice.
  3. Exploitation: The server processes the request without verifying the identity of the requester, thus resetting the target user's password.
  4. Account Takeover: The attacker then logs in with the newly set password, gaining full access to the victim's account.

The lack of access control (CWE-306) is the root cause. The server fails to validate that the requestor is authorized to perform the password reset action.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch details are available, we can only hypothesize the vulnerable and patched code patterns.

Vulnerable Code (Python/Flask example):

@app.route('/api/reset-password', methods=['POST'])
def reset_password():
    username = request.json.get('username')
    new_password = request.json.get('new_password')
    # Missing authentication/authorization check
    user = User.query.filter_by(username=username).first()
    if user:
        user.set_password(new_password)
        db.session.commit()
        return jsonify({"status": "success"}), 200
    return jsonify({"error": "User not found"}), 404

Patched Code (Python/Flask example):

@app.route('/api/reset-password', methods=['POST'])
def reset_password():
    # Authentication check
    if not session.get('user_id'):
        return jsonify({"error": "Unauthorized"}), 401
    # Authorization check - ensure the user is resetting their own password
    current_user_id = session.get('user_id')
    username = request.json.get('username')
    new_password = request.json.get('new_password')
    user = User.query.filter_by(username=username).first()
    if user and user.id == current_user_id:
        user.set_password(new_password)
        db.session.commit()
        return jsonify({"status": "success"}), 200
    return jsonify({"error": "Forbidden"}), 403

The patched version adds a session check to ensure the user is authenticated and an authorization check to ensure they are resetting their own password.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Lab Setup:

  1. Deploy a vulnerable instance of Ai3 QbiBot (if available) or set up a mock environment with a similar password reset endpoint.
  2. Use a tool like Burp Suite or Postman to interact with the API.

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Identify the password reset endpoint. Common paths include /api/reset-password, /reset, /forgot-password, or /user/reset.
  2. Send a POST request with the target username and a new password.
curl -X POST https://target.com/api/reset-password \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "admin", "new_password": "Pwned123!"}'
  1. If successful, the server returns a success message.
  2. Log in with the new credentials:
curl -X POST https://target.com/api/login \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "admin", "password": "Pwned123!"}'
  1. Use the obtained session token to access admin functionalities.

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection:

  • Monitor for unusual password reset requests, especially those without a preceding forgot-password flow.
  • Alert on multiple password reset attempts for different users from the same IP.
  • Log all password reset events and correlate with authentication logs.

Mitigation:

  • Implement proper access control on the password reset endpoint.
  • Require a valid, one-time token sent via email or SMS.
  • Enforce rate limiting on password reset attempts.
  • Use Web Application Firewall (WAF) rules to block direct API calls to reset endpoints without proper headers.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network IOCs:
    • POST requests to /api/reset-password or similar endpoints without a valid session cookie.
    • Unusual login events immediately following a password reset.
    • Multiple failed login attempts followed by a successful login with a new password.
  • System IOCs:
    • User accounts with recently changed passwords that were not initiated by the legitimate user.
    • Log entries showing password reset API calls from IP addresses not associated with known users.
  • File IOCs:
    • No specific file-based IOCs are expected, as this is a logic flaw.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2024_3777_Password_Reset_Exploit {
    meta:
        description = "Detects attempts to exploit CVE-2024-3777 by looking for password reset API calls without authentication"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2024-10-27"
        reference = "CVE-2024-3777"
    strings:
        $api_path = "/api/reset-password" nocase
        $json_key_username = "\"username\"" nocase
        $json_key_password = "\"new_password\"" nocase
    condition:
        all of them
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2024-3777 - Unauthenticated Password Reset Attempt
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP POST requests to the password reset endpoint without a valid session cookie.
author: Valters IT
date: 2024/10/27
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: POST
        cs-uri-stem: '/api/reset-password'
        cs-uri-query: '*'
    filter:
        cs-cookie: 'session=*'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate password reset requests from authenticated users (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"CVE-2024-3777 - Unauthenticated Password Reset Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/api/reset-password"; http_uri; content:!"session="; http_cookie; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

  1. Immediate Actions:

    • If a patch is available, apply it immediately.
    • If no patch is available, disable the password reset feature temporarily or implement a compensating control, such as a WAF rule to block direct API calls.
    • Review all user accounts for unauthorized password changes and force password resets for all users.
  2. Long-term Fixes:

    • Implement proper access control on the password reset endpoint. Ensure that only authenticated users can reset their own passwords.
    • Use a token-based password reset flow where a unique, time-limited token is sent to the user's registered email or phone.
    • Conduct a security audit of all API endpoints to ensure they enforce authentication and authorization.
  3. Detection and Monitoring:

    • Deploy the provided YARA, Sigma, and Suricata rules to detect exploitation attempts.
    • Enable detailed logging for all authentication and password reset events.
    • Set up alerts for unusual patterns, such as multiple password resets from a single IP.
  4. User Awareness:

    • Notify users to be vigilant about unexpected password reset emails or notifications.
    • Encourage users to enable multi-factor authentication (MFA) if available.

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