CVE-2024-46941

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-46941 is a security vulnerability in Android's SystemUI component, characterized by an incorrect component protection setting that permits unauthorized access to specific sensitive information. The flaw resides in how SystemUI exposes certain components without adequate permission checks, potentially allowing a locally installed malicious application to retrieve data that should be restricted to system-level interfaces. While the NVD has not yet assigned a CVSS score, the vulnerability's local attack vector and information disclosure impact classify it as a medium-severity issue in the Android ecosystem. All Android devices running versions that include SystemUI with the vulnerable component protection configuration are potentially affected, with the actual impact dependent on the specific information exposed through this misconfiguration.

Technical Analysis

The vulnerability is rooted in Android's component protection model, specifically within the SystemUI package (com.android.systemui). Android employs a permission-based access control system where components such as Activities, Services, and Broadcast Receivers are protected by permissions declared in the AndroidManifest.xml file. When a component is declared with android:exported="true" (or implicitly exported due to intent filters) without an accompanying android:permission attribute or proper signature-level permission enforcement, any application on the device can invoke it.

The "incorrect component protection setting" described in the NVD entry indicates that one or more SystemUI components have been declared with insufficient protection levels. This is a common source of Android vulnerabilities, often arising from developers forgetting to specify android:permission on exported components, or mistakenly using android:protectionLevel="normal" instead of android:protectionLevel="signature" or "signatureOrSystem".

The attack surface is entirely local — an attacker must have an application installed on the target device to exploit this vulnerability. The information disclosure occurs when a malicious app invokes the unprotected SystemUI component via an Intent, Activity start, or Service binding. The exposed information could include UI state data, system configuration details, or other sensitive data that SystemUI maintains internally.

Because the patch confidence is 2/4 (claimed but not independently confirmed), there is a single source asserting that a fix exists. This is likely an Android Security Bulletin patch that corrected the exported state or added the required permission check to the vulnerable component. The fix would typically involve either setting android:exported="false" on the component (if external access is unnecessary) or adding a android:permission attribute referencing a signature-level permission.

Exploitation Scenarios

Step 1: Reconnaissance and Target Identification

An attacker first identifies a vulnerable Android device running a version of Android with the affected SystemUI component. Target identification involves checking the Android version via the device's Settings, or the attacker could distribute a malicious app through a third-party app store or phishing campaign targeting users of specific Android versions.

Step 2: Crafting the Malicious Application

The attacker develops an Android application using the standard SDK. The malicious app contains a module that constructs explicit intents targeting SystemUI components. Through reverse engineering of the SystemUI APK (which is accessible via AOSP source code or extracted from a device), the attacker identifies the specific component name and its expected Intent structure.

// Simplified exploit logic in attacker's app (not actual code)
Intent intent = new Intent();
intent.setClassName("com.android.systemui", "com.android.systemui.power.PowerUI");
intent.putExtra("action", "get_battery_stats");
startActivity(intent);

The attacker's app also declares no special permissions, proving that the component protection is truly bypassed.

Step 3: Exploitation Trigger

When the victim installs and launches the malicious app, the app invokes the unprotected SystemUI component. Depending on the component type:

• Activity: The attacker starts the Activity, potentially triggering UI elements that leak information through Intent extras or result data.
• Service: The attacker binds to the Service and receives data through the Binder interface.
• Broadcast Receiver: The attacker sends crafted broadcasts that trigger the receiver to pass sensitive data back to the attacker's app.

Step 4: Information Collection and Exfiltration

The sensitive information exposed by the component is captured by the malicious app. This data could include system status indicators, notification metadata, or UI configuration values. The attacker's app then exfiltrates this data by:

• Sending it to a remote C2 server via HTTPS POST requests.
• Storing it locally and transmitting during the next network connection.
• Using Android's notification listener APIs if elevated privileges are also compromised.

Step 5: Post-Exploitation Impact

While this vulnerability is limited to information disclosure, it can serve as a stepping stone in a broader attack chain. The harvested information might reveal:

• Device-specific identifiers useful for targeted attacks.
• User behavior patterns (e.g., screen lock state, battery status) for social engineering.
• System configuration details that aid in exploiting additional vulnerabilities.

In a sandbox-escape scenario, the information could be combined with other privilege escalation exploits to gain broader access to the device.

Impact Assessment

Confidentiality Impact: The vulnerability directly compromises confidentiality by allowing unauthorized access to specific information. The data exposed is typically system-level information that applications should not be able to retrieve, though the exact scope is limited by what the vulnerable component exposes.

Integrity Impact: None expected — this is a pure information disclosure vulnerability with no mechanism for data modification or system manipulation.

Availability Impact: None expected — the vulnerability does not cause denial of service or system crashes.

CVSS Analysis: With no official CVSS score assigned, a reasonable estimate based on the AV:L (Local), AC:L (Low), PR:L (Low), UI:R (Required), S:U (Unchanged), C:L (Low), I:N (None), A:N (None) vector would yield a base score of approximately 3.3, placing it in the Low severity category (3.1-4.0). However, context matters: if this component is part of a chain of vulnerabilities in a high-value target environment, the practical impact could be elevated.

Affected Systems: All Android versions that include the vulnerable SystemUI component are affected. This potentially spans multiple Android versions (Android 10 through Android 14+), depending on when the incorrect protection setting was introduced.

Blast Radius: The blast radius is limited to a single device per exploitation event. However, because Android has billions of active devices, the aggregate attack surface is substantial. For enterprises, any Android device used for corporate data is a potential target, and a successful exploitation chain could lead to corporate data exposure if other local vulnerabilities are chained.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: Android SystemUI Component Protection Bypass - CVE-2024-46941
id: 2b8f7a3e-9d4c-4f6a-8e2b-1a5f9c7d3e21
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious local application activity attempting to invoke protected SystemUI components on Android devices
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-46941
author: Valtersit Threat Intelligence
date: 2024/06/15
tags:
    - attack.t1548
    - attack.initial-access
    - cve.2024.46941
logsource:
    product: android
    service: logcat
    category: system
detection:
    selection:
        - 'com.android.systemui' in component_name
        - 'Permission Denial' in message
        - 'requires' in message and 'from pid' in message
    filter_known:
        - message|contains: 'android.permission.DUMP'
        - message|contains: 'android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE'
    condition: selection and not filter_known
level: medium
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate system processes invoking SystemUI components
    - Debugging tools with proper permissions
fields:
    - process_name
    - uid
    - component_name
    - message

YARA Rule

rule Android_SystemUI_CVE_2024_46941
{
    meta:
        author = "Valtersit Threat Intelligence"
        description = "Detects Android applications attempting to exploit CVE-2024-46941 SystemUI component protection bypass"
        date = "2024-06-15"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-46941"
        severity = "medium"
        cve = "CVE-2024-46941"

    strings:
        $s1 = "com.android.systemui" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "startActivity" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "bindService" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "getSystemService" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "intent.setClassName" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "systemui" ascii wide nocase
        
        $m1 = "power" ascii wide nocase
        $m2 = "statusbar" ascii wide nocase
        $m3 = "notification" ascii wide nocase
        $m4 = "battery" ascii wide nocase
        $m5 = "display" ascii wide nocase

    condition:
        // DEX/APK file and contains SystemUI references
        uint32(0) == 0x46445700 or // DEX magic
        uint32(0) == 0x50414B00 or // APK/ZIP magic
        (
            any of ($s*) and
            any of ($m*) and
            (filesize < 10MB) and
            (
                uint32(0) == 0x46445700 or
                uint32(0) == 0x50414B00
            )
        )
}

rule Android_SystemUI_Information_Disclosure_Heuristic
{
    meta:
        author = "Valtersit Threat Intelligence"
        description = "Heuristic detection for apps with high-risk SystemUI interaction patterns"
        date = "2024-06-15"
        severity = "high"

    strings:
        // Components that might be exposed
        $c1 = "PowerUI" ascii wide
        $c2 = "NotificationShade" ascii wide
        $c3 = "StatusBar" ascii wide
        $c4 = "SystemUIService" ascii wide
        $c5 = "RecentsActivity" ascii wide
        
        // Data extraction patterns
        $d1 = "getExtra" ascii wide
        $d2 = "getData" ascii wide
        $d3 = "getString" ascii wide
        $d4 = "readLine" ascii wide
        $d5 = "openFileInput" ascii wide
        
        // Exfiltration patterns
        $e1 = "HttpURLConnection" ascii wide
        $e2 = "Socket" ascii wide
        $e3 = "sendData" ascii wide
        $e4 = "outputStream" ascii wide

    condition:
        (any of ($c*) and any of ($d*)) and any of ($e*)
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2024-46941 Android SystemUI Data Exfiltration Attempt"; flow:established,to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/data/upload"; http_uri; content:"device_id"; nocase; http_client_body; threshold:type limit, track by_src, count 10, seconds 60; classtype:attempted-information-leak; reference:url,nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-46941; sid:1002446; rev:1;)

alert tls any any -> any 443 (msg:"CVE-2024-46941 Android SystemUI Compromise - Suspicious TLS Beacon"; flow:established; tls.sni; content:"|2e|exfil|2e|"; nocase; tls.sni; content:"|2e|top"; nocase; tls.sni; classtype:site-beacon; metadata:cve 2024 46941; sid:1002447; rev:1;)

alert dns any any -> any 53 (msg:"CVE-2024-46941 Android SystemUI exploit DNS query to exfil domain"; dns.query; content:"systemul-enum"; nocase; dns.query; content:".com"; dns.query; threshold:type limit, track by_src, count 20, seconds 300; classtype:attempted-information-leak; sid:1002448; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

// EQL query to detect suspicious local app activity targeting SystemUI
sequence by process.entity_id
  [process where event.action == "start" and 
   process.name : "app_process*" and
   event.outcome == "success"]
  [process where event.action == "start" and
   process.parent.name : "zygote*" and
   process.args : "*com.android.systemui*"]
  [network where event.action == "connect" and
   destination.port >= 443 and
   destination.ip != "0.0.0.0" and
   network.protocol == "tls" or network.protocol == "http"]

// Alerts for multiple SystemUI permission denials from same app
process where event.action == "access-denied" and
  process.args : "*Permission Denial*" and
  process.args : "*com.android.systemui*" and
  process.code_signature.status == "unsigned" and
  // High frequency pattern
  (process.name in ("com.malicious.app1", "com.malicious.app2"))
| stats count as denial_count by process.name, process.code_signature.subject_name
| where denial_count > 5

// Anomalous component invocation from non-system app
any where 
  event.category == "process" and
  event.type == "start" and
  process.executable == "/system/bin/app_process32" or
  process.executable == "/system/bin/app_process64" and
  process.args contains "com.android.systemui" and
  not process.code_signature.subject_name in ("AOSP", "Google Inc.")

Splunk SPL Query

index=android_os sourcetype="logcat" 
| regex message=".*Permission Denial.*com\.android\.systemui.*"
| eval malicious = if(match(uid, "^u0_a[0-9]+$") AND uid != "u0_a0", "true", "false")
| where malicious == "true"
| stats count as denial_count by uid, process_name, app_package, component_name
| where denial_count > 3
| table _time, uid, process_name, app_package, component_name, denial_count
| sort - denial_count

index=network_traffic sourcetype="ssl" 
| search dest_port=443 AND sni_keywords IN ("exfil", "beacon", "upload", "data")
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, sni
| eval severity = if(count > 20, "high", "medium")
| table src_ip, dest_ip, sni, count, severity

index=android_debug sourcetype="am_proc_start" 
| search component LIKE "%systemui%" 
| eval is_system_app = if(uid < 10000, 1, 0)
| where is_system_app == 0
| stats earliest(_time) as first_seen, latest(_time) as last_seen, count by app_package, component
| eval exploitation_time = last_seen - first_seen
| where count > 1
| table first_seen, last_seen, app_package, component, count, exploitation_time

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="android,">
    <rule id="120500" level="12">
        <decoded>logcat</decoded>
        <match>Permission Denial</match>
        <regex>com\.android\.systemui</regex>
        <description>Android: Potential CVE-2024-46941 exploitation attempt - unauthorized access to SystemUI components detected</description>
        <mitre>
            <id>T1548</id>
        </mitre>
        <group>cve-2024-46941,android,systemui,information_disclosure</group>
    </rule>

    <rule id="120501" level="15" frequency="5" timeframe="60">
        <if_matched_sid>120500</if_matched_sid>
        <same_uid/>
        <description>Android: Repeated SystemUI permission denial from same UID - likely active exploitation of CVE-2024-46941</description>
        <mitre>
            <id>T1548</id>
        </mitre>
        <group>cve-2024-46941,android,privilege_escalation</group>
    </rule>

    <rule id="120502" level="10">
        <decoded>logcat</decoded>
        <match>unable to start activity</match>
        <regex>com\.android\.systemui</regex>
        <description>Android: Non-system app attempting to invoke restricted SystemUI component - Indicator of CVE-2024-46941 reconnaissance</description>
        <group>cve-2024-46941,android,reconnaissance</group>
    </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch Confidence: 2/4 (CLAIMED — single source claims patch (not independently confirmed))

The patch status for CVE-2024-46941 is currently unconfirmed. While one source claims a fix exists, this has not been independently verified through official Android Security Bulletin channels. Enterprises should exercise caution and assume the vulnerability may be unpatched on many devices.

1) Immediate Mitigations (until patch is confirmed and deployed):

• Disable sideloading: Restrict installation of apps from unknown sources using mobile device management (MDM) policies (e.g., Microsoft Intune, VMware Workspace ONE, MobileIron). Set INSTALL_NON_MARKET_APPS to denied via device policy.
• Application whitelisting: Only allow approved corporate applications on managed devices using Android Enterprise's setAlwaysOnVpnPackage and managed configuration.
• Enforce Play Protect: Ensure Google Play Protect is enabled and set to "Scan device for security threats" on all devices. Verify via MDM policy that GPS_ENFORCE_APPS_SCAN is enforced.
• Monitor app behavior: Use Android Enterprise recommended security apps that monitor for unusual component invocation patterns (e.g., Lookout, Zimperium, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint).
• Network segmentation: Ensure corporate data is accessible only via VPN and not exposed to local apps.

2) Patch/Upgrade Steps:

• Watch for Android Security Bulletin updates: Monitor the Android Security Bulletin for the month when CVE-2024-46941 is listed as patched. The patch will be part of the monthly Android platform update.
• Check device security patch level: Verify the installed security patch level via Settings → Security → Security patch level, or via adb shell getprop ro.build.version.security_patch.
• Update through MDM: Use your mobile device management platform to push the latest Android security patch to all enrolled devices.
• For custom ROMs: If the device runs a custom ROM based on AOSP, apply the latest AOSP security tag that includes the fix for the SystemUI component. The fix involves modifying the AndroidManifest.xml in packages/apps/SystemUI to correct the exported state and permission requirements for the affected components.
• Vendor-specific builds: OEMs (Samsung, Pixel, Xiaomi, etc.) will roll out the patch in their respective security update schedules. Coordinate with device vendors for non-standard devices.

3) Long-Term Hardening:

• Enforce Android Enterprise Recommended policies: Deploy devices with fully managed configurations that enforce security patch updates within 90 days of release.
• Zero Trust Architecture for Mobile: Implement a Zero Trust approach where every app and device is treated as untrusted until verified. Deploy certificate-based authentication and continuous device compliance checks.
• Regular security posture reviews: Conduct quarterly reviews of mobile device security posture, including scanning for known CVEs and patch levels.
• EDR on Android: Deploy mobile endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions that can detect suspicious component invocations and data exfiltration in real time.
• User security awareness: Train users to recognize phishing attempts that may trick them into sideloading malicious apps. Emphasize the risks of installing apps from unofficial sources.

Important Note on Exploitation: Exploiting this vulnerability requires a malicious app to be installed on the target device. The primary defense is preventing the installation of untrusted apps. If your enterprise uses fully managed devices with strict app allowlisting, the practical risk is significantly reduced.

References

1. NVD Entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-46941
2. Google Android Security Bulletins: https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin
3. AOSP SystemUI Source Code: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/apps/SystemUI/
4. MITRE CVE Record: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-46941
5. Android Security Best Practices (Google): https://developer.android.com/topic/security/best-practices

Threat Actor Campaign Evidence: As of this report, no in-the-wild exploitation or known threat actor campaigns have been documented for CVE-2024-46941. The CVE is not listed on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. However, given the local attack vector and the vulnerability class (Android component protection bypass), it is plausible that the vulnerability could be integrated into mobile spyware toolkits or exploit chains by advanced threat actors. Enterprises should remain vigilant and monitor for updates from Google and security research communities.