CVE-2025-15258
Executive Summary
CVE-2025-15258 identifies an open redirect vulnerability in the Edimax BR-6208AC V2 router, specifically in firmware versions 1.02 and 1.03. The flaw resides in the formALGSetup function within the /goform/formALGSetup endpoint of the web-based configuration interface. By manipulating the wlan-url argument, an unauthenticated remote attacker can redirect a user to an arbitrary external domain. This is a classic open redirect (CWE-601) with a low CVSS score of 3.5, but it can be leveraged for phishing campaigns or as a stepping stone in more complex attacks. The device has reached End of Life (EOL) and will receive no patches, making all deployed units permanently vulnerable.
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Supply Chain & Package Security
This vulnerability is not related to any software package registry (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It affects a hardware appliance (Edimax BR-6208AC V2 router) and its embedded firmware. No supply chain package security implications apply.
CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level
- CVSS Score: 3.5 (Low)
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
- Attack Vector (AV): Network – exploitable remotely.
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low – no special conditions required.
- Privileges Required (PR): None – no authentication needed.
- User Interaction (UI): Required – the victim must click a crafted link.
- Scope (S): Unchanged – the redirect does not affect other components.
- Confidentiality (C): None – no data exposure.
- Integrity (I): Low – the redirect can lead to a malicious site.
- Availability (A): None – no denial of service.
Threat Level: Low. The open redirect requires user interaction and does not directly compromise the router. However, it can be weaponized for social engineering attacks.
Deep Dive & Mechanics
The vulnerability is triggered via an HTTP GET or POST request to /goform/formALGSetup with a crafted wlan-url parameter. The router’s web server does not validate or sanitize the URL, allowing an attacker to specify any external domain. When a legitimate user visits a crafted link (e.g., http://<router-ip>/goform/formALGSetup?wlan-url=http://evil.com), the router responds with an HTTP redirect to the attacker-controlled site.
Root Cause: The formALGSetup function directly uses the wlan-url parameter in a Location header without validation. This is a classic open redirect pattern.
Attack Scenario:
- Attacker identifies a vulnerable Edimax BR-6208AC router (e.g., via Shodan).
- Attacker crafts a phishing link:
http://<router-ip>/goform/formALGSetup?wlan-url=http://phishing-site.com. - Victim clicks the link, is redirected to the phishing site, and may disclose credentials.
Vulnerable vs. Patched Code
No patched version exists. The device is EOL. Below is a conceptual comparison.
Vulnerable Code (pseudo):
def formALGSetup(request):
wlan_url = request.GET.get('wlan-url')
# No validation
return redirect(wlan_url)
Patched Code (hypothetical):
def formALGSetup(request):
wlan_url = request.GET.get('wlan-url')
# Validate against allowed domains
if not is_allowed_domain(wlan_url):
return error("Invalid URL")
return redirect(wlan_url)
Exploitation & Lab Setup
Red Team (Attacker)
Prerequisites:
- A vulnerable Edimax BR-6208AC router (firmware 1.02 or 1.03).
- Network access to the router’s web interface (port 80/443).
Exploit Steps:
- Identify the router IP (e.g., via Shodan or local network scan).
- Craft a malicious URL:
http://<router-ip>/goform/formALGSetup?wlan-url=http://attacker-controlled-site.com - Send the link to the victim (e.g., via email or social media).
- Victim clicks the link and is redirected to the attacker’s site.
Proof-of-Concept (PoC) using curl:
curl -v "http://192.168.1.1/goform/formALGSetup?wlan-url=http://evil.com"
Expected response: HTTP 302 with Location: http://evil.com.
Blue Team (Defender)
Detection:
- Monitor HTTP requests to
/goform/formALGSetupwith suspiciouswlan-urlparameters. - Look for redirect responses (HTTP 302) to external domains from the router.
Mitigation:
- Since no patch exists, the only mitigation is to replace the device with a supported model.
- If replacement is not immediate, restrict access to the router’s web interface to trusted IPs only (e.g., via firewall rules).
- Disable remote management if not required.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
- Network IOCs:
- HTTP request to
/goform/formALGSetupwith awlan-urlparameter pointing to an external domain. - HTTP 302 response from the router with a
Locationheader containing an external URL.
- HTTP request to
- Host IOCs:
- Router firmware version 1.02 or 1.03 (check via web interface).
- Unusual outbound connections from the router to unknown domains (though the redirect is client-side, the router itself does not initiate connections).
Detection Engineering
YARA Rule
rule CVE_2025_15258_Open_Redirect {
meta:
description = "Detects open redirect attempts against Edimax BR-6208AC"
author = "Valters IT"
date = "2025-04-10"
cve = "CVE-2025-15258"
strings:
$endpoint = "/goform/formALGSetup"
$param = "wlan-url="
$http = "HTTP/1.1"
condition:
$endpoint and $param and $http
}
Sigma Rule
title: CVE-2025-15258 Open Redirect on Edimax BR-6208AC
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests to /goform/formALGSetup with a wlan-url parameter
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
category: webserver
product: apache
detection:
selection:
cs-uri-query|contains: "/goform/formALGSetup?wlan-url="
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative use (rare)
level: medium
Suricata Rule
alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-15258 Edimax BR-6208AC Open Redirect"; flow:to_server; content:"/goform/formALGSetup"; http_uri; content:"wlan-url="; http_uri; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
Remediation & Mitigation
Immediate Actions:
- Replace the device: The Edimax BR-6208AC V2 is EOL and will not receive patches. Upgrade to a supported router model.
- Restrict access: If replacement is delayed, configure firewall rules to allow only trusted IPs to access the router’s web interface.
- Disable remote management: Turn off remote administration if not absolutely necessary.
Long-Term Recommendations:
- Conduct a hardware lifecycle review to identify and replace all EOL devices.
- Implement network segmentation to isolate legacy devices.
- Use web application firewalls (WAF) to filter malicious requests if the router is behind a corporate network.
Vendor Statement: Edimax has confirmed the EOL status and recommends upgrading to newer models.
Valters IT