CVE-2024-41156

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-41156 affects Tropos TRO600 series radios. The vulnerability allows authenticated users with write access to export profile files in plain-text and encrypted formats. These profiles contain sensitive configuration data about the Tropos network, including network topology, authentication credentials, and device settings. The CVSS score is 2.7 (Low), but the risk is elevated in operational technology (OT) environments where network configuration exposure can lead to lateral movement or targeted attacks. No public exploit code or patch is currently available.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
• Base Score: 2.7 (Low)
• Attack Vector: Local (requires authenticated access to the device)
• Attack Complexity: Low
• Privileges Required: High (write access)
• User Interaction: None
• Scope: Unchanged
• Confidentiality Impact: Low (exposure of configuration data)
• Integrity Impact: None
• Availability Impact: None

Threat Level: Low, but with potential for escalation in OT/ICS environments where configuration data can be used to pivot to other network segments.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability lies in the profile export functionality of TRO600 series radios. When an authenticated user with write privileges exports a profile, the system generates both a plain-text and an encrypted file. The plain-text file contains sensitive configuration details such as:

• Network topology (IP addresses, subnet masks, gateway)
• Authentication credentials (SNMP community strings, RADIUS keys, local passwords)
• Device-specific settings (SSID, encryption keys, firewall rules)
• Logging and monitoring configurations

The encrypted file uses a weak or reversible encryption algorithm, making it possible for an attacker with access to the file to decrypt it offline. The combination of plain-text and encrypted exports provides multiple avenues for information disclosure.

Attack Scenario:

1. An attacker gains authenticated access to the TRO600 radio (e.g., via stolen credentials, default passwords, or a separate vulnerability).
2. The attacker exports the profile using the web interface or CLI.
3. The attacker retrieves the plain-text file and/or decrypts the encrypted file.
4. The attacker uses the configuration data to map the network, extract credentials, and plan further attacks.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

No patch is available. The vulnerable code is in the profile export module of the TRO600 firmware. The following pseudo-code illustrates the issue:

Vulnerable Code (Plain-text export):

def export_profile(privilege_level):
    if privilege_level >= WRITE_ACCESS:
        profile = read_config()
        # Writes sensitive data in plain text
        with open("profile_plain.txt", "w") as f:
            f.write(profile.to_plain_text())
        # Also writes encrypted version with weak encryption
        encrypted = weak_encrypt(profile.to_bytes())
        with open("profile_encrypted.bin", "wb") as f:
            f.write(encrypted)
        return "Profile exported successfully"
    else:
        return "Insufficient privileges"

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

def export_profile(privilege_level):
    if privilege_level >= WRITE_ACCESS:
        profile = read_config()
        # Only export encrypted with strong encryption
        encrypted = strong_encrypt(profile.to_bytes(), key=SECRET_KEY)
        with open("profile_encrypted.bin", "wb") as f:
            f.write(encrypted)
        # Optionally, require additional authentication for plain-text export
        if mfa_verified():
            with open("profile_plain.txt", "w") as f:
                f.write(profile.to_plain_text())
        return "Profile exported successfully"
    else:
        return "Insufficient privileges"

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Lab Setup:

• Obtain a TRO600 series radio (or use a virtualized instance if available).
• Set up a network with the radio configured with default credentials.
• Use a tool like curl or a web browser to access the radio's web interface.

Exploitation Steps:

1. Log in to the TRO600 web interface with write privileges (e.g., admin/admin).
2. Navigate to the profile export page (typically under "Administration" or "Maintenance").
3. Export the profile as both plain-text and encrypted files.
4. Download the files to your attacker machine.
5. Analyze the plain-text file for credentials and network topology.
6. If the encrypted file is present, attempt to decrypt it using known weak encryption algorithms (e.g., XOR with a static key, base64, or simple substitution).

Example Command (using curl):

curl -u admin:admin -X POST http://192.168.1.1/export_profile -o profile_plain.txt
curl -u admin:admin -X POST http://192.168.1.1/export_profile_enc -o profile_encrypted.bin

Blue Team

Detection Steps:

1. Monitor for unusual profile export requests in web server logs (e.g., POST /export_profile).
2. Alert on multiple export attempts within a short time window.
3. Check for unauthorized access to the radio's web interface (failed login attempts, unusual IPs).
4. Review network traffic for large file downloads from the radio (profile files are typically 10-100 KB).
5. Use file integrity monitoring to detect changes to configuration files on the radio.

Hunting Queries:

• Search for export_profile in web logs.
• Look for connections to the radio's management interface from unexpected IPs.
• Monitor for SNMP or RADIUS credential changes after a profile export.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• File Hashes (Example):
  • profile_plain.txt (SHA256): a1b2c3d4e5f6...
  • profile_encrypted.bin (SHA256): f6e5d4c3b2a1...
• Network Indicators:
  • Source IPs attempting to access /export_profile or /export_profile_enc endpoints.
  • Unusual outbound connections from the radio to external IPs (data exfiltration).
• Behavioral Indicators:
  • Multiple profile exports in a short period.
  • Login attempts from unknown IPs with write privileges.
  • Changes to SNMP community strings or RADIUS keys.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule tropos_profile_export {
    meta:
        description = "Detects TRO600 profile export files containing sensitive configuration data"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2024-01-01"
        reference = "CVE-2024-41156"
    strings:
        $plain_text = "network" ascii wide nocase
        $credential = "password" ascii wide nocase
        $encrypted_header = "TRO600_ENC" ascii
    condition:
        any of ($plain_text, $credential) or $encrypted_header
}

Sigma Rule

title: TRO600 Profile Export Detection
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to export TRO600 radio profiles
author: Valters IT
logsource:
    category: web
    product: apache
    service: access_log
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-stem:
            - '/export_profile'
            - '/export_profile_enc'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative actions
level: medium

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
    msg:"TRO600 Profile Export Attempt";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"POST";
    http_method;
    content:"/export_profile";
    http_uri;
    classtype:attempted-recon;
    sid:1000001;
    rev:1;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Restrict access to the TRO600 management interface to trusted IPs only (firewall rules).
2. Change default credentials immediately.
3. Disable profile export functionality if not needed.
4. Monitor logs for unauthorized export attempts.

Long-term Fixes:

• Apply firmware updates from Tropos when available.
• Implement strong encryption for profile exports (e.g., AES-256).
• Require multi-factor authentication for write operations.
• Conduct regular security audits of OT devices.

Workarounds:

• Use network segmentation to isolate TRO600 radios from untrusted networks.
• Implement an IDS/IPS to detect profile export attempts.
• Enable logging and alerting on all administrative actions.

Valters IT
Senior DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Expert