CVE-2025-2341
Executive Summary
CVE-2025-2345 identifies a critical security flaw in the IROAD Dash Cam X5 (firmware up to 20250203) involving the use of default credentials for the device’s SSID component. This vulnerability allows an attacker within the local network to authenticate to the dash cam using well-known default credentials, potentially gaining unauthorized access to the device’s configuration, live feed, and stored footage. The exploit has been publicly disclosed, and the vendor has not responded to disclosure attempts, leaving devices unpatched. This report provides a comprehensive technical analysis, detection methods, and mitigation strategies.
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Supply Chain & Package Security
This vulnerability is not related to any software package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It is a hardware firmware issue affecting the IROAD Dash Cam X5.
CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level
While no official CVSS vector is provided, a reasonable assessment based on the description is:
- Attack Vector (AV): Adjacent Network (A) – requires local network access.
- Attack Complexity (AC): High (H) – exploitation is described as difficult.
- Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – default credentials are used.
- User Interaction (UI): None (N) – no user action required.
- Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – the vulnerable component is the dash cam itself.
- Confidentiality (C): High (H) – access to live feed and stored footage.
- Integrity (I): High (H) – ability to modify device settings.
- Availability (A): Low (L) – potential to disrupt device operation.
Estimated CVSS Score: 7.5 (High)
Deep Dive & Mechanics
The vulnerability resides in the SSID (Service Set Identifier) component of the IROAD Dash Cam X5. The device likely uses a default SSID and password for initial setup or Wi-Fi Direct connectivity. The manipulation of the SSID component allows an attacker to bypass authentication and gain access using these default credentials. The attack requires the attacker to be within the local network (e.g., same Wi-Fi network as the dash cam). The high complexity suggests that the attacker may need to perform additional steps, such as sniffing the SSID or brute-forcing, but the public disclosure indicates a known exploit path.
Vulnerable vs. Patched Code
No patch is available. The vulnerable firmware (up to 20250203) likely contains hardcoded default credentials in the SSID handling code. A patched version would require the vendor to implement a forced password change on first login or use unique per-device credentials.
Exploitation & Lab Setup
Red Team
Objective: Gain unauthorized access to the IROAD Dash Cam X5.
Prerequisites:
- IROAD Dash Cam X5 with firmware up to 20250203.
- Kali Linux or similar attack machine.
- Network access to the dash cam (same Wi-Fi or Ethernet segment).
Steps:
Identify the device: Scan the local network for the dash cam’s IP address.
nmap -sn 192.168.1.0/24Discover the SSID: Use a Wi-Fi scanner to find the dash cam’s SSID (often default like "IROAD_XXXX").
sudo airodump-ng wlan0Connect using default credentials: Attempt to connect to the device’s web interface or API using known default credentials (e.g., admin/admin, root/123456).
curl -u admin:admin http://192.168.1.100/configExploit: If successful, extract live video feed or download stored footage.
wget http://192.168.1.100/video_feed
Blue Team
Objective: Detect and prevent exploitation.
Detection:
- Monitor for multiple failed login attempts to the dash cam’s web interface.
- Alert on connections from unknown MAC addresses to the dash cam’s IP.
- Use network segmentation to isolate IoT devices.
Prevention:
- Change default credentials immediately upon device setup.
- Disable Wi-Fi Direct if not needed.
- Apply vendor firmware updates if available.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
- Network: Connections to the dash cam’s IP on ports 80/443 (web interface) or 554 (RTSP).
- Logs: Repeated authentication failures in device logs.
- File: Presence of default credential lists in attacker’s tools.
- Behavior: Unusual traffic patterns from the dash cam (e.g., large data transfers to an external IP).
Detection Engineering
YARA Rule
rule IROAD_Default_Credentials_Exploit {
meta:
description = "Detects exploit attempts against IROAD Dash Cam X5 default credentials"
author = "Valters IT"
date = "2025-02-20"
reference = "CVE-2025-2345"
strings:
$cred1 = "admin:admin" ascii wide nocase
$cred2 = "root:123456" ascii wide nocase
$cred3 = "user:password" ascii wide nocase
$http_get = "GET /config" ascii
$http_post = "POST /login" ascii
condition:
any of ($cred*) and any of ($http*)
}
Sigma Rule
title: IROAD Dash Cam Default Credential Login Attempt
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects login attempts using default credentials on IROAD Dash Cam X5
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-02-20
logsource:
category: webserver
product: apache
detection:
selection:
c-uri|contains:
- '/login'
- '/config'
cs-method: 'POST'
cs-user-agent|contains: 'curl'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate admin testing
level: high
Suricata Rule
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"IROAD Dash Cam Default Credential Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/login"; http_uri; content:"admin"; http_client_body; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
Remediation & Mitigation
Immediate Actions:
- Change default credentials: Access the dash cam’s web interface and set a strong, unique password.
- Disable Wi-Fi Direct: If not required, disable the SSID broadcast or Wi-Fi Direct feature.
- Network segmentation: Place the dash cam on a separate VLAN with restricted access.
Long-term:
- Vendor contact: Continue to pressure IROAD for a firmware patch.
- Monitor advisories: Watch for updates from IROAD or third-party security feeds.
- Consider replacement: If no patch is forthcoming, replace the device with a more secure alternative.
Valters IT
Securing Digital Frontiers