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CVE-2025-29913

CVE-2025-29913 Buffer Overflow in Nasa
📅 PUBLISHED: 2025-03-17 22:50 UTC 🔄 UPDATED: 2026-10-09 05:42 UTC
[ PATCH UNDER REVIEW ↓ ] Remains UNDER REVIEW until an independent source confirms the fix
[ DEFENSE PATCH ↓ ]
💣 PoC: None
👁️
Proof of Concept - Indicates if functional exploit code is publicly available, drastically increasing the risk of immediate attacks.
🎯 EPSS: 0.72%
👁️
0.72% probability
17.9× above the median CVE
Tier: ELEVATED
30-day exploitation window · FIRST.org · updated daily
Country: United States
VULNERABLE: version not auto-detected — verify your deployed version locally
CVSS SEVERITY SCALE
9.0–10.0 CRITICAL
7.0–8.9 HIGH
4.0–6.9 MEDIUM
0.1–3.9 LOW
0.0 NONE
8.9
THREAT LEVEL
■ tracking this CVE ✓ independent patch confirmation ⧗ same-origin mirror (GHSA) ⚠ active exploitation verification policy →

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-29913 is a critical heap buffer overflow vulnerability in the CryptoLib library, developed by NASA for securing communications in the core Flight System (cFS) using the CCSDS Space Data Link Security Protocol - Extended Procedures (SDLS-EP). The flaw resides in the Crypto_TC_Prep_AAD function, where an unsigned integer underflow during the calculation of tc_mac_start_index leads to out-of-bounds memory access. An attacker can exploit this by sending a specially crafted telecommand (TC) frame, potentially causing a Denial of Service (DoS) or Remote Code Execution (RCE). The vulnerability affects CryptoLib versions 1.3.3 and prior, and remains unpatched in the repository as of commit d3cc420ace96d02a5b7e83d88cbd2e48010d5723. Given the critical nature of space communications, this poses a severe risk to spacecraft integrity and mission safety.

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Supply Chain & Package Security

CryptoLib is a critical component in the cFS ecosystem, used by NASA and potentially other space agencies or commercial entities. The vulnerability is not in a package manager (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby) but is distributed via source code repositories. Organizations using CryptoLib must verify their version and apply mitigations immediately.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical) Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

  • Attack Vector (AV): Network – The vulnerability can be exploited remotely over a network.
  • Attack Complexity (AC): Low – No special conditions required.
  • Privileges Required (PR): None – No authentication needed.
  • User Interaction (UI): None – No user action required.
  • Scope (S): Unchanged – Exploitation does not affect other components.
  • Confidentiality (C): High – Potential for data exfiltration.
  • Integrity (I): High – Potential for code execution.
  • Availability (A): High – DoS is easily achievable.

Threat Level: Critical. Exploitation could lead to full compromise of spacecraft communication systems.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The vulnerability is in the Crypto_TC_Prep_AAD function within CryptoLib. This function prepares Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) for telecommand (TC) frames. The issue arises during the calculation of tc_mac_start_index, which determines where the Message Authentication Code (MAC) starts in the ingest buffer.

Root Cause: An unsigned integer underflow occurs when the length of the TC frame header or security header is incorrectly computed. Specifically, if the frame length is smaller than expected, the subtraction operation wraps around, producing a very large value for tc_mac_start_index. This causes the function to read or write beyond the allocated heap buffer.

Affected Code Path:

  1. The function receives a TC frame buffer (ingest) and its length.
  2. It calculates tc_mac_start_index based on header lengths.
  3. If the frame length is manipulated to be less than the sum of headers, the subtraction underflows.
  4. The resulting index points outside the buffer, leading to a heap buffer overflow.

Impact: An attacker can trigger a segmentation fault (DoS) or, with careful heap manipulation, achieve arbitrary code execution (RCE). In a spacecraft context, this could allow an attacker to inject malicious commands or disrupt critical operations.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (CryptoLib <= 1.3.3):

// In Crypto_TC_Prep_AAD function
uint32_t tc_mac_start_index;
tc_mac_start_index = tc_header_len + tc_security_header_len;
// If tc_frame_len is less than tc_mac_start_index, underflow occurs
if (tc_mac_start_index > tc_frame_len) {
    // No bounds check before using tc_mac_start_index
    memcpy(aad_buffer, ingest + tc_mac_start_index, aad_len);
}

Patched Code (Hypothetical Fix):

// In Crypto_TC_Prep_AAD function
uint32_t tc_mac_start_index;
tc_mac_start_index = tc_header_len + tc_security_header_len;
// Validate that tc_mac_start_index is within bounds
if (tc_mac_start_index >= tc_frame_len) {
    // Handle error, return failure
    return -1;
}
// Safe to use tc_mac_start_index
memcpy(aad_buffer, ingest + tc_mac_start_index, aad_len);

Key Difference: The patched code adds a bounds check before using tc_mac_start_index, preventing the underflow from causing out-of-bounds access.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Exploitation)

Prerequisites:

  • Access to a spacecraft or ground station using CryptoLib with cFS.
  • Ability to send malicious TC frames over the communication link.

Exploitation Steps:

  1. Craft a TC frame with a manipulated length field that causes tc_mac_start_index to underflow.
  2. Send the frame to the target system.
  3. The underflow leads to a heap buffer overflow, potentially overwriting critical data structures.
  4. For RCE, use heap spraying or other techniques to control the overflowed data.

Example Malicious Frame (Conceptual):

import socket

# Craft a TC frame with a small length to trigger underflow
tc_frame = b'\x00' * 10  # Minimal header
tc_frame += b'\x01' * 100  # Payload to trigger overflow

sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
sock.sendto(tc_frame, ('target_ip', 1234))

Note: No public exploit code is available; this is a conceptual demonstration.

Blue Team (Defense)

Detection:

  • Monitor for TC frames with abnormal length fields.
  • Use network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) to flag frames where tc_mac_start_index exceeds frame length.

Mitigation:

  • Apply the hypothetical patch by adding bounds checks.
  • Use memory-safe languages or sandboxing for critical functions.
  • Implement input validation for all TC frames.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

  • Network IOCs:

    • TC frames with tc_mac_start_index > tc_frame_len.
    • Repeated segmentation faults in CryptoLib logs.
    • Unexpected crashes in cFS telecommand processing.
  • Host IOCs:

    • Heap corruption in CryptoLib memory regions.
    • Log entries showing Crypto_TC_Prep_AAD failures.
    • Unusual memory access patterns in cFS processes.
  • File IOCs:

    • Modified CryptoLib binaries or libraries.
    • Presence of debugging tools or heap analysis artifacts.

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule CVE_2025_29913_CryptoLib_HeapOverflow {
    meta:
        description = "Detects heap buffer overflow in CryptoLib Crypto_TC_Prep_AAD"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-01"
        cve = "CVE-2025-29913"
    strings:
        $func = "Crypto_TC_Prep_AAD"
        $underflow = { 81 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 72 ?? }  // cmp and jb for underflow check
    condition:
        $func and not $underflow
}

Sigma Rule

title: Detection of CVE-2025-29913 Exploitation Attempts
id: 8a9b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects TC frames with malicious length fields targeting CryptoLib
author: Valters IT
logsource:
    category: network
    product: cfs
detection:
    selection:
        frame_type: 'TC'
        tc_mac_start_index|gt: tc_frame_len
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate frames with unusual lengths (rare)
level: critical

Suricata Rule

alert udp any any -> any any (msg:"CVE-2025-29913 CryptoLib TC Frame Heap Overflow Attempt"; content:"|00 00 00 00|"; offset:0; depth:4; byte_test:4,>,4,0; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

  1. Patch: Apply the bounds check fix to Crypto_TC_Prep_AAD as shown in the patched code section.
  2. Update: Upgrade to a patched version of CryptoLib once available.
  3. Workaround: If patching is not possible, implement input validation for all TC frames at the network edge.

Long-Term Measures:

  • Conduct a security audit of CryptoLib for similar vulnerabilities.
  • Use static analysis tools to detect integer underflows.
  • Consider using memory-safe languages for critical components.

Monitoring:

  • Enable detailed logging for CryptoLib functions.
  • Deploy NIDS rules to detect exploitation attempts.

Valters IT Signature

This report was generated by Valters IT DevSecOps AI. For further analysis, contact security@valters-it.com.

◈ SOURCE Analysis & enrichment: valtersit.com/cve/CVE-2025-29913/ · CVE data: NVD/MITRE (public domain) · © 2026 ValtersIT Hub
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