CVE-2025-30106

Executive Summary

CVE-2025-30106 exposes a critical security flaw in IROAD v9 dashcam devices. The device ships with hardcoded default Wi-Fi credentials (qwertyuiop) that cannot be changed by the end user. This allows any attacker within Wi-Fi range to connect to the dashcam’s network and perform passive network sniffing, potentially capturing unencrypted traffic, video streams, or other sensitive data transmitted over the local network.

The vulnerability is classified as CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials. The CVSS v3.1 base score is 7.5 (High) due to low attack complexity, no privileges required, and high confidentiality impact. No patch is currently available from the vendor.

Supply Chain & Package Security

This vulnerability is not related to any software package registry (NPM, PyPI, Go, Ruby). It is a hardware/firmware issue in IROAD dashcam devices. Supply chain risk is limited to the physical device and its embedded firmware.

CVSS Breakdown & Threat Level

Threat Level: High. The attack surface is limited to physical proximity (Wi-Fi range), but the exploit is trivial and requires no authentication.

Deep Dive & Mechanics

The IROAD v9 dashcam creates a Wi-Fi access point (AP) for initial setup and live viewing. The default SSID and password are hardcoded in the firmware and cannot be modified through the device’s user interface or mobile app. The password qwertyuiop is a simple keyboard sequence, making it easily guessable.

Attack Flow:

1. Attacker scans for Wi-Fi networks with SSIDs matching IROAD dashcam patterns (e.g., IROAD-XXXX).
2. Attacker connects using the known default password qwertyuiop.
3. Once connected, the attacker can sniff all traffic on the dashcam’s local network, including:
   • Unencrypted video streams (if not encrypted)
   • Device configuration data
   • Any other traffic from connected clients (e.g., phones, laptops)
4. The attacker may also attempt to access the dashcam’s web interface or API using the same credentials.

Root Cause: The firmware does not provide a mechanism to change the Wi-Fi password. The hardcoded credential is stored in plaintext in the firmware image.

Vulnerable vs. Patched Code

Vulnerable Code (Firmware):

// Example pseudocode from IROAD v9 firmware
#define WIFI_SSID "IROAD-XXXX"
#define WIFI_PASSWORD "qwertyuiop"

void init_wifi_ap() {
    wifi_softap_set_config(&ap_config);
    ap_config.ssid = WIFI_SSID;
    ap_config.password = WIFI_PASSWORD;
    ap_config.authmode = WIFI_AUTH_WPA2_PSK;
}

Patched Code (Hypothetical):

// Patched firmware would allow user configuration
char wifi_password[64];
void init_wifi_ap() {
    if (user_has_set_password()) {
        strcpy(wifi_password, get_user_password());
    } else {
        // Generate random password or force user to set one
        generate_random_password(wifi_password, 16);
    }
    ap_config.password = wifi_password;
}

No official patch is available. The vendor has not released a firmware update addressing this issue.

Exploitation & Lab Setup

Red Team (Attacker)

Prerequisites:

• A device with Wi-Fi capability (laptop, Raspberry Pi, smartphone)
• Kali Linux or similar penetration testing distribution
• Tools: aircrack-ng, wireshark, tcpdump

Step-by-Step Exploitation:

1. Scan for IROAD dashcam networks:

   sudo iw dev wlan0 scan | grep -E "SSID|IROAD"
   

2. Connect to the dashcam using default credentials:

   sudo nmcli device wifi connect "IROAD-XXXX" password "qwertyuiop"
   

3. Start packet capture:

   sudo tcpdump -i wlan0 -w dashcam_capture.pcap
   

4. Analyze captured traffic:

   wireshark dashcam_capture.pcap
   

Expected Results: The attacker can see all unencrypted traffic, including video streams, device configuration, and potentially credentials for other services.

Blue Team (Defender)

Detection & Response:

1. Monitor for unauthorized Wi-Fi connections:

   • Use a Wi-Fi intrusion detection system (WIDS) to alert on new devices connecting to the dashcam network.
   • Check DHCP logs for unknown MAC addresses.

2. Network segmentation:

   • Place dashcams on a separate VLAN with strict firewall rules.
   • Disable the dashcam’s Wi-Fi AP if not needed.

3. Firmware integrity checks:

   • Regularly verify firmware hash against known good values.
   • Monitor for unexpected changes in device behavior.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Detection Engineering

YARA Rule

rule IROAD_Hardcoded_Credentials {
    meta:
        description = "Detects hardcoded default credentials in IROAD v9 firmware"
        author = "Valters IT"
        date = "2025-04-01"
        reference = "CVE-2025-30106"
    strings:
        $password = "qwertyuiop"
        $ssid_pattern = /IROAD-[A-Z0-9]{4}/
    condition:
        $password and $ssid_pattern
}

Sigma Rule

title: IROAD Dashcam Default Credential Usage
id: 7a8b9c0d-1e2f-3a4b-5c6d-7e8f9a0b1c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects network connections using IROAD default Wi-Fi password
author: Valters IT
date: 2025-04-01
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationPort: 554
        DestinationIp: 192.168.1.1
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate IROAD dashcam users
level: high

Suricata Rule

alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> 192.168.1.1 554 (msg:"IROAD Dashcam RTSP Stream Access"; flow:to_server; content:"DESCRIBE"; nocase; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

Remediation & Mitigation

Immediate Actions:

1. Disable Wi-Fi AP: If the dashcam’s Wi-Fi is not required, disable it via the device settings or physically disconnect the antenna.
2. Network Segmentation: Place the dashcam on a separate VLAN with no access to critical systems.
3. Monitor Network: Use the provided detection rules to identify unauthorized access.

Long-Term Fix:

• Vendor Patch: Contact IROAD support and request a firmware update that allows password changes.
• Device Replacement: If no patch is available, consider replacing the dashcam with a model that supports secure credential management.

Workaround:

• Use a separate Wi-Fi router with MAC filtering to restrict which devices can connect to the dashcam network.

Valters IT
Senior DevSecOps & Cyber Threat Intelligence Analyst
Report generated for CVE-2025-30106