CVE-2024-38466

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-38466 exposes a critical security flaw in Shenzhen Guoxin Synthesis image systems prior to version 8.3.0. The vulnerability is a hardcoded default credential (123456Qw) that is universally applied to all installations. This allows any attacker who can reach the system's login interface to gain administrative access without any authentication bypass or exploitation of additional vulnerabilities. The presence of a static, well-known password effectively nullifies the system's access control, enabling full compromise of the image processing and management platform. This is a classic example of CWE-798 (Use of Hard-coded Credentials) and is trivial to exploit, posing a severe risk to operational security in environments using this system.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to an open-source package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It is a proprietary embedded system vulnerability. The risk is introduced directly by the vendor's manufacturing and deployment process, where the default password is not randomized or forced to be changed upon first login.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

While no official CVSS vector is provided, a reasonable assessment based on the vulnerability characteristics is:

• Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – The system is accessible over a network.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions are required.
• Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – No prior authentication needed.
• User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user action required.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The vulnerable component is the only one affected.
• Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Full access to all data on the system.
• Integrity (I): High (H) – Full control to modify system settings and data.
• Availability (A): High (H) – Ability to disrupt or destroy the system.

Estimated CVSS Base Score: 9.8 (Critical)

The threat level is Critical due to the ease of exploitation, the lack of required privileges, and the potential for complete system compromise.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is not a complex software bug but a fundamental security design flaw. The Shenzhen Guoxin Synthesis image system, which is likely used for industrial image processing, surveillance, or document management, ships with a hardcoded administrative password: 123456Qw.

Mechanics:

1. The system's authentication mechanism, likely a web interface or API, checks user-provided credentials against a stored hash or plaintext value.
2. During initial setup or factory reset, the system creates a default administrative user (e.g., admin or root) with the password 123456Qw.
3. The system does not enforce a password change on first login.
4. An attacker who discovers the system's IP address can simply attempt to log in using the default credentials.
5. Upon successful authentication, the attacker gains full administrative privileges, allowing them to view, modify, or delete images, change system configurations, create backdoor accounts, or pivot to other network resources.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

The vulnerability is not in a specific code function but in the system's configuration and deployment process.

Vulnerable Behavior (Version < 8.3.0):

• The system's initialization script or configuration file contains a hardcoded password.
• Example (conceptual):

  # /etc/init.d/guoxin-init.sh
  echo "admin:123456Qw" | chpasswd
  

• The system does not check if the password has been changed before granting access.

Patched Behavior (Version >= 8.3.0):

• The vendor has removed the hardcoded default password.
• The system now generates a unique, random password during first boot.
• Alternatively, the system forces the administrator to set a password during the initial setup wizard.
• Example (conceptual):

  # /etc/init.d/guoxin-init.sh
  if [ ! -f /etc/guoxin/.initialized ]; then
      NEW_PASS=$(openssl rand -base64 12)
      echo "admin:$NEW_PASS" | chpasswd
      touch /etc/guoxin/.initialized
      echo "Initial password: $NEW_PASS" > /etc/guoxin/password.txt
  fi
  

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Lab Setup:

1. Deploy a vulnerable Shenzhen Guoxin Synthesis image system (version < 8.3.0) in an isolated network.
2. Ensure the system's web interface or API is accessible from the attacker's machine.

Exploitation Steps:

1. Discovery: Scan the network for the system. Common ports might include 80 (HTTP), 443 (HTTPS), or a custom port.

   nmap -p 80,443,8080 192.168.1.0/24 --open
   

2. Identify Login Page: Access the system's IP address in a browser. Look for a login form.
3. Attempt Default Credentials:
   • Username: admin
   • Password: 123456Qw
   • If admin fails, try root, administrator, or guoxin.
4. Automated Exploitation (using cURL):

   curl -X POST http://192.168.1.100/login \
     -d "username=admin&password=123456Qw" \
     -c cookies.txt
   

5. Post-Exploitation: Once logged in, the attacker can:
   • Download all stored images.
   • Modify system settings.
   • Upload a web shell for persistent access.
   • Use the system as a pivot point to attack other internal systems.

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection & Response:

1. Monitor Authentication Logs: Look for successful logins from unexpected IP addresses, especially using the username admin.

   grep "Accepted password for admin" /var/log/auth.log
   

2. Network Monitoring: Detect brute-force attempts or single login attempts using the default password.
   • Suricata Rule: (See Detection Engineering section)
3. Honeypot: Deploy a decoy system with the same default credentials to detect scanning activity.
4. Immediate Remediation:
   • Change the default password immediately on all systems.
   • If possible, isolate the system from the internet and untrusted networks.
   • Apply the vendor's patch (upgrade to version 8.3.0 or later).

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network IOCs:
  • Successful HTTP POST requests to /login with body containing password=123456Qw.
  • Connections from external IPs to the system's management interface on ports 80/443.
• System IOCs:
  • Presence of a new administrative user account.
  • Unusual outbound connections from the system (e.g., to a C2 server).
  • Modified system configuration files (e.g., /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow).
  • New files in the web root directory (e.g., /var/www/html/shell.php).
• File IOCs:
  • Hash of the default password file (if accessible): 123456Qw (MD5: e10adc3949ba59abbe56e057f20f883e).

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2024_38466_Default_Credential {
    meta:
        description = "Detects the hardcoded default password 123456Qw in Shenzhen Guoxin Synthesis image system configuration files"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2024-01-01"
        reference = "CVE-2024-38466"
        hash = "e10adc3949ba59abbe56e057f20f883e"
    strings:
        $password = "123456Qw"
        $username = "admin"
    condition:
        $password and $username
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2024-38466 - Default Credential Login Attempt
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects successful login attempts using the default password 123456Qw for Shenzhen Guoxin Synthesis image system
author: Valters IT
date: 2024/01/01
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38466
logsource:
    category: application
    product: guoxin_synthesis
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624  # Successful logon
        TargetUserName: 'admin'
        LogonProcessName: 'Advapi'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative actions during initial setup (should be rare)
level: critical

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
    msg:"CVE-2024-38466 - Shenzhen Guoxin Synthesis Default Credential Attempt";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"POST"; http_method;
    content:"/login"; http_uri;
    content:"password=123456Qw"; http_client_body;
    classtype:attempted-admin;
    sid:1000001;
    rev:1;
    reference:cve,2024-38466;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Change Default Password: Log into every Shenzhen Guoxin Synthesis image system and change the password from 123456Qw to a strong, unique password.
2. Network Segmentation: Place these systems on a separate VLAN with strict firewall rules. Do not expose them directly to the internet.
3. Apply Vendor Patch: Upgrade the system firmware to version 8.3.0 or later, which removes the hardcoded default credential.

Long-Term Mitigations:

1. Vendor Accountability: Demand that the vendor provide a secure-by-default configuration in future releases, including randomized initial passwords and mandatory password change on first login.
2. Regular Audits: Conduct periodic security audits of all embedded systems to identify and remediate default credentials.
3. Monitoring: Implement the detection rules provided above to alert on any attempts to use the default password.

Valters IT – Securing your digital infrastructure with precision and expertise.