CVE-2025-25229

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-25229 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Omnissa Workspace ONE Unified Endpoint Management (UEM). A malicious actor with valid user privileges can exploit this flaw to make the server send crafted requests to internal systems, potentially enumerating internal network resources and accessing restricted internal information. The vulnerability carries a CVSS score of 5.4 (Medium), indicating a moderate risk primarily to confidentiality. No public proof-of-concept (PoC) code or patch details are currently available, but the attack vector is network-based and requires low complexity and low privileges.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to an open-source package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It affects a proprietary enterprise endpoint management platform. Supply chain risk is limited to the vendor's software distribution channels; no third-party package dependencies are implicated.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

• CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
• Base Score: 5.4 (Medium)
• Attack Vector (AV): Network – Exploitable remotely.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low – No special conditions required.
• Privileges Required (PR): Low – Attacker needs valid user credentials.
• User Interaction (UI): None – No victim action needed.
• Scope (S): Unchanged – Exploit does not cross trust boundaries.
• Confidentiality (C): Low – Limited information disclosure.
• Integrity (I): None – No data modification.
• Availability (A): None – No denial of service.

Threat Level: Medium. The requirement for authenticated access reduces the attack surface, but the potential to map internal networks and access sensitive internal services makes this a valuable reconnaissance tool for an insider or compromised account.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability resides in how Workspace ONE UEM handles user-supplied URLs or network paths. When a user with privileges submits a request that includes a URI (e.g., for fetching configuration, checking connectivity, or importing data), the application does not properly validate the target. An attacker can manipulate this input to point to internal IP addresses (e.g., http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ for cloud metadata, or http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin) or internal hostnames.

The SSRF occurs because the server-side code uses the user-supplied URL to make an HTTP request without restricting the destination. The response is then reflected back to the attacker, allowing them to read internal resources. This is a classic SSRF pattern (CWE-918).

Attack Flow:

1. Attacker authenticates to the Workspace ONE UEM console.
2. Attacker identifies a feature that accepts a URL (e.g., "Add Repository", "Test Connection", "Import from URL").
3. Attacker submits a request with a URL pointing to an internal resource (e.g., http://192.168.1.1/status).
4. The server fetches that URL and returns the content to the attacker.
5. Attacker iterates through internal IP ranges to map the network and discover services.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

No patch or specific code diff is available. However, the vulnerable pattern is typical:

Vulnerable (pseudocode):

def fetch_url(user_url):
    response = requests.get(user_url)  # No validation
    return response.text

Patched (pseudocode):

def fetch_url(user_url):
    parsed = urlparse(user_url)
    if parsed.hostname in ['127.0.0.1', 'localhost', '169.254.169.254', '0.0.0.0']:
        raise ValueError("Blocked internal address")
    if is_private_ip(parsed.hostname):
        raise ValueError("Blocked private IP range")
    response = requests.get(user_url)
    return response.text

The fix involves implementing an allowlist of permitted external domains or a denylist of internal IP ranges, and validating the URL before making the request.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Exploitation)

Prerequisites:

• Valid user credentials for Workspace ONE UEM.
• Network access to the UEM server.
• A feature that accepts a URL (e.g., "Add Repository" under Settings > System > Repositories).

Exploitation Steps:

1. Log in to the UEM console.
2. Navigate to a feature that accepts a URL input (e.g., System > Repositories > Add).
3. In the URL field, enter an internal target:

   http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
   

4. Submit the form. The server will fetch the cloud metadata and display it in the response.
5. To enumerate internal hosts, use a script to iterate through common private IP ranges:

   for ip in $(seq 1 254); do
       curl -X POST -d "url=http://192.168.1.$ip:8080" -b "session=valid_cookie" https://uem.target.com/api/test_connection
   done
   

Expected Outcome: The attacker gains visibility into internal network services, cloud metadata, and potentially sensitive configuration files.

Blue Team (Detection & Response)

Detection Steps:

1. Monitor for outbound HTTP requests from the UEM server to internal IP addresses (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local).
2. Alert on unusual URL parameters in UEM API calls, especially those containing IP addresses or hostnames.
3. Review logs for repeated requests to different internal IPs from the same user session (reconnaissance pattern).

Hunting Query (Splunk):

index=proxy sourcetype=web
| search dest_ip IN (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16)
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, user
| where count > 5

Response:

• Immediately revoke the compromised user session.
• Block outbound traffic from the UEM server to private IP ranges at the firewall.
• Apply vendor patch when available.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Network IOCs:
  • Outbound HTTP requests from UEM server to private IP ranges (10.x.x.x, 172.16-31.x.x, 192.168.x.x, 127.x.x.x, 169.254.x.x).
  • Repeated requests to cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254).
• Log IOCs:
  • UEM audit logs showing test_connection or add_repository actions with URLs containing IP addresses.
  • Web server logs with url parameter containing internal IPs.
• File IOCs:
  • Temporary files created by the server when fetching internal resources (e.g., /tmp/ssrf_*).

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_25229_SSRF_Detection {
    meta:
        description = "Detects SSRF attempts against internal IPs in UEM logs"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-25229"
    strings:
        $ip_pattern = /(https?:\/\/)(127\.|10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.|192\.168\.|169\.254\.)/
        $url_param = /[?&]url=http/
    condition:
        $url_param and $ip_pattern
}

Sigma Rule

title: CVE-2025-25229 SSRF Attempt Against Internal IPs
id: 8a9b3c4d-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f3a4b5c6d
status: experimental
description: Detects SSRF attempts in Workspace ONE UEM logs where URL parameter points to internal IP
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: web
    product: omnissa_workspace_one_uem
detection:
    selection:
        url|contains:
            - '127.0.0.1'
            - '10.'
            - '172.16.'
            - '172.17.'
            - '172.18.'
            - '172.19.'
            - '172.20.'
            - '172.21.'
            - '172.22.'
            - '172.23.'
            - '172.24.'
            - '172.25.'
            - '172.26.'
            - '172.27.'
            - '172.28.'
            - '172.29.'
            - '172.30.'
            - '172.31.'
            - '192.168.'
            - '169.254.'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate internal service checks (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
    msg:"CVE-2025-25229 SSRF Attempt - Internal IP in URL";
    flow:to_server,established;
    content:"url"; http_uri;
    pcre:"/(https?:\/\/)(127\.|10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.|192\.168\.|169\.254\.)/Ri";
    classtype:attempted-recon;
    sid:10000001;
    rev:1;
)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Network Segmentation: Restrict outbound HTTP/HTTPS traffic from the UEM server to only known external IPs. Block all traffic to private IP ranges at the firewall.
2. Web Application Firewall (WAF): Deploy WAF rules to block requests containing internal IP addresses in URL parameters.
3. Input Validation: If possible, implement a proxy or middleware that validates all outbound requests from the UEM server.

Long-Term Fix:

• Apply the official patch from Omnissa when released.
• Upgrade to a patched version of Workspace ONE UEM.
• Conduct a code review of all URL-handling functions to ensure proper allowlisting.

Workaround:

• Disable any features that accept user-supplied URLs (e.g., "Add Repository", "Test Connection") until a patch is available.
• Use a reverse proxy to intercept and validate all outbound requests.

Valters IT