CVE-2024-8355
Executive Summary
CVE-2024-8355 is a critical SQL injection vulnerability in the Visteon Infotainment System’s DeviceManager component, specifically within the iAP Serial Number parsing logic. The flaw allows a physically present attacker to inject arbitrary SQL queries, leading to code execution with root privileges. Authentication is not required, making this a high-severity local attack vector. The vulnerability was reported via ZDI-CAN-20112 and currently has no known patch or public exploit. The EPSS score is 0.0%, indicating low exploitation likelihood in the wild, but the physical access requirement limits the attack surface to in-vehicle scenarios.
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CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level
- CVSS Score: 6.8 (Medium)
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack Vector: Physical (AV:P) – attacker must have physical access to the infotainment system.
- Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – no special conditions required.
- Privileges Required: None (PR:N) – no authentication needed.
- User Interaction: None (UI:N) – no user action required.
- Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – vulnerability does not affect other components.
- Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability: High (C:H/I:H/A:H) – full compromise of the system.
Threat Level: Medium due to physical access requirement, but impact is severe (root-level code execution).
Deep Dive & Mechanics
The vulnerability resides in the DeviceManager service of Visteon Infotainment systems. When processing the iAP (iPod Accessory Protocol) serial number, the software fails to sanitize user-supplied input before constructing SQL queries. This allows an attacker to inject malicious SQL statements by crafting a specially formatted serial number string.
Root Cause: The application uses string concatenation or interpolation to build SQL queries without parameterized statements or input validation. For example, a query like SELECT * FROM devices WHERE serial = ' + user_input + ' can be exploited by providing ' OR '1'='1 or other SQL injection payloads.
Attack Flow:
- Attacker gains physical access to the vehicle’s infotainment system (e.g., via USB port or diagnostic interface).
- Attacker sends a crafted iAP serial number containing SQL injection payload.
- DeviceManager executes the malicious SQL query, potentially extracting data, modifying records, or executing stored procedures.
- The SQL injection can be leveraged to execute operating system commands via SQLite’s
load_extensionor similar features, achieving root-level code execution.
Impact: Full control over the infotainment system, including access to vehicle data, audio, navigation, and potentially CAN bus interfaces.
Vulnerable vs. Patched Code
Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):
// DeviceManager.c
void process_iAP_serial(char *serial) {
char query[256];
sprintf(query, "SELECT * FROM devices WHERE serial = '%s'", serial);
sqlite3_exec(db, query, callback, 0, &err);
}
Patched Code (Conceptual):
// DeviceManager.c
void process_iAP_serial(char *serial) {
sqlite3_stmt *stmt;
sqlite3_prepare_v2(db, "SELECT * FROM devices WHERE serial = ?", -1, &stmt, 0);
sqlite3_bind_text(stmt, 1, serial, -1, SQLITE_TRANSIENT);
sqlite3_step(stmt);
sqlite3_finalize(stmt);
}
Key Difference: The patched version uses parameterized queries (prepared statements) to separate SQL logic from data, preventing injection.
Exploitation & Lab Setup
Red Team
Prerequisites:
- Physical access to a Visteon Infotainment system (e.g., in a vehicle or test bench).
- USB or diagnostic interface to send iAP serial number data.
Exploitation Steps:
- Connect to the infotainment system via USB (iAP protocol).
- Send a crafted serial number payload, e.g.,
' UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10--. - Observe SQL errors or data exfiltration to confirm injection.
- Use SQLite-specific payloads to execute commands:
'; ATTACH DATABASE '/tmp/evil.db' AS evil; CREATE TABLE evil.cmd (data TEXT); INSERT INTO evil.cmd VALUES ('test');-- - For code execution, use
load_extensionif SQLite is compiled with extension loading:'; SELECT load_extension('/path/to/malicious.so');--
Lab Setup:
- Use a virtualized Visteon system or a real head unit in a controlled environment.
- Tools:
sqlmapwith--sqliteflag, custom Python script to send iAP serials.
Blue Team
Detection:
- Monitor for unusual SQL errors in system logs (e.g.,
sqlite3_execfailures). - Look for unexpected file writes or process executions from the DeviceManager service.
- Use file integrity monitoring on SQLite databases.
Prevention:
- Ensure input validation on all iAP serial numbers (allow only alphanumeric characters).
- Apply principle of least privilege to the DeviceManager process.
- Disable SQLite extension loading if not needed.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
- File Artifacts:
/tmp/evil.dbor similar unexpected SQLite databases.- Modified SQLite databases in
/var/lib/visteon/.
- Process Anomalies:
- DeviceManager spawning unexpected child processes (e.g.,
/bin/sh).
- DeviceManager spawning unexpected child processes (e.g.,
- Network Indicators:
- Outbound connections from the infotainment system to unknown IPs (if code execution enables network access).
- Log Entries:
- SQLite error messages containing injection patterns (e.g.,
UNION,SELECT,ATTACH).
- SQLite error messages containing injection patterns (e.g.,
Detection Engineering
YARA Rule
rule CVE_2024_8355_SQLi_Serial {
meta:
description = "Detects SQL injection attempts in iAP serial number strings"
author = "Valters IT"
date = "2025-04-10"
reference = "CVE-2024-8355"
strings:
$sqli1 = /'(\s*OR\s*|\s*AND\s*|\s*UNION\s*|\s*SELECT\s*|\s*ATTACH\s*)/i
$sqli2 = /(\s*--\s*|\s*#\s*|\s*\/\*)/i
$sqli3 = /load_extension/i
condition:
any of ($sqli*) and filesize < 1MB
}
Sigma Rule
title: CVE-2024-8355 SQL Injection in Visteon DeviceManager
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects SQL injection patterns in iAP serial number processing logs
author: Valters IT
logsource:
product: linux
service: syslog
detection:
selection:
- EventID: 1 # Process creation
CommandLine|contains: 'sqlite3'
- EventID: 2 # File creation
TargetFilename|contains: '.db'
- Message|contains|all:
- 'serial'
- 'SQL error'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate SQLite operations
level: high
Suricata Rule
alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2024-8355 SQL Injection Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"serial"; nocase; content:"'"; distance:0; within:100; pcre:"/(OR|AND|UNION|SELECT|ATTACH|load_extension)/i"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
Remediation & Mitigation
Immediate Actions:
- Isolate the system: Disconnect the infotainment system from any critical vehicle networks (e.g., CAN bus) if possible.
- Input validation: Implement strict allowlist validation for iAP serial numbers (only alphanumeric characters).
- Parameterized queries: Rewrite all SQL queries in DeviceManager to use prepared statements.
Long-term Fix:
- Vendor must release a firmware update that replaces string concatenation with parameterized queries.
- Apply code review for all input handling in the infotainment system.
Workarounds:
- Disable iAP serial number processing if not required.
- Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) or IDS at the vehicle network level.
Valters IT
DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence
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