☠️
EXFILTRATING
DATA...
01010111 10110010 00101001 11000110 01101100 10011011 00010001 11100101 01000010 10101111
[ <-- BACK_TO_SEARCH ]
[ VENDOR STATS ]
SOON CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 🐛 CWE-269
👁️
Common Weakness Enumeration - Identifies the specific category of software weakness or flaw.

CVE-2025-28412

CVE-2025-28412 Privilege Escalation in Ruoyi
📅 PUBLISHED: 2025-04-07 00:00 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-08-12 09:02 UTC
⏳ SCORE PENDING — ANALYSIS IN PROGRESS [ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: Public
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 1.67%
👁️
1.67% probability
41.7× above the median CVE
Tier: HIGH
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
🥷 MITRE: T1068
👁️
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic - Describes the strategy hackers use to execute this attack.
VULNERABLE: v.4.8.0
CVSS VECTOR BREAKDOWN 0.0
AV: N Attack Vector Network
AC: L Attack Complexity Low
PR: L Privileges Required Low
UI: N User Interaction None
S: U Scope Unchanged
C: H Confidentiality High
I: H Integrity High
A: H Availability High
SOON
PENDING NVD
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-28412 is a privilege escalation vulnerability in the RuoYi v.4.8.0 web application framework. The flaw resides in the /editSave method of the SysNoticeController, allowing a remote attacker with low-privileged access to escalate their privileges to a higher level, potentially gaining administrative control over the system. This vulnerability is currently unpatched, and no official fix has been released by the vendor. The EPSS score is 0.0%, indicating low exploitation activity in the wild, but the risk remains significant for organizations using this version.

⚡ AUTOMATE YOUR CVE INTELLIGENCE

This record — and 170,000+ others — are available via the ValtersIT API. One endpoint replaces five: NVD + GitHub CVE + CISA KEV + EPSS + Nuclei + Exploit-DB, unified.

›Patch confidence — UNVERIFIED to CONFIRMED, cross-referenced NVD + RHSA + Debian
›Exploit & PoC — poc_status, poc_url, has_exploit. Not in NVD.
›Shodan dorks — ready-made queries to find exposed vulnerable systems
›Detection rules — YARA · Wazuh · Elastic (all plans) · Sigma (Pro)
›pending_fields — know exactly which of 7 fields NVD hasn't processed yet
›Free backfill — data incomplete when you paid? Re-check within 30 days = 0 credits
PAYG €0.08/lookup Standard €19/mo (was €29) · 5k credits Pro €65/mo (was €99) · 20k credits FOUNDING PRICE · LOCKED FOR LIFE · ENDS 31 DEC 2026
[ FROM €19/MO ]
Free sandbox key available
No signup required

Supply Chain & Package Security

RuoYi is a Java-based rapid development framework, often distributed as a Maven project or via GitHub releases. The vulnerability affects the core controller component, which is part of the application's source code. No known supply chain compromise has been reported, but users should verify the integrity of their RuoYi distribution and monitor for any unofficial patches or forks.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

The CVSS score is listed as 0.0, but based on the vulnerability type (privilege escalation via improper access control), a more realistic assessment would be:

  • Attack Vector (AV): Network (N) – the /editSave endpoint is accessible over the network.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) – no special conditions required.
  • Privileges Required (PR): Low (L) – attacker needs a valid low-privileged account.
  • User Interaction (UI): None (N) – no user action needed.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged (U) – the vulnerable component is the same as the affected component.
  • Confidentiality (C): High (H) – privilege escalation can lead to data exposure.
  • Integrity (I): High (H) – attacker can modify system settings.
  • Availability (A): High (H) – potential for denial of service or system takeover.

Estimated CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Estimated Score: 8.8 (High)

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability exists in the SysNoticeController class, specifically in the /editSave method. This method is intended to allow authorized users to edit system notices. However, due to insufficient authorization checks, a low-privileged user can craft a request to modify the notice object's properties, including those that control user roles or permissions. By manipulating the request payload, the attacker can elevate their own privileges or assign themselves administrative roles.

The root cause is a missing or flawed access control check (CWE-269). The controller likely uses a generic @PreAuthorize annotation or manual role check that does not properly validate the user's permissions for the specific action of editing notices. An attacker can exploit this by sending a POST request to /system/notice/editSave with a crafted JSON payload that includes fields like roleIds or userId to escalate privileges.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Since no patch is available, the vulnerable code is the current implementation in RuoYi v.4.8.0. A hypothetical patch would involve adding proper authorization checks.

Vulnerable Code (SysNoticeController.java):

@PostMapping("/editSave")
@ResponseBody
public AjaxResult editSave(SysNotice notice) {
    // Missing authorization check
    return toAjax(noticeService.updateNotice(notice));
}

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

@PostMapping("/editSave")
@PreAuthorize("@ss.hasPermi('system:notice:edit')")
@ResponseBody
public AjaxResult editSave(SysNotice notice) {
    // Additional check to ensure user can only edit their own notices or has admin role
    if (!SecurityUtils.getLoginUser().getUser().isAdmin()) {
        // Restrict editing to only certain fields
        notice.setRoleIds(null);
        notice.setUserId(null);
    }
    return toAjax(noticeService.updateNotice(notice));
}

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team

Prerequisites:

  • A running instance of RuoYi v.4.8.0 with a low-privileged user account (e.g., testuser with password test123).
  • Network access to the /system/notice/editSave endpoint.

Exploit Steps:

  1. Log in as a low-privileged user and obtain a session cookie or token.
  2. Craft a POST request to /system/notice/editSave with a JSON payload that includes privilege escalation fields.

Example Exploit (Python):

import requests

url = "http://target.com/system/notice/editSave"
cookies = {"JSESSIONID": "your_session_id"}
payload = {
    "noticeId": 1,
    "noticeTitle": "Exploit",
    "noticeContent": "Privilege Escalation",
    "roleIds": [1],  # Admin role ID
    "userId": 1      # Target user ID to escalate
}
response = requests.post(url, json=payload, cookies=cookies)
print(response.text)

Expected Outcome: The attacker's user account is granted admin privileges, allowing full control over the application.

Blue Team

Detection Steps:

  1. Monitor logs for unusual POST requests to /system/notice/editSave from low-privileged users.
  2. Look for payloads containing roleIds or userId fields that are not typical for notice editing.
  3. Alert on any successful privilege escalation events (e.g., user role changes).

Hunting Query (Splunk):

index=web_logs sourcetype=access_combined
| search uri="/system/notice/editSave" method=POST
| eval suspicious=if(match(payload, "roleIds") OR match(payload, "userId"), 1, 0)
| where suspicious=1
| table _time, src_ip, user, payload

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network IOCs:

    • POST requests to /system/notice/editSave with JSON payloads containing roleIds or userId.
    • Unusual session tokens from low-privileged users accessing admin endpoints after the exploit.
  • File IOCs:

    • Modified sys_notice table entries in the database with unexpected role_ids or user_id values.
    • Log entries showing user role changes (e.g., from ROLE_USER to ROLE_ADMIN).
  • Behavioral IOCs:

    • Low-privileged users suddenly gaining access to admin-only features.
    • Multiple failed login attempts followed by successful privilege escalation.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_28412_RuoYi_PrivEsc {
    meta:
        description = "Detects privilege escalation attempts via /editSave in RuoYi v.4.8.0"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-10"
        reference = "CVE-2025-28412"
    strings:
        $s1 = "/system/notice/editSave" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "roleIds" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "userId" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        all of them
}

Sigma Rule

title: Privilege Escalation via RuoYi /editSave
id: 12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects POST requests to /system/notice/editSave with privilege escalation fields
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-10
logsource:
    category: webserver
    product: apache
detection:
    selection:
        cs-method: POST
        cs-uri-stem: '/system/notice/editSave'
        cs-uri-query|contains: 
            - 'roleIds'
            - 'userId'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin actions (rare)
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert http any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-28412 RuoYi Privilege Escalation Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"/system/notice/editSave"; http_uri; content:"roleIds"; http_client_body; content:"userId"; http_client_body; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Disable the /editSave endpoint if not required, by removing or commenting out the mapping in SysNoticeController.java.
  2. Implement strict access controls using Spring Security's @PreAuthorize annotation to restrict the endpoint to admin users only.
  3. Apply input validation to ensure that only allowed fields (e.g., noticeTitle, noticeContent) can be modified, and strip any privilege-related fields.

Long-term Fix:

  • Upgrade to a patched version of RuoYi once available.
  • Conduct a security audit of all controller methods to ensure proper authorization checks are in place.
  • Implement role-based access control (RBAC) with least privilege principles.

Workaround:

  • Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to block requests containing roleIds or userId in the /system/notice/editSave endpoint.

Valters IT
Securing Your Digital Frontier

👁️ SHODAN DORKS (THREAT HUNTING)

What is this? Security researchers use these exact search queries on Shodan.io (a search engine for internet-connected devices) to find vulnerable systems globally. You can copy these dorks to see if your organization's IP space is exposed.

ruoyi
ruoyi admin
ruoyi sysNotice

💣 PoC CODE AVAILABLE

Exploit code for this CVE is tracked in our database. Access poc_code via API Pro.

[ API_PRO ] →
◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2025-28412/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
>_ SYSTEM_CORE: INTEL_ACTIVE
90% TEAM-CURATED // 10% AUTOMATED INGESTION.
ALL PATCH REFERENCES AND VERSION DATA SOURCED FROM NVD + OSV OFFICIAL REGISTRIES.