CVE-2024-55507

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-55507 is a privilege escalation vulnerability in CodeAstro Complaint Management System v1.0. The flaw resides in the delete_e.php component, allowing a remote attacker to delete arbitrary user accounts or escalate their own privileges without proper authorization. The vendor has not released a patch, and no public proof-of-concept (PoC) or exploit code is available at this time. The vulnerability is classified under MITRE ATT&CK tactic T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation) and CWE-269 (Improper Privilege Management). Due to the lack of authentication checks in the affected endpoint, any unauthenticated user can trigger administrative actions.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This is a standalone PHP application, not an NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby package. No supply chain implications are present.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

CVSS Score: 0.0 (No official vector assigned)
EPSS Score: 0.0% (Low exploitation probability)
Threat Level: Medium (Privilege escalation with no authentication required, but no active exploitation observed)

Estimated CVSS Vector (based on analysis):
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

• Attack Vector: Network
• Attack Complexity: Low
• Privileges Required: None
• User Interaction: None
• Scope: Unchanged
• Confidentiality: None
• Integrity: High
• Availability: None

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability exists in the delete_e.php script, which is intended for administrative user deletion. The script fails to verify the user's session or role before processing the id parameter. An attacker can send a crafted HTTP GET request to delete_e.php?id=<target_user_id> to delete any user account, including administrators. This can be leveraged to escalate privileges by deleting a legitimate admin and then registering a new admin account, or by manipulating the application state.

Root Cause:

• Missing authentication and authorization checks in delete_e.php.
• The script directly executes a SQL DELETE query using the unsanitized id parameter.

Attack Flow:

1. Attacker identifies the target application URL.
2. Attacker sends a GET request to delete_e.php?id=1 (or any valid user ID).
3. The application deletes the user without verifying the requester's identity.
4. Attacker can then register a new admin account or perform further actions.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (delete_e.php):

<?php
include 'db.php';
$id = $_GET['id'];
$sql = "DELETE FROM users WHERE id = $id";
mysqli_query($conn, $sql);
header('Location: users.php');
?>

Patched Code (Recommended):

<?php
session_start();
include 'db.php';

// Check if user is logged in and is admin
if (!isset($_SESSION['user_id']) || $_SESSION['role'] != 'admin') {
    header('Location: login.php');
    exit();
}

$id = intval($_GET['id']); // Sanitize input
$sql = "DELETE FROM users WHERE id = ?";
$stmt = mysqli_prepare($conn, $sql);
mysqli_stmt_bind_param($stmt, "i", $id);
mysqli_stmt_execute($stmt);
header('Location: users.php');
?>

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Attacker)

Lab Environment:

• Target: CodeAstro Complaint Management System v1.0 running on Apache/PHP.
• Attacker: Kali Linux with curl or Burp Suite.

Exploitation Steps:

1. Enumerate user IDs (e.g., by observing user list or brute-forcing).
2. Send a GET request to delete an admin user:

   curl -X GET "http://target.com/complaint/delete_e.php?id=1"
   

3. Register a new admin account via the registration page (if accessible).
4. Log in with the new admin account to gain full control.

Note: No public exploit code is available; this is a manual exploitation scenario.

Blue Team (Defender)

Detection:

• Monitor for unusual GET requests to delete_e.php with an id parameter.
• Alert on any deletion of user accounts without prior authentication.
• Use the Sigma rule below to detect unauthorized access attempts.

Mitigation:

• Immediately apply the patched code (see above).
• Restrict access to delete_e.php via .htaccess or web server configuration.
• Implement session validation and role-based access control.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network:

  • HTTP GET requests to /complaint/delete_e.php?id=<number> from unauthenticated sources.
  • Unusual spikes in user deletion events.

• File:

  • Modified or deleted user entries in the database.
  • New admin accounts created shortly after deletion.

• Logs:

  • Web server logs showing GET /complaint/delete_e.php?id=1 with 200 response.
  • Database logs showing DELETE queries on users table.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule Detect_Privilege_Escalation_CVE_2024_55507 {
    meta:
        description = "Detects exploitation attempts of CVE-2024-55507 in CodeAstro Complaint Management System"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2024-55507"
    strings:
        $s1 = "delete_e.php" nocase
        $s2 = "id=" nocase
        $s3 = "DELETE FROM users" nocase
    condition:
        all of ($s1, $s2) or $s3
}

Sigma Rule

title: Unauthenticated User Deletion via delete_e.php
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to exploit CVE-2024-55507 by sending GET requests to delete_e.php without authentication
author: Valters IT
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: GET
        cs-uri-stem: /complaint/delete_e.php
        cs-uri-query: id=*
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin actions (if authentication is properly implemented)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> $HOME_NET any (
    msg:"CVE-2024-55507 - Unauthenticated User Deletion Attempt";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"GET"; http_method;
    content:"/complaint/delete_e.php"; http_uri;
    content:"id="; http_uri;
    classtype:attempted-admin;
    sid:1000001;
    rev:1;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

1. Immediate Action:

   • Apply the patched code provided in the "Vulnerable vs. Patched Code" section.
   • Restrict access to delete_e.php using .htaccess or web server allow/deny rules.

2. Long-term Fix:

   • Implement a full authentication and authorization framework (e.g., using PHP sessions and role checks).
   • Use prepared statements for all database queries to prevent SQL injection.
   • Conduct a security audit of all other endpoints in the application.

3. Monitoring:

   • Deploy the Sigma and Suricata rules to detect exploitation attempts.
   • Enable detailed logging for all administrative actions.

4. Vendor Communication:

   • Since the vendor is unresponsive, consider migrating to a supported alternative or forking the project with security fixes.

Valters IT
Securing Digital Frontiers