CVE-2025-10014

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-10014 is a high-complexity, low-severity improper authorization vulnerability discovered in the Elunez eladmin application, version 2.7 and possibly earlier. The flaw resides in the /api/users/updateEmail/ endpoint, specifically within the updateUserEmail function. An authenticated attacker with knowledge of the target user's RSA-encrypted password can manipulate the id and email parameters to change the email address of another user without proper authorization. This could lead to account takeover via password reset or phishing attacks. The vulnerability is considered difficult to exploit due to the requirement of knowing the victim's encrypted password and the high complexity of the attack. No official patch has been released, and no public exploit code or nuclei template is available at this time.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability affects the Elunez eladmin application, which is a Java-based backend management system. It is not an NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby package. However, the application may rely on third-party libraries for RSA encryption and REST API handling. The lack of a patch and the public availability of exploit details increase the supply chain risk for organizations using this software.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
• Base Score: 3.1 (Low)
• Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) - The attack can be performed remotely.
• Attack Complexity (AC): High (H) - The attack requires knowledge of the victim's RSA-encrypted password and specific parameter manipulation.
• Privileges Required (PR): Low (L) - The attacker needs a valid user account on the system.
• User Interaction (UI): None (N) - No user interaction is required.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U) - The vulnerability does not affect other components.
• Confidentiality (C): None (N) - No data is exposed.
• Integrity (I): Low (L) - The attacker can modify the victim's email address.
• Availability (A): None (N) - No impact on system availability.

Threat Level: Low. The high complexity and requirement for the victim's encrypted password significantly reduce the likelihood of widespread exploitation. However, the impact on integrity (email change) could facilitate further attacks like password reset hijacking.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is a classic case of improper authorization (CWE-285). The updateUserEmail function in the /api/users/updateEmail/ endpoint fails to verify that the authenticated user is authorized to change the email address of the user specified by the id parameter. The function likely performs the following steps:

1. Receives a POST request with parameters id (target user ID) and email (new email address).
2. Decrypts the provided RSA-encrypted password (likely the attacker's own password) to authenticate the request.
3. Updates the email address of the user with the given id without checking if the authenticated user has permission to modify that specific user's profile.

The attack flow:

1. Attacker obtains a valid user account on the eladmin system.
2. Attacker captures their own RSA-encrypted password (e.g., from a previous login or API response).
3. Attacker sends a POST request to /api/users/updateEmail/ with:
   • id: The ID of the victim user.
   • email: The attacker-controlled email address.
   • password: The attacker's RSA-encrypted password.
4. The server decrypts the password, authenticates the attacker, but then updates the victim's email without proper authorization checks.
5. The attacker can then initiate a password reset for the victim's account, which will be sent to the attacker-controlled email, leading to account takeover.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no official patch is available, the following is a hypothetical comparison based on the vulnerability description.

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual Java):

@PostMapping("/api/users/updateEmail/")
public ResponseEntity<?> updateUserEmail(@RequestParam Long id, @RequestParam String email, @RequestParam String encryptedPassword) {
    // Authenticate the request
    User currentUser = authenticateUser(encryptedPassword);
    if (currentUser == null) {
        return ResponseEntity.status(HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED).build();
    }
    // VULNERABLE: No check if currentUser has permission to update user with 'id'
    User targetUser = userRepository.findById(id).orElse(null);
    if (targetUser == null) {
        return ResponseEntity.notFound().build();
    }
    targetUser.setEmail(email);
    userRepository.save(targetUser);
    return ResponseEntity.ok("Email updated successfully");
}

Patched Code (Conceptual Java):

@PostMapping("/api/users/updateEmail/")
public ResponseEntity<?> updateUserEmail(@RequestParam Long id, @RequestParam String email, @RequestParam String encryptedPassword) {
    // Authenticate the request
    User currentUser = authenticateUser(encryptedPassword);
    if (currentUser == null) {
        return ResponseEntity.status(HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED).build();
    }
    // PATCHED: Verify that the authenticated user is the owner of the account
    if (!currentUser.getId().equals(id)) {
        return ResponseEntity.status(HttpStatus.FORBIDDEN).body("You can only update your own email");
    }
    User targetUser = userRepository.findById(id).orElse(null);
    if (targetUser == null) {
        return ResponseEntity.notFound().build();
    }
    targetUser.setEmail(email);
    userRepository.save(targetUser);
    return ResponseEntity.ok("Email updated successfully");
}

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Prerequisites:

• A valid user account on the eladmin instance.
• The RSA-encrypted password of the attacker's account (can be obtained by intercepting a login request or from the client-side storage).
• The victim's user ID (can be enumerated via other API endpoints or user listing).

Exploitation Steps:

1. Identify Target: Enumerate user IDs. For example, using a GET request to /api/users (if accessible).
2. Obtain Encrypted Password: Intercept a login request or use a previously captured encrypted password for your account.
3. Craft Exploit Request:

   curl -X POST "http://target-eladmin.com/api/users/updateEmail/" \
     -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
     -d "id=VICTIM_USER_ID&email=attacker@evil.com&password=ENCRYPTED_PASSWORD"
   

4. Verify: Check if the victim's email has been changed by attempting to log in with the victim's username and using the "Forgot Password" feature, which should send the reset link to attacker@evil.com.

Note: The exact parameter names and encryption method may vary. The attacker must know the RSA public key used by the server to encrypt the password.

Blue Team

Detection:

• Monitor for unusual POST requests to /api/users/updateEmail/ where the id parameter does not match the authenticated user's ID.
• Alert on multiple failed password reset attempts followed by successful email changes.
• Log and review all email change events, especially those originating from IP addresses not associated with the user.

Prevention:

• Implement proper authorization checks in the updateUserEmail function to ensure the authenticated user can only modify their own email.
• Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for email change operations.
• Require re-authentication (e.g., current password) for sensitive profile changes.
• Monitor and rate-limit email change requests.

Hunting:

• Search logs for requests to /api/users/updateEmail/ with different id and email parameters.
• Correlate email change events with password reset requests to identify potential account takeover chains.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network IOCs:
  • POST requests to /api/users/updateEmail/ with parameters id, email, and password.
  • Unusual email change events where the new email domain does not match the organization's domain.
• System IOCs:
  • User accounts with recently changed email addresses that are not verified.
  • Multiple password reset requests for the same account shortly after an email change.
• Log IOCs:
  • Application logs showing updateUserEmail calls with mismatched user IDs.
  • Authentication logs showing successful login followed by an email change for a different user.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_10014_Eladmin_Email_Change {
    meta:
        description = "Detects exploitation attempts of CVE-2025-10014 in Elunez eladmin"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-10014"
    strings:
        $s1 = "/api/users/updateEmail/" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "updateUserEmail" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "id=" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "email=" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "password=" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        all of ($s1, $s2, $s3, $s4, $s5)
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2025-10014 - Eladmin Unauthorized Email Change
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to exploit improper authorization in eladmin's updateUserEmail function
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
references:
    - CVE-2025-10014
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
    service: access_combined
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-stem: '/api/users/updateEmail/'
        cs-uri-query|contains: 
            - 'id='
            - 'email='
            - 'password='
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate email updates by authorized users
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.t1548
    - cve.2025.10014

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
    msg:"CVE-2025-10014 - Eladmin Unauthorized Email Change Attempt";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"POST";
    http_method;
    content:"/api/users/updateEmail/";
    http_uri;
    content:"id=";
    http_client_body;
    content:"email=";
    http_client_body;
    content:"password=";
    http_client_body;
    classtype:attempted-user;
    sid:10000014;
    rev:1;
    reference:cve,2025-10014;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Disable the Endpoint: If possible, temporarily disable the /api/users/updateEmail/ endpoint until a patch is applied.
2. Implement Workaround: Apply a Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule to block requests to /api/users/updateEmail/ where the id parameter does not match the authenticated user's session ID.
3. Review Access Controls: Manually audit the updateUserEmail function and add authorization checks to ensure users can only update their own email.

Long-term Fix:

• Patch: Apply the official patch from Elunez when released. If not available, modify the source code to include proper authorization checks as shown in the "Patched Code" section.
• Update: Upgrade to a patched version of eladmin if one becomes available.
• Security Hardening: Implement role-based access control (RBAC) for all user management functions. Enforce MFA for sensitive operations.

Monitoring:

• Enable detailed logging for all email change requests.
• Set up alerts for multiple email changes from the same IP or user.
• Regularly review user accounts for unauthorized email changes.

Valters IT - DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence