CVE-2025-2343

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-2343 is a critical vulnerability in IROAD Dash Cam X5 and X6 devices (up to firmware version 20250308). The issue lies in the Device Pairing component, which uses hard-coded credentials. An attacker with local network access can exploit this to gain unauthorized access to the device, potentially leading to full compromise of the dash cam and its data. The attack complexity is high, but the impact is severe due to the static credentials. No patch is available, and the vendor has not responded to disclosure attempts.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to any software package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It is a hardware/firmware issue in IROAD dash cams. However, the hard-coded credentials could be extracted from firmware updates or device dumps, posing a supply chain risk if the firmware is distributed through untrusted channels.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• Attack Vector (AV): Adjacent Network (AV:A) – Requires local network access.
• Attack Complexity (AC): High (AC:H) – Exploitation is difficult due to network proximity and potential mitigations.
• Privileges Required (PR): None (PR:N) – No prior authentication needed.
• User Interaction (UI): None (UI:N) – No user action required.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (S:U) – Exploit affects only the vulnerable component.
• Confidentiality (C): High (C:H) – Full access to device data.
• Integrity (I): High (I:H) – Ability to modify device settings or firmware.
• Availability (A): High (A:H) – Could render device inoperable.

CVSS Score: 7.5 (High) – Based on the vector above.

Threat Level: High – Despite high attack complexity, the lack of a patch and the presence of hard-coded credentials make this a significant risk for users on local networks.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is in the Device Pairing functionality of IROAD Dash Cam X5 and X6. The device uses hard-coded credentials for initial pairing or authentication, which are static across all units. An attacker on the same local network can:

1. Discover the device via network scanning (e.g., using Shodan dorks or local ARP scans).
2. Intercept or brute-force the pairing process using the known credentials.
3. Gain unauthorized access to the device’s web interface, API, or firmware update mechanism.

The hard-coded credentials are likely embedded in the firmware binary, which can be extracted via reverse engineering. Since the vendor has not responded, no official fix exists. The attack requires local network access, but once inside, the attacker can exfiltrate video footage, modify settings, or use the device as a pivot point.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):

// Example of hard-coded credentials in firmware
#define PAIRING_USER "admin"
#define PAIRING_PASS "IROAD1234"

int authenticate(char *user, char *pass) {
    if (strcmp(user, PAIRING_USER) == 0 && strcmp(pass, PAIRING_PASS) == 0) {
        return 1; // Success
    }
    return 0;
}

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

// Should use dynamic pairing with unique credentials per device
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>

char pairing_user[32];
char pairing_pass[64];

void generate_credentials() {
    srand(time(NULL));
    snprintf(pairing_user, sizeof(pairing_user), "user_%d", rand());
    snprintf(pairing_pass, sizeof(pairing_pass), "pass_%d_%d", rand(), rand());
}

Since no patch exists, the vulnerable code remains in all firmware versions up to 20250308.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Lab Setup:

• IROAD Dash Cam X5 or X6 (firmware <= 20250308)
• Attacker machine on same local network (e.g., Kali Linux)
• Network scanning tools (nmap, netdiscover)

Exploitation Steps:

1. Discover the device:

   nmap -sn 192.168.1.0/24
   

   Look for devices with open ports (e.g., 80, 443, 8080).

2. Identify the web interface:

   curl http://<device_ip>/
   

3. Attempt authentication with hard-coded credentials:

   curl -u admin:IROAD1234 http://<device_ip>/api/status
   

4. If successful, extract data or modify settings:

   curl -u admin:IROAD1234 http://<device_ip>/api/download_video
   

Note: The exact credentials are unknown but can be extracted from firmware dumps. This is a proof-of-concept; actual exploitation may require reverse engineering.

Blue Team

Detection:

• Monitor for repeated failed authentication attempts on dash cam web interfaces.
• Look for unusual network traffic to/from dash cam IPs on ports 80/443.
• Use network segmentation to isolate dash cams from critical systems.

Mitigation:

• Disable remote access to dash cams if not needed.
• Use VLANs to restrict device communication.
• Monitor for firmware updates from IROAD (though currently none).

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network: Unusual HTTP requests to dash cam IPs with basic authentication headers.
• File: Firmware dumps containing hard-coded strings like "admin" or "IROAD".
• Behavior: Multiple failed login attempts on dash cam web interface.
• Registry/Config: Changes to device settings (e.g., Wi-Fi credentials, recording schedules).

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule IROAD_Hardcoded_Credentials {
    meta:
        description = "Detects hard-coded credentials in IROAD Dash Cam firmware"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-03-09"
        reference = "CVE-2025-2343"
    strings:
        $cred1 = "admin" ascii wide nocase
        $cred2 = "IROAD" ascii wide nocase
        $cred3 = "pairing" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        all of ($cred*) and filesize < 10MB
}

Sigma Rule

title: IROAD Dash Cam Hardcoded Credential Exploitation
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to exploit hard-coded credentials on IROAD Dash Cams
author: Valters IT
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri|contains: '/api/'
        sc-status: 200
        cs-method: 'GET'
        cs-user-agent|contains: 'curl'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin access
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
    msg:"IROAD Dash Cam Hardcoded Credential Attempt";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"Authorization: Basic"; http_header;
    content:"admin"; http_client_body;
    sid:1000001;
    rev:1;
    reference:cve,2025-2343;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Isolate devices: Place dash cams on a separate VLAN with no internet access.
2. Disable remote pairing: If possible, disable the Device Pairing feature via device settings.
3. Monitor network: Use IDS/IPS rules (like the Suricata rule above) to detect exploitation attempts.

Long-Term:

• Vendor contact: Continue to pressure IROAD for a firmware update that removes hard-coded credentials.
• Replace devices: If no patch is forthcoming, consider replacing with more secure alternatives.
• Firmware analysis: Reverse engineer firmware to identify and remove hard-coded credentials (advanced).

Patch Status: No patch available. Users must rely on workarounds.

Valters IT
DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence