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CVE-2024-45616

CVE-2024-45616 Buffer Overflow in Opensc
📅 PUBLISHED: 2024-09-03 21:20 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-15 23:35 UTC
[ OFFICIAL PATCH DEPLOYED ↓ ] FIX: CONFIRMED — 3+ independent sources confirm fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.36%
👁️
0.36% probability
8.9× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
Country: USA License: Commercial
Patch available — upgrade to latest release
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
3.9
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

SHADOW_DORKS: ["OpenSC smart card", "OpenSC APDU buffer"]

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-45616 is a vulnerability in OpenSC, a set of open-source tools and libraries for working with smart cards and USB cryptographic tokens. The flaw resides in insufficient control of the response APDU (Application Protocol Data Unit) buffer and its length during communication with a card. An attacker with physical access or the ability to supply a malicious USB device or smart card can send a specially crafted response to APDUs, potentially leading to a buffer overflow. This could allow arbitrary code execution or denial of service on the host system. The vulnerability affects OpenSC tools, PKCS#11 module, minidriver, and CTK. No public exploit or patch is currently available.

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CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • CVSS Score: 0.0 (No CVSS vector provided)
  • Attack Vector: Physical (requires malicious USB device or smart card)
  • Attack Complexity: Low
  • Privileges Required: None
  • User Interaction: Required (user must insert the malicious device)
  • Scope: Unchanged
  • Confidentiality Impact: High (potential for arbitrary code execution)
  • Integrity Impact: High
  • Availability Impact: High
  • Threat Level: High (due to potential for full system compromise via physical access)

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is a classic buffer overflow in the APDU response handling. When a smart card or USB token communicates with the host via APDUs, the host expects a response of a certain length. If the card returns a response that exceeds the allocated buffer size, the excess data can overwrite adjacent memory. This can corrupt data, crash the application, or be leveraged for code execution.

The issue is in the opensc library and its associated tools (e.g., opensc-tool, pkcs11-spy, minidriver). The lack of proper bounds checking on the response APDU buffer allows an attacker to control the overflow content. Since the attacker supplies the malicious device, they can craft the response to include shellcode or other payloads.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):

// Example of vulnerable APDU response handling
unsigned char response[256];
int len = transmit_apdu(apdu, response, sizeof(response));
// No check if len > sizeof(response)
process_response(response, len);

Patched Code (Conceptual):

unsigned char response[256];
int len = transmit_apdu(apdu, response, sizeof(response));
if (len > sizeof(response)) {
    // Handle error, truncate, or reject
    len = sizeof(response);
}
process_response(response, len);

The patched version ensures that the response length does not exceed the buffer size before processing.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Prerequisites:

  • A programmable smart card or USB token (e.g., Java Card, FIPS 201 card)
  • OpenSC tools installed on the target system
  • Physical access to the target

Steps:

  1. Program the malicious card to return an oversized APDU response.
  2. Insert the card into the target system.
  3. When the user or system initiates communication (e.g., via opensc-tool), the card sends the crafted response.
  4. The buffer overflow occurs, potentially executing arbitrary code.

Example Payload (Conceptual):

# Python script to program a Java Card with oversized response
from smartcard.System import readers
from smartcard.util import toBytes

# Connect to card
r = readers()
connection = r[0].createConnection()
connection.connect()

# Craft APDU response that overflows buffer
overflow_payload = b'A' * 512  # Exceeds typical 256-byte buffer
# Send APDU command that triggers the vulnerable response handling
apdu = [0x00, 0xA4, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00]  # SELECT command
response, sw1, sw2 = connection.transmit(apdu)
# The card should respond with the overflow payload

Blue Team

Detection:

  • Monitor for unusual smart card activity, especially from unknown devices.
  • Use endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to detect buffer overflow attempts.
  • Implement application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized OpenSC tools.

Mitigation:

  • Disable automatic smart card services if not needed.
  • Use only trusted smart cards from known sources.
  • Apply vendor patches when available.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • File Hashes: None available (no known malware)
  • Network Indicators: None (local attack)
  • Process Names: opensc-tool, pkcs11-spy, minidriver
  • Registry Keys: N/A
  • YARA Rule: See Detection Engineering

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2024_45616_OpenSC_Buffer_Overflow {
    meta:
        description = "Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2024-45616 in OpenSC"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2024-45616"
    strings:
        $apdu_response = /[A-Za-z0-9]{256,}/  // Long APDU response
        $opensc_tool = "opensc-tool"
        $pkcs11_spy = "pkcs11-spy"
    condition:
        any of ($opensc_tool, $pkcs11_spy) and $apdu_response
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2024-45616 OpenSC Buffer Overflow Detection
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects oversized APDU responses in OpenSC logs
author: Valters IT
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: syslog
detection:
    selection:
        - EventID: 1000  # Example event ID for OpenSC errors
        - Message: "*buffer overflow*" or "*APDU response too long*"
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate large APDU responses from some cards
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2024-45616 OpenSC Buffer Overflow Attempt"; flow:to_server; content:"|00 A4 04 00 00|"; depth:5; content:"|41 41 41 41|"; distance:0; within:512; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

  1. Patch: Apply vendor patches when available. Monitor OpenSC GitHub for updates.
  2. Workaround: Disable automatic smart card services (systemctl stop pcscd).
  3. Access Control: Restrict physical access to systems.
  4. Monitoring: Enable logging for smart card events and monitor for anomalies.
  5. User Training: Educate users not to insert unknown smart cards or USB devices.

Valters IT
DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence

◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2024-45616/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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