CVE-2024-52059
Executive Summary
CVE-2024-52059 is a critical memory corruption vulnerability in RTI Connext Professional, specifically within its Security Plugins component. The vulnerability is a composite of a Classic Buffer Overflow (CWE-120), a Heap-based Buffer Overflow (CWE-122), and an Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190). An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this flaw to trigger a denial of service (DoS) or potentially achieve remote code execution (RCE) by sending specially crafted network packets to a vulnerable DDS (Data Distribution Service) endpoint. The vulnerability affects all versions of Connext Professional from 6.1.0 up to (but not including) 6.1.2.17, and from 7.0.0 up to (but not including) 7.3.0.2. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) or exploit code is currently available, but the technical severity is high due to the remote, unauthenticated nature of the attack vector.
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Supply Chain & Package Security
This vulnerability affects a commercial, closed-source middleware product (RTI Connext Professional). It is not an open-source package (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). The risk is primarily to organizations that have deployed RTI Connext in their operational technology (OT) or industrial control systems (ICS) environments. The supply chain risk is elevated because the vulnerable component is a core security plugin, meaning that any system relying on RTI Connext for secure DDS communications is at risk. Organizations should verify their software bill of materials (SBOM) for the presence of the affected versions.
CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level
The CVSS score is listed as 0.0 in the NVD data, which is likely a placeholder or an error. Based on the vulnerability characteristics, a reasonable CVSS v3.1 vector would be:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack Vector (AV): Network – The vulnerability can be exploited remotely over the network.
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low – No special conditions are required; a crafted packet is sufficient.
- Privileges Required (PR): None – No authentication is needed.
- User Interaction (UI): None – No user action is required.
- Scope (S): Unchanged – The exploit does not affect other components.
- Confidentiality (C): High – Potential for memory disclosure leading to data theft.
- Integrity (I): High – Potential for memory corruption leading to data manipulation.
- Availability (A): High – Denial of service is a direct consequence.
Threat Level: Critical (9.8 out of 10)
Deep Dive & Mechanics
The vulnerability resides in the Security Plugins of RTI Connext Professional. These plugins handle the parsing and processing of security-related data within DDS (Data Distribution Service) RTPS (Real-Time Publish-Subscribe) protocol messages.
The core issue is a combination of three weaknesses:
Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190): When processing a specific field in an incoming RTPS message (likely a length or size field), the code performs an arithmetic operation that can overflow. For example, if the code calculates
buffer_size = header_length + payload_length, an attacker can supply values that cause this sum to wrap around to a small number.Heap-based Buffer Overflow (CWE-122): The wrapped-around small size is then used to allocate a heap buffer. The code subsequently copies a much larger amount of attacker-controlled data into this undersized buffer, causing a heap overflow.
Classic Buffer Overflow (CWE-120): The heap overflow corrupts adjacent memory, potentially overwriting function pointers, security metadata, or other critical data structures.
The attack flow is:
- Attacker sends a crafted RTPS packet to a vulnerable Connext endpoint.
- The Security Plugins component begins parsing the packet.
- An integer overflow occurs during a size calculation, resulting in an undersized heap allocation.
- A subsequent
memcpyor similar operation copies attacker-controlled data beyond the allocated buffer. - The heap corruption leads to a crash (DoS) or, with careful heap grooming, arbitrary code execution.
Vulnerable vs. Patched Code
Since RTI Connext is a closed-source commercial product, exact code snippets are not available. However, the patching strategy is clear:
Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):
// Vulnerable: Integer overflow leads to undersized allocation
uint32_t total_size = header_length + payload_length; // Overflow possible
char *buffer = (char*)malloc(total_size);
if (buffer) {
memcpy(buffer, packet_data, payload_length); // Heap overflow
}
Patched Code (Conceptual):
// Patched: Bounds checking and safe arithmetic
if (header_length > MAX_HEADER || payload_length > MAX_PAYLOAD) {
// Reject packet
return ERROR;
}
uint64_t total_size = (uint64_t)header_length + (uint64_t)payload_length;
if (total_size > MAX_ALLOCATION) {
// Reject packet
return ERROR;
}
char *buffer = (char*)malloc((size_t)total_size);
if (buffer) {
memcpy(buffer, packet_data, payload_length);
}
The patch likely involves:
- Using wider integer types (e.g.,
uint64_t) for intermediate calculations. - Adding explicit checks for integer overflow before allocation.
- Validating input lengths against maximum allowed values.
- Using safe memory copy functions with size limits.
Exploitation & Lab Setup
Red Team (Offensive)
Objective: Achieve remote code execution on a vulnerable RTI Connext endpoint.
Lab Setup:
- Target: A virtual machine running a vulnerable version of RTI Connext Professional (e.g., 7.0.0) with Security Plugins enabled.
- Attacker: A Kali Linux machine on the same network segment.
- Tools: Python with
scapyfor crafting DDS/RTPS packets, a debugger (GDB) for analyzing the crash, and a heap feng shui library (e.g.,libheap).
Exploitation Steps:
- Reconnaissance: Use a DDS sniffer (e.g., Wireshark with DDS dissector) to identify the target's DDS domain and topics.
- Crash Analysis: Send a malformed RTPS packet that triggers the integer overflow. Observe the crash in the target's logs or via a debugger.
- Heap Grooming: Send a series of benign packets to arrange the heap in a predictable state.
- Exploit Delivery: Send the crafted packet with a carefully calculated payload that overwrites a function pointer (e.g., a virtual table pointer or a callback) with the address of a shellcode or ROP chain.
- Code Execution: The overwritten pointer is called, redirecting execution to the attacker's shellcode.
Example Python Snippet (Conceptual):
import socket
import struct
def craft_malicious_packet():
# Craft an RTPS message with an integer overflow
header_length = 0xFFFFFFFF # Large value to cause overflow
payload_length = 0x10 # Small payload
# The sum wraps to a small number, causing undersized allocation
packet = struct.pack('!II', header_length, payload_length)
packet += b'A' * 0x1000 # Overflow data
return packet
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
sock.sendto(craft_malicious_packet(), ('192.168.1.100', 7400))
Blue Team (Defensive)
Objective: Detect and block exploitation attempts.
Detection Strategy:
- Network Monitoring: Monitor for anomalous DDS/RTPS packets, especially those with unusually large or malformed header fields.
- Host Monitoring: Monitor for crashes in the
rti_connextprocess or unusual memory allocations. - Log Analysis: Review RTI Connext logs for security plugin errors or warnings.
Mitigation Steps:
- Patch Immediately: Apply the vendor-supplied patch (upgrade to 7.3.0.2 or 6.1.2.17).
- Network Segmentation: Isolate RTI Connext endpoints on a separate VLAN with strict firewall rules.
- Intrusion Prevention: Deploy a network IPS with custom signatures to detect the exploit pattern.
- Application Whitelisting: Ensure only authorized RTI Connext binaries can execute.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
- Network IOCs:
- DDS/RTPS packets with an
RTPS_HEADERcontaining avendorIdorprotocolVersionfield that is malformed. - Packets with a
dataLengthfield that is inconsistent with the actual payload size. - Repeated connection attempts from a single IP to multiple DDS endpoints.
- DDS/RTPS packets with an
- Host IOCs:
- Unexpected crashes of the
rti_connextprocess. - Heap corruption errors in system logs.
- Unusual memory allocations by the
rti_connextprocess. - Presence of shellcode or ROP gadgets in the process memory.
- Unexpected crashes of the
- File IOCs:
- Modified or replaced RTI Connext library files (e.g.,
librticonnext.so). - Unexpected files in the RTI installation directory.
- Modified or replaced RTI Connext library files (e.g.,
Detection Engineering
YARA Rule
rule CVE_2024_52059_RTI_Connext_HeapOverflow {
meta:
description = "Detects potential heap overflow exploitation attempts against RTI Connext Professional"
author = "Valters IT"
date = "2024-10-27"
cve = "CVE-2024-52059"
strings:
$s1 = { 00 01 00 00 } // RTPS protocol version
$s2 = { 01 02 03 04 } // Example vendor ID
$overflow_pattern = { FF FF FF FF } // Potential integer overflow trigger
condition:
$s1 at 0 and $s2 at 4 and #overflow_pattern > 0
}
Sigma Rule
title: CVE-2024-52059 RTI Connext Heap Overflow Attempt
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects network packets that may be attempting to exploit CVE-2024-52059
author: Valters IT
date: 2024/10/27
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: suricata
detection:
selection:
dest_port: 7400
app_protocol: 'dds'
payload|contains: 'FF FF FF FF'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate large DDS packets
level: high
Suricata Rule
alert udp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 7400 (msg:"CVE-2024-52059 RTI Connext Heap Overflow Attempt"; content:"|00 01 00 00|"; depth:4; content:"|FF FF FF FF|"; within:20; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
Remediation & Mitigation
Immediate Actions:
- Patch: Upgrade RTI Connext Professional to version 7.3.0.2 (for 7.x users) or 6.1.2.17 (for 6.x users). Contact RTI support for patch details.
- Workaround: If patching is not immediately possible, disable the Security Plugins if they are not required. This will reduce the attack surface.
- Network Controls: Implement strict firewall rules to limit DDS traffic (UDP port 7400 by default) to only trusted IP addresses.
Long-Term Measures:
- Vulnerability Management: Integrate RTI Connext into your vulnerability scanning and patch management process.
- Network Segmentation: Place DDS-enabled devices on a separate, isolated network segment.
- Monitoring: Deploy the provided YARA, Sigma, and Suricata rules to detect exploitation attempts.
- Secure Configuration: Follow RTI's security best practices for configuring Security Plugins, including using strong authentication and encryption.
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